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Summary 
This thesis is about the relationship between ethics 
and language in the work of the contemporary French 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. The approach taken is to 
place his work in the context of a current debate in 
philosophy about the limits of language and the end(s) 
of philosophy. In the first chapter it looks at the 
place and significance of the thinking of Hegel, 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Derrida in this debate, and 
locates Levinas' thinking within it by examining his 
reading of Descartes. The thesis then goes on to 
examine the major themes in Levinas' work and offers an 
interpretation of his claims for the "primacy" of the 
ethics which demonstrates their bearing on the 
traditional concern with the relationship between 
metaphysics and the other. The thesis makes special 
reference throughout to Jacques Derrida's first major 
essay on Levinas, "Violence and Metaphysics". 
The thesis demonstrates the sense in which in Levinas 
"ethics" is the 'enactment' of the philosophical 
concern with the other. It explores in detail the 
overlap between this concern with the other in 
philsophy and the relationship to the other person, in 
Levinas' thinking. This is undertaken, in this thesis, 
in the form of a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between the key notions of the face to face and the 
third party as is found in his first major work 
Totality and Infinity. The analysis is then extended to 
the later work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. 
In this context, the thesis demonstrates how the beyond 
being is held to signify within philosophy, by 
inspiring philosophy with the thought of the other. The 
thesis as a whole considers how, in Levinas, the beyond 
being and the relation to the other are antecedent to 
their thematic representation in philosophy. It 
examines how the necessity of their representation is 
related, in Levinas, to a certain injustice vis a vis 
the other person. 
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CHAPTER UN. E 
THE M Uff, T API.. IG ITY OF ENDS 
Ix troductic n 
The difference between the me and the non-me, like 
embodiment, precedes any reflection on the nature of 
identity and difference. The unity of Being is not 
given to thought. 'Thinking is, rather, given as the 
restoration of the unity of Being; as the resolute 
assumption of this task. Philosophy is then reflection 
on and the generation of the manifold relations 
between the me and the non-me; the same and the other. 
Everything is in sight including the relationality by 
which what is in sight is made intelligible - the unity 
of Being is thus preserved in its being permitted to 
assert itself. The other stands in some relation to the 
same, always presented either in its being other than 
myself, as for-me or mine. The relation might be 
understood to be empirical, dialectical, historical, 
sociological, etc. In each case it is a relation of 
knowing this other, such that it might be said that I 
am a knowing of this other. In Hegel the moment of 
self-knowledge is inseparable from my knowing of the 
other in its otherness. Does this thought imply the 
reduction of the truly other to the same? Or in 
Descartes, for example, does the identification of 
knowing and being in the cogito indicate the 
reunification of the me and the non-me in the same? If 
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the answer to these questions is yes and if, in 
addition, this suppression of the absolutely other is a 
characteristic trait of the metaphysics of Being, then 
it is despite all this that the thought of the 
absolutely other returns to haunt philosophy and 
challenge the autonomy of Being. The thought of the 
absolutely other, the Other, dispelled by the first 
thought as a naivety, returns and challenges the 
autonomy of Being asserted in themes seeking to exclude 
the Other, by dismissing it as pre-philosophical. The 
Other is suppressed at the outset in being presented as 
the object of thematic thought, be that thought in the 
form of idealism, realism or whatever. 
The philosophy since Hegel which has grasped the 
necessity of seeking a passage between the two extremes 
of idealism and realism, has most notably been 
undertaken in the form of phenomenology. Phenomenology 
is also a transcending of the subject/object 
distinction, around which the whole of conceptuality is 
structured. It has sought, in various ways, to 
transcend the difference between the self and the 
other on the basis of some form of reduction. This 
reduction is not merely of the identity of the subject, 
but also its very subjectivity. Heidegger, for 
instance, reduces the subject to the mere jam,, of fin, 
when he says Dasein, and relegates the self/other 
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distinction to the realm of the ontic, demonstrating 
how the everyday experience of the world is determined 
by it. But are not the parameters for this passage 
between idealism and realism conceived entirely within 
a thinking that has always already dispelled the 
thought of the absolutely other? The passage sought 
between idealism and realism may be taken, on this 
model, to escape the extremism of thinking Being as 
subject or object, but does it not, at the same time, 
remain closed to the Other? Heidegger's thinking in 
fact exposes this danger for the first time, on the 
basis of the ontological difference. The question then 
becomes one as to whether the reduction of subjectivity 
in terms of this difference, despite it certainly not 
being the same difference as that which differentiates 
idealism from realism, itself represents the recurrence 
1.1 of the doctrine of the unity of Being. Does Heidegger's 
thinking represent the most profound demonstration of 
the internal workings of a totality and little beyond 
that, as the contemporary French thinker, Emmanuel 
Levinas, suggests, and can the thinking of the 
ontological difference be encompassed within ethical 
metaphysics? 
This thesis explores Levinas' work in the context of 
these questions. It locates it within a tradition of 
thinking concerned with the end of philosophy and 
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examines in detail key points in his major work 
Totality and Infinity and later developments in his 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, in which his 
claims for the "primacy" of "ethics" are most powerful, 
provoking and questionable. The first chapter of this 
essay provides the reader with the philosophical 
context of the reading of Levinas offered in the essay 
as a whole. It presents a synopsis of the thinking of 
the end of philosophy in Heidegger, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
along with an account of the incisive and critical 
gathering of these various theses in the work of 
another contemporary French thinker, Jacques Derrida. 
Levinas' general thesis of the primacy of ethics having 
been introduced at the end of this first chapter, in 
terms of his reading of Descartes, Chapter 2 is 
interested in his relation to phenomenology in general 
and explains his retention of the "phenomenological 
method" in view of his rejection of Husserl' s 
understanding of the method's significance. The chapter 
pinpoints the resurrection of the subject in Levinas' 
metaphysics, against its "dissolution", in post-Hegelian 
ontologies, as the crucial move in developing a notion 
of the same. This notion of the same, as is made clear 
later on, facilitates a thinking of the other otherwise 
than it is thought by the tradition. This new way of 
thinking (it) is allegedly one which breaks (with) the 
unity of Being. At this stage this shift is presented 
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as a move away f rom the thinking of the subject, or 
the ego, in terms of its identity in favour of its 
"substantivity". In this chapter the "ethical" 
significance of this is provisionally explored. 
Chapters 3 and 4 draw extensively on Derrida's reading 
of Levinas given in his essay "Violence and 
Metaphysics". Chapter 3 demonstrates the manner in 
which Levinas' discourse represents a transgression of 
metaphysics from within and exhibits a profound sense 
of the necessity by which philosophy occurs as 
ontological metaphysics. Chapter 4 shows this as it is 
seen to be at work in various parts of Levinas' two 
major works. Chapter 4 is therefore the centrepiece of 
the thesis because it deals closely with the point in 
TI at which the ethical relation is confronted with the 
necessity of its own being; its being as a social 
phenomenon, in the form of third relations. If it is 
the case that the Levinasian text is 'recaptured' by 
metaphysics, then it is at this point that most can be 
learnt from his work about the nature and necessity of 
this recapture. For this opening, which the ethical 
relation is claimed to signify, to be genuine, on the 
other hand, then the thought requires the otherwise 
than being (to [be] precisely that and not merely to be 
otherwise). This is certainly a point at which the 
Levinasian text demands much of 'us'; demands our 
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thinking otherwise (than) to accomodate the thought 
philosophically. 
Chapter 5 deals with Levinas' expression of the way of 
the opening or breach of ontological metaphysics is 
accomplished, referring to his presentation of this in 
the later work, OTB, as a reduction in reverse - the 
reverse movement he refers to as the "unsaying of the 
said". This final chapter gives the sense in which 
Levinas' work is a strikingly original theory about the 
relationship between ethics and language and 
establishes a post-Heideggerian framework for a new 
reading of the tradition. Finally, Chapter 5 presents 
an interpretation of the opening... of metaphysics we 
encounter in Levinas in terms of what it claims to be 
'positively'. It is found that the anarchical past 
stated and approached within philosophy, and whose 
authenticity Levinas' claims for the ethical both 
require and insist upon, is not something . mysterious; 
the mystery of something absent; something always 
already past: To be in the trace of the Other in 
Levinas is not to arrive on the scene too late, because 
the movement of opening he presents is the passage 
into the time of the Other. In Levinas, human life is 
not characterized as being too late for the beginning 
and too mortal to wait for the end of history and time: 
"To live an eternal life is to be able to judge history 
6 
without waiting for its end. " Does Levinas' thinking 
give us a sense of the relation to the Other which 
escapes the infinite regression of thinking caught 
between sense and nonsense? This thesis is intended as 
a contribution to the understanding of this question. 
'7 
The Multiplicity cf Endue 
Every philosopher at some stage in his thinking comes 
to reflect on the end to which his thinking is 
directed. In different times, in different traditions 
this reflection has manifested itself in different 
ways; either implicitly or explicity, in the form of a 
question or of an assumption, as eschatology, as 
teleology. That the notion of the end of philosophy has 
in various forms always been a matter of interest for 
philosophy suggests not only that it has a history in 
philosophy, but is part of its essential fabric. For 
this reason no history of philosophy could ever 
seriously consider itself to be independent of a 
philosophy of history. Accordingly philosophy must 
acknowledge to itself the indeterminate nature, or 
perhaps the interpretative status, of all the 
representations it makes to itself of its own relation 
to the end of philosophy; it must recognise its own 
essential role as participant in this drama rather than 
mere spectator. 
That the notion of the end of philosopy has a history 
which can be traced, is not itself a ground upon which 
to choose to look at any particular philosophy or text. 
However, the thinkers toward whom this thesis directs 
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its attention in what follows immediately, and 
throughout, are thinkers for whom the end of 
philosophy is understood to be related to the very 
movement of history in a most significant way. Despite 
this island of common ground shared by these thinkers, 
there is an ocean of difference which separates the 
thinking of Hegel, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Derrida and 
Levinas. These differences are in turn reflected in the 
manifold senses of the end which emerge in their theses 
and which we shall represent in this first chapter. We 
shall demonstrate the way in which the end of 
philosophy is encountered in each without raising 
issues of comparative assessment. As will become clear 
in the course of this thesis, a straightforward 
comparative critique would itself involve the 
presupposition of a certain concept of the end and 
adopting such a style would therefore be inconsistent 
with what the thesis goes on to discuss. In the course 
of the critical exposition presented here we shall see 
what kind of issues lie at the heart of discourse in so 
far as it makes a meditation on the 'absolutely other' 
the key to thinking end of philosophy. 
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Hegel 
In Hegel the telos of philosophy is conceived in terms 
of the 'completion' (Vollendung) of metaphysics. In U 
Phenomenology of Spirit this is understood as the 
historical becoming (Geschicte) of the absolute. This 
notion is to be distinguished from that of a history 
(Historie) of intellectual development, or any simple 
chron©Logy of events. This is best achieved by 
considering the manner in which the Absolute is said to 
be "with us" at each stage of our thinking as it moves 
toward absolute knowing. The following sketch of 
Hegel's thinking of the end of philosophy shows the 
sense in which it is an aspect of each 'shape' of 
consciousness. It also serves to introduce the notion 
of the reversal of consciousness as it is to be found 
in Hegel. 
Hegel thought that the philosophical thinking of his 
day had become alienated from itself and was 
directionless. It took its end and fundamental concern 
to be the satisfactory resolution of the 
epistemological problems associated with cognition. 
After Descartes knowledge and certainty appeared to be 
the natural concerns of philosophy rather than the 
phenomenon of knowing. Indeed, in Kant the centrality 
of these concerns for philosophy is confirmed by making 
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them an aspect of reason itself. According to Hegel, 
however, cognition is thus made "the instrument.. or 
the medium through which one discovers" the Absolute 
(PS 973). 
Hegel attempts to show that the interminability of the 
problems that such thinking raises for itself, are the 
result of certain assumptions unquestioningly adopted 
at the outset. Thought "takes for granted certain ideas 
about cognition as an instrument and as a medium and 
assumes that there is a difference between ourselves 
and this cognition. " (ibid). Such thinking thus posits 
the truth of cognition and in the same move renders 
this truth radically inaccessible (in itself). Hegel's 
remarks on the role of cognition are not offered as 
critical analysis, nor for that matter do they seek to 
reject critical metaphysics: on the contrary, Hegel is 
the first thinker to attempt to philosophize without 
choosing between these two alternatives and in doing so 
to write a history of philosophy in which critique is 
based on something more fundamental. By means of 
descriptive phenomenology alone Hegel presents an 
account of critical consciousness as the result of an 
entire process of self-formation. This consciousness 
remains opaque to itself, it is ignorant. Ignorant not, 
however, in the sense of not knowing something which in 
principle is not accessible to it, but ignorant in the 
11 
more profound sense of the limitation which is 
intrinsic to the system by which it develops itself. 
This system is limited by its conception of truth as 
certainty. Hegel proposes the existence of a higher or 
more fundamental order of self-reflection to which he 
gives the name "phenomenological experience". 
Phenomenological experience reveals critical 
consciousness to be a mere stage in the development of 
Spirit. 
Hegel's starting point could be described as Cartesian, 
but his way follows a path of reflection upon 
subjective experience rather than radical doubt and the 
search for the certainty of objective existents. The 
first significant discovery of this meditation is that 
consciousness of something is always accompanied by the 
consciouness of being conscious of that object. 
Consciousness thus distinguishes between its object and 
its own relatedness to its object, and it does so in 
the same moment. It was the failure to grasp this 
simple fact about consciousness, namely that this 
distinction occurs entirely within consciousness, which 
prompted philosophers coming before Hegel to think 
truth and falsity in terms of the non-correspondence of 
being in itself and being for itself. With this strict 
antithesis, philosophy inflicted on itself the "fear of 
falling into error". Hegel freed philosophy of this 
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fear by simply pointing out that the experience of 
knowing is a state in which consciousness adopts an 
attitude to its own state of knowledge and that this is 
intrinsic to what knowledge, or better to say, knowing, 
is. By this simple reflection on the nature of 
consciousness Hegel inaugurated a revolution deposing 
epistemology from its throne in favour of a republic in 
which there is no "royal road" to the Absolute. 
Consciousness progresses towards the Absolute with a 
necessity, of which Hegel' s Phenomenology of Spirit is 
one of the finest expressions in the history of 
philosophy. Later in this thesis we shall see the sense 
in which it is meditation on this necessity that 
produces the multiplicity of ends, i. e. philosophies 
about the end of philosophy, referred to in the title 
of this chapter. 
The contradiction between the two moments of 
consciousness generates the fundamental movement of 
conciousness along its path. In actually reading The. 
Phenomenology of Spirit we are captured by it and 
launched on the way it announces. We ourselves "are 
setting foot on the pathway of the natural 
consciousness which is pressing forward to true 
knowledge" (PS §77). Natural consciousness proceeds in 
response to the incommensurability of the two moments 
of consciousness; between the being-for-consciousness 
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of the object and consciousness- of-self-related-to- 
the-object. Clearly the standard by which the 
inadequacy of these is Judged can only be a product of 
their difference. It may seem that as the adequation 
occurs within consciousness then it must be arbitrary 
and therefore what we have here is a form of idealism. 
However, the important point is simply this: 
consciousness makes this judgment, and this is what is 
of interest to phenomenology. Indeed, the standard 
changes as does the object, f or the standard was based 
on the object qua known- object. The negation by which 
consciousness rejects its first object is of course not 
an arbitrary negation ( we know this if only because we 
know it as well as we know anything else): it is a 
determinate negation of the first object. If it did 
arise out of an empty, abstract, or non-referring 
negation then we would not experience any of the 
'resistance' characteristic of our worldly lives. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts this well, 
"We would never be aware of adjusting ourselves to things 
and reaching them where they are, beyond us, but would be 
conscious only of restricting our thoughts to the immanent 
objects of our intentions. "' 
The progress of natural consciousness does not, 
however, enable it to instantaneously free itself from 
its own natural attitude, but it does move in that 
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direction; it educates itself. At each moment "natural 
consciousness exists essentially in immediate unity 
with the total situation which at any given time 
dominates and determines it. "z This unity is what Hegel 
calls the "shape" of consciousness. Natural 
consciousness neither disappears nor becomes redundant 
when it finds itself inadequate to the new object; it 
survives by assimilating the new object and adopting a 
new shape. What is presented to it by real 
consciousness becomes part of its total physiognomy. 
The progress of natural consciousness can be 
represented as a series of experiences, but this 
progression is not in itself the goal pursued by the 
phenomenologist. We normally understand experience as 
that within which all appearance (parousia) occurs, but 
the notion of phenomenological experience introduced by 
Hegel is held to be that within which the appearance of 
experience itself is experienced. Phenomenological 
consciousness grasps the ordinary notion of experience 
in the form of a reflection by means of which it 
'stands back' from it, a move by which it is able to 
describe the distinct moments of consciousness. We, the 
phenomenol ogi sts, can look on in such a way as to have 
a perspective on the path of consciousness. Were it not 
for the appearance <or phenomenological experience) of 
experience, then natural consciousness would take 
phenomenal knowledge as adequate to its object and 
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identify itself with it; it would remain unquestioned 
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by that consciousness which might otherwise perceive 
an inadequacy between standard and object. The result 
of this would be that the movement towards the Absolute 
would not take place. Of course natural consciousness 
experiences phenomenal knowledge and develops in 
response to this experience, but without the benefit of 
phenomenological experience it is limited. This is 
precisely the situation of critical philosophy, which 
cannot come to know itself for what it really is. When 
consciousness begins to phenomenologise it begins to 
see that for phenomenological experience to be known to 
consciousness, it must relate to it prior to any 
objectification. Without this, consciousness only 
concerns itself with 'experience' in the ordinary 
sense; therefore only with the new shape of 
consciousness and not with its development as such. For 
phenomenological consciousness to be able to observe 
the development of consciousness, it must do so without 
it making a contribution to the development of that 
consciousness itself. It must, as Hegel says, be "pure 
apprehension" of this process. As it stands, this 
explanation is unsatisfactory because we are unable to 
assert the qualitative distinction between natural and 
phenomenological consciousness independently of the 
fact that the self-apprehension of the latter comes 
about Ma an examination of the former; pure 
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apprehension is always of something, namely, the 
dialectical movement of consciousness. If 
phenomenological consciousness is to contribute nothing 
to its object (which it must if it is to be of a truly 
different order than natural consciousness) then it 
must relate to itself without taking itself to be an 
object; it must be transparent to itself. As 
phenomenological consciousness cannot become an object 
for itself it cannot make itself an object of 
reflection. What it experiences in this moment is the 
collapse of the distinction between the two 
consciousnesses; consciousness of the object and 
consciousness of being consciousness of that object 
are experienced as the same. Phenomenological 
consciousness does not represent itself to itself as in 
reflection but knows itself 'implicitly', with an 
immediacy and without recourse to intellection. 
Whatever word might be used to name the movement by 
which phenomenological consciousness experiences its 
own being, what is important for Hegel is that this 
moment is experienced as the reversal of consciousness. 
The unity of consciousness is experienced in the same 
moment as the distinction between knowing subject and 
object-known-by-the-subject disappears. It is this 
totality which is the object for the phenomenologist. 
Hegel calls this the 'reversal' because "we" no longer 
think from the perspective of consciousness in its 
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opposition to objects, but rather from objects qua 
negated by consciousness. 
"This way of looking at the matter is something contributed 
by us, by means of which the succession of experiences 
through which consciousness passes is raised into a 
scientific progression. " (PS §87) 
Our contribution (unsere Zutat) elevates the path of 
consciousness to Science. As this presents itself, 
namely, as the end term of the series, it is clear that 
it is in a sense the ' result' of the path of 
consciousness. Consciousness also realizes at this 
moment that this result is no accident and therefore it 
must be the case that the path of consciousness had 
been Scientific all along: "Because of this necessity, 
the way to Science is itself already Science. " (PS §88) 
The becoming of the totality was (as "we" now know it 
to have been) at each stage a participation in the 
Absolute. Of We" may now wonder oS to where our new 
understanding of the Absolute has brought us, given 
that what we previously took to be the goal of thinking 
turns out to have been with us all along. It seems that 
the dialectic both required the difference between the 
two moments of consciousness in order to arrive at its 
fundamental unity and, similarly, the qualitative 
distinction between phenomenological consciousness and 
natural consciousness, in order for the progression of 
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the latter to be scientific from the outset. The 
reversal of consciousness is the point or stage of the 
progression at which it realizes that phenomenological 
consciousness inheres within natural consciousness all 
along. The Absolute itself is inherent in each shape of 
consciousness. Absolute knowing is the 'end' of 
philosophy in Hegel, but also, as we have just 
explained, it is also the 'beginning' 
Hegel believed that through the dialectical 'method', 
consciousness would be able to capture its own essence 
and that 
"... it may purify itself for the life of the Spirit, and 
achieve finally, through a completed experience of itself, 
the awareness of what it really is in itself. " (PS577) 
The question of the end of philosophy is not answered 
in Hegel's phenomenology but opened up. By showing that 
what philosophy took to be its t elos, the True (or 
Truth), to be the constant and fundamental property of 
thought (and which is "just as much substance as 
subject") Hegel leaves us not with an answer but with 
all the work of thinking to be done. This is to be 
understood in two senses: firstly, as Hegel stresses, 
that the ladder to the Absolute is not something that 
can be demonstrated or accounted for prior to the 
commencement of our own ascent. This means we cannot 
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know before we bring this knowing into being: knowing 
is not a thing but an act - we must da it. Secondly, 
the completion (Vollendung) of metaphysics is an 
essential issue for dialectical thinking because of 
what we could call the 'revenge' of natural 
consciousness. We have indicated how the reversal of 
consciousness is the crucial moment in which it learns 
of its progress and its orientation to the Absolute: 
the condition for the truth of each shape of 
consciousness is phenomenological consciousness, which 
knows itself other than by means of reflection. What 
about the fact that at the moment of reversal "we" too 
make an object of this otherwise non-thematic 
consciousness? Indeed if we did not do this then we 
could not talk about it, nor assign it a central role 
in Science, nor represent it in any way whatsoever. 
This does not in fact contradict Hegel's account of 
consciousness: what it indicates is that "our 
contribution", which is "pure apprehension" does not 
become an object of consciousness as such - what 
happens when we attempt to think it is that a new shape 
of consciousness arises. What "we" have before us then, 
on the road to Science, is never the end of philosophy 
qua eschaton - the Absolute itself. The Absolute is, 
however, proper to thought in that it is with us at 
each stage. This is why Hegel says that consciousness 
is "true in what it affirms" and "false in what it 
20 
denies". For Hegel the end of philosophy is with us and 
is yet to come, the relation between these two is, of 
course, dialectical and thought is the work of the 
dialectic. 
The circularity implicit in the presentation of the 
dialectic in the Phenomeno logy of Spirit could be said 
to be the 'structure' of the Absolute. How "we" who 
find ourselves enclosed within this circular system, at 
the same moment as we discover "our" relation to the 
Absolute, are to respond to the necessity of our 
engagement, has become the issue through which we might 
characterize our epoch. As Michel Foucault once said, 
"Whether through logic or epistemology, whether through Marx 
or Nietzsche, our entire epoch struggles to disengage itself 
from Hegel. "'-". 
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He1degger 
Important changes occur in the course of Heidegger's 
thinking with regard to how he thinks the end of 
philosophy. These changes reflect his attempt to 
accomplish a break with metaphysical thinking and not 
merely describe its limits. That such changes impose 
themselves on Heidegger indicates the way in which 
the thinking of the end of metaphysics is inextricably 
tied up with the issue of a break with the tradition 
and the production of a new signification in thinking. 
The best way to introduce this thought here is to look 
at how Heidegger regards his own relation to 
metaphysics in the course of his analyses. 
Firstly we can consider the way in which he undertakes 
the task of the de-structuring of the history of 
ontology in Being and Time (BT) 96., - Like other 
analyses in BT this one takes the question of being 
(die Seinsfrage) as its "clue", the question here being 
understood to be proper to Dasein rather than 
subjectivity (BewuBtsein). The "ontological difference" 
(between Sein and seiendes) which places Dasein in a 
privileged relation to Sein, marks a point of 
involution in thinking such that thinking the end of 
philosophy is seen to be the "ownmost" possibility of 
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Dasein because the history of Sein is in a crucial 
sense the same as that of Dasein. 
"The ownmost meaning of Being which belongs to the inquiry 
into Being as an historical inquiry, gives us the assignment 
(Anweisung) of enquiring into the history of that inquiry 
itself, that is, of becoming historiological. In working out 
the question of Being, we must heed this assignment, so that 
by positively making the past our own, we may bring 
ourselves into full possession of the ownmost possibilities 
of such inquiry. " (BT56) 
This assignment is, however, problematic because the 
historicity of Dasein, by virtue of which it stands in 
this privileged relation, means that it has "no ground 
of its own to stand on". In other words, any 
historiology is, as such, a part of what Dasein 
attempts to scrutinize. Hence, 
"Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the tradition of which 
it has more or less taken hold... (this tradition) blocks our 
access to those primordial sources from which the categories 
and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite 
generally drawn. " (ibid) 
For Heidegger the possibility of a more originary 
thinking comes to the fore with the completion 
(Vollendung) of metaphysics. This possibility is 
inscribed within metaphysics because the history of 
Being is the same as metaphysics, and it is through 
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the thinking of the ontological difference that the 
possibility of the reappropriation of this history, by 
means of the de-struction of onto-theology, is grasped. 
At this stage the problem of freeing thought from its 
metaphysical framework is not simply one of discarding 
something, but also one of not being able to fully 
grasp something: the Vollendung of metaphysics in 
Heidegger stresses the fulfilment (Vollziehung) and not 
simply the end (Endung) of metaphysics. This implies 
that the movement toward the completion of the 
tradition must be an assuming of the positive 
possibilities. The 'limits' of metaphysical thinking 
are in no way to be thought of as an obstacle to this 
movement, but rather the condition of its possibility. 
The de-struction, which Heidegger undertakes is not 
merely a historiology; it is an attempt to respond to 
the directive given by that which engenders 
conceptuality but remains hidden itself, namely, the 
other. The legitimacy of making this sort of claim 
is based, in Heidegger on the experience of Nothing (das 
Nichts), an experience he places both at the origin 
and at the end of metaphysics- 
6 The very essence of 
Dasein is a transcendence of the beingness 
(Seiendenheit) of beings; it occurs as a going beyond 
the subject matter of metaphysics. The questioning 
nature of Dasein indicates its assignation as a going 
beyond metaphysics; it is its proper pursuit. At first 
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Heidegger conceived his project to be the working out 
of a Fundamentalontologie, which was to proceed by 
means of existential analyses of the ontic structures 
of being-in-the-world. This thinking too involved a 
reversal in its demonstration of the priority of the 
ontological over the ontic. Here the relation between 
the two and the parallel relation between Sein/Dasein 
is not held to be dialectical, so the reversal is 
understood rather as a 'transformation' of thinking; a 
thinking from the 'perspective' of Being rather than 
beings. In contrast, dialectical thinking turns back on 
itself at the point of reversal only to grasp the 
beingness of beings; it remains wholly metaphysical -a 
metaphysical system merely reversed. A short digression 
here into Heidegger's account of this 'shortcoming' in 
Hegel's dialectic is in order here as it demonstrates 
something which forces Heidegger to reassess his own 
way of thinking the reversal. 
The question around which Heidegger enters into a 
dialogue with Hegel is that of how we are to understand 
the "we", the "for us" and "our contribution" in 
relation to presence and e xperience-1 In his use of 
the "we" (who look on the whole system of Science) 
Hegel makes a distinction between appearance in. 
experience and appearance gam, experience. Heidegger 
suggests that Hegel fails to see the full significance 
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of this distinction. In so far as phenomenological 
experience is non-representable or non-objectifiable, 
"we" experiencers are equally non-dialectical. 7' We are 
not a higher form of consciousness, as Hegel indeed 
notes, but if we conclude that "we" are the experience, 
then the appearance of experience remains a problem. 
The reversal, the point at which experience turns back 
on itself, reveals both the absolute presence of beings 
(Seiendenheit), namely, what is experienced,, and the 
absolute presence of experience. In order for the 
Absolute (beingness of beings) to be revealed to "us", 
"we" must be such that we are beings acquainted with 
our own beingness. The "we" signifies the relation to 
the Absolute in which the presence of beings can 
appear. The self-presentation of experience in 
experience, Heidegger suggests, implies that for "us" 
to experience the beingness of beings, "we" must be 
able to do so on the basis of a pre-comprehension of 
Being. Experience should therefore be considered the 
self-presentation of the Absolute qua Absolute. Hegel 
does not think of it in this way because the 
transparency of experience, which appears in the 
reversal, is thought of as "absolute subject"; as 
subjectivity qua Science. Hegel interprets what 
Heidegger refers to as Being as absolute self- 
certainty. The Heideggerian "we" 'experiences' the 
self-disclosure of Being, which, in the same moment, 
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conceals its own truth as the absoluteness of the 
Absolute. 
The purpose of this 'critique' is not to try to give 
the last word on Hegel's dialectic! What we see instead 
is an exemplary de-structuring reading Hegel, one which 
attempts to think the unnthought (Ungedachte) in his 
text. It is also an example of what was referred to in 
BT@6 as exploiting "the positive possibilities" of the 
tradition. What it demonstrates above all is the sense 
and extent of $our" entrenchment within the 
metaphysical tradition. It becomes clear that by the 
same necessity which reinscribes Hegel within the 
tradition, Heidegger' s thinking, too, is held to a re- 
evaluation; a reinscribing of a limit. It is language 
(itself) which comes to be seen as the 'source' of 
conceptual thinking and therefore thinking always 
conceptualizes. The de-structuring of the history of 
Being cannot alone achieve the retrieval (Wiederholung) 
of Being and encounters its own limit as language. 
Having taken us to a more profound understanding of the 
reversal, Heidegger's thinking takes on a radically new 
style and an attempt to engage language in another kind 
of reflexivity, which we are not going to concern 
ourselves with here. 
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In the Metter on Humanism 
S 
Heidegger notes that the 
metaphysical tradition and indeed his own thinking in 
BT is not only limited in that it thinks Being as a 
concept, but also because it "fails to recognise that 
there is a thinking more rigorous than the conceptual"ct 
Its failure in this respect stems from the retention of 
an "inappropriate concern" to be "science and 
research". Indeed scientific thinking, for Heidegger, 
is the thinking which flourishes "when original 
thinking has come to an end". In The End of Philosophy 
and the Task of Thjnknl a, he says, 
"... philosophy is ending in the present age. It has found 
its place in the scientific attitude of socially active 
humanity. " ;I 
The empirical sciences originate in 'subjective 
thinking'; the unfolding of truth (understood as 
'certainty') occurs within this process and the 
'objective' product is proof or demonstrates the 
validity of such thinking. 
"The development of the sciences is at the same time their 
separation from philosophy and the establishment of their 
independence. This process belongs to the completion of 
philosophy... This development looks like the mere 
dissolution of philosophy, and in truth is precisely its 
completion. " (ibid) 
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Heidegger is not, of course, saying here that the 
natural sciences,. are themselves dangerous or 
undesirable, but rather that we live in an epoch in 
which thinking comes to halt in so far as it takes 
truth to be that with which scientific thought is 
concerned. The 'da nger' which is at hand with the 
completion of metaphysics understood in this way, is 
that the 'certainty' which characterizes the success of 
natural science will be taken for the proper object of 
thinking. Thinking would thus enter a kind of 'dark 
age'. On the other hand, as it is only by means of the 
completion of metaphysics that its limitations come to 
light, Heidegger asks: 
"is there a first possibility for thinking apart from the 
last (so) characterized? "ll- 
An essential aspect of the task of thinking is that it 
participates in the completion of metaphysics. Not by 
imitating natural science, but as the "gathering" of 
metaphysics as the history of metaphysics. 
"The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the 
whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most 
extreme possibility. End as completion thus means 
gatbering. H 
For Heidegger we are in the time of this "gathering" 
and our epoch is to be characterized as the epoch of 
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the overcoming (Oberwindung) of metaphysics. The 
exposure of metaphysics to itself as being limited is a 
product of the work of this gathering and Heidegger 
considered much of this to have been done by Nietzsche 
in his thinking of the reversal (see below). 
Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche does not consider his 
thinking of the reversal to be an overcoming of 
metaphysics, it represents rather a coming full-circle. 
In Nietzsche's "final position", Heidegger sees the 
final stage of Platonism in the form of an inversion. 
He thinks of Nietzsche as having taken metaphysics to 
its zenith, the point at which a decision must be made: 
"... as to whether with the end of Platonism man, as he has 
been hitherto, has come to an end, whether he is to become 
that kind of man Nietzsche characterized as the last man, or 
whether that type of man can be overcome and the "overman" 
begin. " 14 
Despite the greatness of Nietzsche's achievement, he 
remains thoroughly caught in metaphysics: 
"We may not presume to stand outside metaphysics because we 
surmise the ending of metaphysics. For metaphysics overcome 
IS in this way does not disappear. It returns transformed. " 
The completion of metaphysics is described in various 
ways by Heidegger and it is a recurrent theme in his 
writings. It is also important to recognise that the 
30 
completion is also the scene of his writing: "The old 
meaning of the word, end is ' place'. "1 His attempt to 
think the completion from within indicates his own 
relation to metaphysics and is a clue for our 
understanding of his thinking of the end of philosophy. 
It is not, emphatically, an historical event nor is it 
merely a concept within his (necessarily) conceptual 
thesis of the end of philosophy. Let us recap by 
looking 
of Philo 
at 
sop 
some 
hy . 
of the ways he expresses it in The End 
" The decline of the truth of Being occurs necessarily, an 
indeed as the completion of metaphysics" (op cit p. 86) 
"The completion of metaphysics begins with Hegel's 
metaphysics of absolute knowledge as the Spirit of the 
will. " (ibid p. 89) 
"With Nietzsche's metaphysics, philosophy is completed. That 
means: It has gone through the sphere of prefigured 
possibilities. " (ibid p. 95) 
"The name technology is understood here in such an essential 
way that its meaning coincides with the term completed 
metaphysics. (ibid p. 93) 
"With the end of philosophy, thinking is not also at its 
end, but in transition to another beginning. " (ibid p. 96) 
The task of overcoming (Wiederholung/ vberwindung) 
overlaps with the completion (Vollendung) of 
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metaphysics for Heidegger, in a way that was hidden to 
the thinking of BT, nevertheless, the notion of the end 
of philosophy marks the continuity between the two 
periods of his thought rather than a break. The insight 
Heidegger attained with regard to the limitations of 
the thinking of BT which led to the abandonment of the 
project set for "Section 3" of that work, does not 
mean that the thinking of the ontological difference is 
also abandoned in the later work. On the contrary it is 
precisely this which provides the insight into the 
'limited' nature of metaphysics as such. 
Heidegger's thinking of the reversal holds that the 
completion/overcoming of metaphysics is the proper 
object of thinking such that - any anticipation of the 
overcoming is already engaged in thinking the relation 
between the two. 
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Nietzscl-ie 
The multiplicity of Nietzsche's styles and the 
scattered fragments of the 'themes' of his thinking, 
throughout his work, would make it an impossible task 
even to attempt a brief discussion of his ' thesis' of 
the end of philosophy, were it not for the fact that at 
certain points he chooses to represent his ideas with 
the most stunning brevity. Nietzsche sees philosophy, 
metaphysics, as condemned to a process of repetition, 
constantly reorganizing the terminology by which it 
expresses itself, but a closed system of reference 
which recurs (eternally), or replays like an old 
record. Whether or not Nietzsche's "philosophizing with 
a hammer" is truly a way breaking this record we shall 
not try to judge here. We shall instead briefly take a 
look at two oft-quoted passages of his, in order to 
make a cursory examination of how he understands this 
repetition to be occuring, and how it manifests itself. 
The first passage is from Twilight of the Idols 
(TWI)'", the second from Beyond Good and Evil (BGE)'19. 
In a section in TWI entitled "How the Real World Became 
a Myth", Nietzsche summarizes the entire history of 
philosophy in six stages. In that summary, comprising a 
mere 1% pages, he describes how in the history of 
philosophy since Plato, for whom the "real" world was 
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accessible, there has been an "inversion" of thinking, 
such that the real world has been "abolished". 
Philosophy, by means of an apparently dialectical 
progression, has moved through an essentially 
predetermined set of possibilities, in a somewhat 
circular manner, and arrived back at its 'original' 
position, but in an inverted form. To this extent we 
could say that this model bears some resemblance to 
Hegel's dialectic: the completion of philosophy is seen 
as an 'inversion' (or reversal) in which the 'end' is 
reinscribed in the 'beginning'. In BGE Nietzsche puts 
it thus: 
"That individual philosophical concepts are not anything 
capricious or autonimously evolving, but grow up in 
connection and relationship with each other; that, however 
suddenly and arbitrary they seem to appear in the history of 
thought, they nevertheless belong just as much to a system 
as all the members of the fauna of a continent - is betrayed 
in the end also by the fact that the most diverse 
philosophers keep filling in a definite fundamental scheme 
of possible philosophies... Their thinking is, in fact, far 
less a discovery than a recognition, a remembering, a 
return,... a kind of atavism. " (BGE §20) 
Nietzsche is also similar to Hegel in so far as he does 
not seek merely to describe our ensnarement within this 
cycle in the form of a history, but to attain a 
thinking which thinks through a reflection of a 
different 'order'; which would not be merely another 
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stage of historical becoming. This is clear in that in 
"How the Real World Became a Myth", the history of 
philosophy from 'beginning' to 'end' (qua 
reversal/inversion) is presented in the first five 
stages. Stage six, the age of Zarathustra, with which 
Nietzsche identifies his own thinking, inaugurates the 
attempt to think from the perspective of the completion 
of metaphysics. Nietzsche's critique of philosophy is 
far from systematic, therefore any systematic 
representation of what he is attempting to accomplish 
tends to detract from its force. Indeed 'attack' is a 
better word than critique; like a terrorist he attacks 
the establishment, mocking its authority, refusing to 
take its 'highest achievements' seriously, disrupting 
the system by adopting different disguises through 
changes of style. Sometimes he is so successful at this 
that he is regarded with contempt by traditional 
philosophers! But before we consider what Nietzsche 
might be doing by adopting such a (multiple) style, let 
us look at how he perceives the necessity by which 
philosophy is secretly disposed to repeat itelf. For 
this we return to BGE920, where he describes it in the 
following way: 
"The strange family resemblances of all Indian, Greek and 
German philosophising is explained easily enough. Where 
there is an affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to 
the common philosophy of grammar -I mean owing to the 
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unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical 
functions - that everything is prepared at the outset for a 
similar development and sequence of philosophical 
systems... " (My emphasis) 
Nietzsche is suggesting a complicity between 
conceptualisation and language, such that the normative 
value of intelligibility and conceptual thought become 
essentially identified in philosophy. What we see in 
these two passages from Nietzsche is an account of the 
reversal in which Nietzsche encounters language as the 
'horizon' or limit from which any future thinking must 
begin. In Nietzsche, as in Hegel and Heidegger, no 
simple distinction is to be made between the 'thesis' 
regarding the end/completion of philosophy and the 
account of 'overcoming' the philosophy that each of 
their respective theses refers to. It is fundamental to 
each of them that they, of necessity, must respond to 
the peripherality that their 'end-theses' reflexively 
define, rather than assume a meta-logical or external 
relation. I am describing their relation to one another 
in this way not to reduce their respective theses to a 
general thesis, but to indicate how what they have 
in common constitutes a kind of 'sub-tradition'; the 
scene of the question about the end of philosophy. A 
certain philosophical opening in which their 
differences can be meaningfully explored. It is 
through the notion of 'eternal return' 
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that Nietzsche could be said to be both bringing 
metaphysics to its close and at the same time making a 
'break' with it. In a moment I shall examine some of 
the different ways in which Nietzsche expresses this 
'idea'. Of course my representation of this notion here 
is an outline of an interpretation. I make this rather 
obvious remark here not merely to apologise in advance 
for the incompleteness of this account, but to remind 
us at he outset that it is precisely such notions as 
'representation' and 'interpretation' (of truths or 
identities) that the 'eternal return' displaces. 
It is by now clear that each of the three thinkers I 
have briefly looked at, for whom the end of philosophy 
is an issue, are in a certain way responding to a 
paradox: metaphysics (which is necessarily conceptual 
thinking) is a closed system of reference which bars 
its own way from thinking the Absolute, Being, or 
whatever name one might give to the other. And yet the 
thought of the otherness of this other prevails and 
always already supplements metaphysics, and in some 
sense refuses subjection to any concept. Nietzsche's 
eternal return embodies this paradox: it both accounts 
for the structural limitation of metaphysics; for the 
impossibility of a signification other than the 
metaphysical, and yet thinks this limit as the 
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'condition' for an "affirmation". Affirmation as ammo 
fati - to love the eternal reccurence of the same as 
our fate and thereby become "overmen". Of course the 
question as to how we are to understand this is 
inseparable from the question of the relation between 
metaphysics and its other, because, by virtue of the 
paradox itself, the expression and determination of any 
'meaning' constitutes the return of metaphysics. This 
is the "greatest weight"1'l that the thinker qua overman 
must bear, and whose task it is to bear. 
The doctrine of Zarathustra, eternal recurrence, has 
two components corresponding to the two horns of the 
paradox as I have just described it. Firstly, it is the 
basis for a sustained attack on the metaphysical 
tradition and secondly, it is equally the basis for a 
transvaluative transformation of thinking (ile, 
metaphysics) toward a "higher principle", namely that 
of the overman or Amor fati. Clearly the first would 
carry no force if it were not to some extent part and 
parcel of the second; straightforward criticism of 
metaphysics is straightforwardly metaphysical. Having 
to use the language of metaphysics carries with it the 
danger of naively reaffirming traditional values and 
privileges. To avoid this Nietzsche's 'criticism' of 
metaphysics must avoid becoming another formulation of 
a critical (i. e. metaphysical) position. In certain 
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places Nietzsche formulates in a theoretical kind of 
way an account of language which, in the rest of his 
work, he attempts to be faithful to, thereby 
demonstrating his understanding of the nature of 
language and, at the same time, the 'transformative' 
character of what he is doing in a concrete way. An 
example of the first is to be found in the essay "Truth 
and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense" 2`-0. Here 
Nietzsche begins, in a seemingly similar way to Hegel 
in the introduction to The Phenomenology of Spirit, by 
criticising the concept of cognition. However, we soon 
come to realize that it is not 'cognition-as-an- 
instrument' or indeed cognition as anything that he 
specifically objects to, but cognition in general, 
which is understood always to be, ultimately, of some 
absolute identity (even when this is thought of as a 
Hegelian sublated 'identity' of identity and 
difference). He then goes on to explain why there is no 
'standard' by which to measure cognition which is not 
essentially anthropocentric, and that to postulate the 
existence of any such standard, even in relation to the 
logic of dialectic, is to open the way for the 'return' 
of the in-itself. He describes how the thought that 
language is capable of expressing truth, or that 
thought is a progression toward truth (and the two 
always go hand-in-hand), is itself an effect of 
language. Firstly he asks: 
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"Whence-arises the impulse to truth? As far as the 
individual tries to preserve himself against other 
individuals, in the natural state of things he uses the 
intellect in most cases for dissimulation; since however, 
man both from necessity and boredom wants to exist socially 
and gregariously, he must endeavour to make peace... The 
first conclusion of peace brings with it a something which 
looks like the first step toward the attainment of that 
enigmatical bent for truth. For that which henceforth is to 
be 'truth' is now fixed; that is to say, a uniformly and 
valid binding designation of things is invented and the 
legislature of language also gives the first laws of truth; 
since here, for the first time, originates the contrast 
between truth and falsity". At 
What is important in this answer, which provides a 
genealogical account of the use of language and the 
notion of truth, is not the empirical validity of its 
claims; whether or not certain developments actually 
happened, but that it makes clear that any history, 
political, sociological, economic etc. must already, in 
its assertion of precisely such a value, have assumed 
the truth which its explanation endeavours to 
represent; it must have assumed the neutrality of that 
truth with respect to language. 
Nietzsche's point is that how we view language, and 
what we believe it to be capable of doing, necessarily 
has a bearing on the way in which we interpret the 
phenomenon; our view of language is integral to our 
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understanding of the world we 'give ourselves'. 
Furthermore, there are only 'interpretations' of this 
kind, and not good or bad representations of an 
(independently) true reality. 
"Only by means of forgetfulness can man ever arrive at 
imagining that he possesses 'truth' in that degree just 
indicated... As certain as no one leaf is exactly similar to 
any other, so certain is it that the idea 'leaf' has been 
formed through an arbitrary omission of these individual 
differences, through a forgetting of the differentiating 
qualities, and this idea now awakens the notion that in 
nature there is besides the leaves, something called the 
'leaf'... " 
In a similar manner and more important with regard to 
philosophical discourse, is the reification of such 
guiding conceptual oppositions as subject/object, 
fact/value, existence/essence etc. It is the relation 
between such key notions which "unconsciously" 
structures and determines the character of metaphysical 
thinking. By the same control, thinking suffers a 
limitation such that metaphysics eternally repeats 
itself, in one form or another, but essentially as the 
same. 
We encounter the 'end of philosophy' in Nietzsche not 
in terms of telos or eschaton, but in terms of the 
radical displacement of these; a rejection of being in 
favour of becoming. With this doctrine of eternal 
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return, Nietzsche foresaw the "end of the longest 
error" and the transformative power that such a 
doctrine possessed. The end of philosophy as the "end 
of the longest error" coincides with the possibility of 
affirmation and amor fati, as exemplified in the 
thinking of Zarathustra, in whom "all opposites are 
blended into a new unity. " 
The thinking of Zarathustra implies some form of 
sublation (Aufhebung), but not one which constitutes a 
logical progression which progresses by means of a 
series of contradictions. We remember that his account 
of language suggests that any persisting identity, 
which would act as the foundation of such a progression 
is an "illusion" created by language. The "inversion" 
of philosophy, which we saw in How the Real World 
Became a Myth, is thought of as philosophy "overcoming 
itself" (sich selbst aufhebende). What this means for 
Nietzsche, he both describes and effectively 
demonstrates in his writing. It involves philosophizing 
in such a way as to take into account the fact that 
language can no longer be regarded as a means for 
revealing truths about man and the world; it involves 
responding to the fact that such notions as 'man' and 
'world' can no longer be held to refer to anything 
independent of the thought and language in which they 
'appear'. 
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The Notion of im Liraft-Text and its 
De cn. structioi-i 
What has emerged from our brief examination of the 
thinking of the end of philosophy in the three 
thinkers Hegel, Heidegger, and Nietzsche is that the 
thought of the end cannot proceed simply as a second- 
order reflection; a kind of branch of philosophy, or a 
meta-philosophy. Each of these discourses is to be 
distinguished from those which are straightforwardly 
'within' the tradition by an extra fold of reflexivity 
which discovers an essential opacity at the heart of 
thinking rather than the usually assumed translucency. 
Each encounters the other and finds it (to be) other 
than metaphysics can represent to itself. The discovery 
of this other coincides with metaphysics' own 
realisation of its limited nature. What we here refer 
to as a limit-text is one which could be said to 
distinguish itself from the tradition by responding 
maximally to the limit character of metapysics. This 
need not imply the theoretical accounting for this 
limit and therefore does not only apply to texts which 
directly address the issue of the limit in saying what 
they say: 'involvement' with the limit could be equally 
unconscious. The general process of deconstruction, to 
which we are now going to address ourselves, spans the 
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distinction between conscious reflection on the end of 
philosophy and an unconscious Involvement in it. We are 
therefore treating the term deconstruction2 , in its 
most general sense, as a reference to the something 
which happens in the text, vis a vis the end of 
philosophy, and beyond the distinction between what 
belongs to the text itself and its external 
interpretation. 
We are going to look now at the theory/practice of 
deconstruction as it is developed in the thinking of 
Jacques Derrida, because, as will become clear later, 
this thinking will be one of our ways of access to the 
Levinasian texts we deal with in the following 
chapters. Before we do that directly, let us first 
reflect on the genealogy of deconstruction in Heidegger 
and Nietzsche. 
We have already noted that in Heidegger the activity of 
questioning related to the ontological priority of 
Dasein, is an aspect of the de-structuring. of the 
metaphysical tradition. In this, whatever is taken to 
be characteristically determinative of the tradition as 
such will be the focus of the de-struction. The 
traditional inquiry into the quiddity of what is, is 
therefore itself an issue. 
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"In so far as a thinker sets out to experience the ground of 
metaphysics, in so far as he sets out to recall the truth of 
Being itself instead of really representing beings as 
beings, his thinking has in a sense left metaphysics. " 
What is important for us here is to appreciate the 
sense in which the analytic of Dasein by which this de- 
structive inquiry proceeds is not to be thought of as a 
philosophical method but belongs to the "ownmost 
possibility" of Dasein. It is not simply a 
phenomenology which thinks in terms of a single moment 
of immediate presence, but refers already to the 
historicity of Dasein. This de-structuring thinking 
represents the possibility for Dasein to grasp its own 
essential relation to the historicizing of history 
(weltgeschichtliches Geschehen). c, It is thus proper to 
authentic Dasein to occur &a a de-structuring of the 
tradition which effectively hides from it the 
"primordial sources" to which it has privileged access 
by virtue of its ontological priority. Dasein 
traditionally derives the meaning of being from 
secondary sources and worse, forgets their secondary 
nature. Heidegger attempts to put thinking back on the 
path to the reappropriation of the originary sources by 
means of a de-struction of "decisive"ßc-" moments in the 
history of philosophy at which the meaning of Being has 
been decisively hidden. That this was later perceived 
to necessarily involve the thinking of a new relation 
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to (the being of) language did not affect this basic 
insight, namely, that the relation to the other qua 
Being is to be approached through the privileged status 
of Dasein in the ontological difference. The de- 
structive reading reveals the decisive withdrawal of 
Being, for example, as it does in Heidegger's reading 
of Hegel, to which we referred earlier. There the 
withdrawal of Being is marked by Hegel's thinking of 
the Absolute as absolute subjectivity. This is the 
point at which the ontological difference is decisively 
dissimulated. 
Nietzsche's views on the nature of language and its 
role in relation to the repeated "filling in of 
possible philosophies" (BGE§20), although very 
different from Heidegger' s, have also been a major 
influence on Derrida's notion of Deconstruction. In 
particular, perhaps, as they are expressed in the 
following: 
"What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human 
relations which became poetically and rhetorically 
intensified, metamorphosed, adorned, and after long usage 
seem' to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are 
illusions of which one has forgotten that they are 
illusions... and by this very unconsciousness, by this very 
forgetting (one) arrives at a sense of truth. "-; 27 
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Philosophy is therefore on a false footing if it 
proceeds as if language were essentially that by which 
the world and its contents were denominated. Nietzsche 
is here challenging the ability of language to 
denominate and at the same time the existence of any 
self-identical entities which might be denominated. 
The notion literal truth is thereby rejected and along 
with it any notion of its opposite - absolute 
metaphoricity. Instead of language either meaning what 
it says or being meaningless, language functions as a 
relational or wholly differential and interwoven 
totality, to which Nietzsche gives the name Will to 
Power. It is not our intention to go into some kind of 
comparative evaluation of philosophies which make 
language the issue at the end of philosophy as such. 
What we do seek to represent is the sense in which the 
issue becomes one of how thinking should respond to 
this revelation of language, and what it 'means' or 
signifies. Derrida both theorizes about the situation 
of language divorced from the transcendental signified 
and seeks also to demonstrate its consequencies 
textually. In this he takes over much from Nietzsche' s 
thinking of the Will to Power which makes of language a 
differential field of force. In Nietzsche this 
differential totality appears through its miriad 
representation in metaphor, but the dominant metaphor 
in Nietzsche used for its expression is that of force. 
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Force can be thought traditionally and mechanistically 
in terms of entities and bodies but it also lends 
itself to an interpretation in terms of relationality 
and differentiality. 20 Derrida sees in this an example 
of where traditional thinking, or, the traditional 
'metaphoricity' begins to deconstruct itself and 
therefore a point where the thinker can best direct his 
energies in moving this deconstruction on. Formally it 
involves in the first instance, a reversal of the 
traditional priority of, in this example, the metaphor 
of the identities of forces over their differentiality. 
What happens here is that metaphysics perceives its 
metaphysicality in terms of the limit. It therefore 
indicates the possible opening on another signification 
and the beyond of metaphysics. However, thought cannot 
by means of this reversal simply move to think the 
condition of its possibility, which it must do to break 
free of metaphysics. It cannot do this because it must 
think this condition otherwise than in the conceptual 
framework of the tradition. The ensnarement within 
metaphysics becomes apparent in the same moment as 
metaphysics discovers itself to be the desire to break 
from it - it cannot simply give up trying to think this 
condition in terms of a making present. For Derrida the 
recapture of Heidegger's, Hegel's, and Nietzsche's 
thinking by metaphysics should be understood to occur 
as a further 'refold' of the metaphysics of presence 
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the very 'folding' of which released their own 
respective insights into the thought of the end of 
philosophy in the first place. The very thought of a 
reflexivity that might facilitate the "twisting free" 
from metaphysics is itself an essentially metaphysical 
thought. Taking the absolute differ-entiality of 
language as his clue Derrida, seeks the deconstruction 
of the "greatest totality". In his work Derrida 
addresses thinkers whose own work implicitly or 
explicitly reverses the traditional priority of 
identity over difference and in which the mark of a 
more profound differentiality is to be traced. 
"There may be a difference even less conceivable than the 
difference between Being and beings. Of course, it could not 
be named as such in our language. Beyond Being and beings, 
this difference, which would differentiate and defer 
(itself) incessantly, would also trace (itself); such a 
difference would be the first or last trace - if we could 
still speak here of origin or end... This differice already 
suggests a mode of writing (ecriture) without presence and 
absence - without history, cause, arche, or telos, which 
would overturn all dialectic, theology, teleology, and 
ontology. This mode of writing would exceed everything that 
the history of metaphysics has conceived in the form of the 
Aristotelian grammd, the point, the line, the circle, as 
well as time and space themselves. "2"°' 
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The theory and practice of this Writing Derrida 
proposes philosophy undertake at the end of philosophy, 
are not to be distinguished; they exemplify one 
another. Writing is thus the attempted deferral of the 
recapture of the text by metaphysics. It is in this 
sense a 'strategy' but one without a telos. It 
represents thus more than the mere recognition of the 
completion of philosophy; it is already in the moment 
of the deferment' a transformative move. It takes 
thinking at the end of philosophy into the closure 
(cloture) of metaphysics. The transformative phase of 
strategic deconstruction's intervention in this closure 
employs a diverse multiplicity of textual devices in an 
attempt to ceaselessly reorganise the "sites of our 
questioning"131. It unloosens and unstitches the 
metaphysical text from the inside and hatches like a 
cuckoo egg that has always already been nested in 
metaphysics. Once hatched this cuckoo can edge out 
arch-concepts such as the transcendental signified, 
identity, presence etc. This fundamental 
differ, antiali ty permits the deployment of certain 
deconstructive agents, which are neither simply words 
nor concepts, to play a vital role in preventing the 
work from equally being either 'recaptured' by 
metaphysics or collapsing into the neutr-ality1. - of 
utter meaninglessness. D1ffer$nce, for example, does 
not replace the notion of being. The trace, which slips 
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into discourse when the transcendental signified slips 
out "does not name anything, it has no identity". 
Certain traditional terms become particularly highly 
charged with transformative energy at the interface 
between the metaphysical text and the limit-text. -! '- 
They are for that reason particularly subversive in the 
hands of the deconstructivist. For example amongst 
those used by Derrida in various places are hinge 
(brisure), which both breaks and joins, pharmakon, 
which both poisons and cures, the hymen -a symbol of 
purity and of the desire for penetration. Such 
"indecidables" and a general indecidability with regard 
to the text, strategically maintain the fluidity and 
dynamism of de-centered discourse as it distances 
itself from the inherited conceptuality. 
"It is not a question of junking these concepts, nor do we 
have the means to do so. Doubtless it is more necessary, 
from within semiology, to transform concepts, to displace 
them, to turn them against their presuppositions, to 
reinscribe them in other chains, and little by little to 
modify the terrain of our work and thereby produce new 
configurations... "'-` 
We have already noted that Derrida's strategy has two 
moments: the first corresponding to the reversal of 
metaphysical hierarchies and the second to the 
transformative phase in which a new concept of Writing 
(ecriture) continues the work of deconstruction. It is 
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the interweaving of these two strategies, says Derrida, 
that achieves the maximal immunity from metaphysical 
'recapture'; the risks associated with either in 
isolation are minimalised. Derrida strongly associates 
the first moment of this strategy with Heidegger, in 
whom 'immanent critique', as Heidegger himself calls it 
and calls for in The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking, runs the risk of reinscribing the value 
presence. '`'ý The second moment of the strategy, which 
refers to the decision to "change ground, in a 
discontinuous and eruptive manner, by stepping abruptly 
outside and by affirming absolute rupture and 
difference", taken in isolation would run another- kind 
of risk: of not saying anything at all, having broken 
with the minimum requirement of communicative 
discourse. The second position he associated with French 
philosophy of the late 1960' s. This was a measure of the 
greater influence of Nietzsche than Heidegger in France 
at that time. : ý: `"- Derrida himself has one foot firmly in 
the Heideggerian camp and he does not in any case 
associate the second moment strategy in isolation with 
Nietzsche. In Spurs " he clearly associates the kind of 
interweaving he theorizes about with the Nietzschean 
text. In his own work he attempts to demonstrate that 
the thought of another signification coincides in our 
epoch with the coming to the fore of difference - the 
mere trace of differance. - and that this is what 
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'shakes' metaphysics, disturbing its sedimented 
conceptuality, opening discourse to the possibility, 
for once, of not taking the dross of re-sedimentation 
but instead the gold of....? ý . We shall close this 
section with a citation of difference, it is also a 
quote from an essay, Differance, by Jacques Derrida. 
"difference is neither a word nor a concept. In it, however, 
we shall see the juncture - rather than the summation - of 
what has been most decisively inscribed in the thought of 
what has convieniently been described as our 'epoch': the 
difference of forces in Nietzsche, Saussure's principle of 
semiological difference, differing as the possibility of 
neurone facilitation, impression and delayed effect in 
Freud, difference as the irreducibility of the trace in 
Levinas, and the ontological difference in Heidegger. "'µ51l 
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When we talk about the ends of philosophy, overcoming 
metaphysics, 'going beyond' metaphysics; when we find 
that there is no question of abandoning metaphysics or 
taking a step outside, because there is no meta- 
language in which a new way of thinking could proclaim 
itself, we are always at the same time as we formulate 
our questions with regard to the signifying of this 
other signification, asking about the relation (itself) 
between metaphysics and its other. We have seen in our 
survey of the thinking of the end of philosophy that 
the thinking of the other in the limit-text is 
reflected in the strategy, way, or method, adopted. 
This in turn reflects what is understood to be 
crucially determinative in the recapture by metaphysics 
of any discourse which seeks to hold out against it. 
Derrida's own strategy, as we have described it so far, 
in terms of the reversal of metaphysical oppositions 
and the transformative manipulation of the energy 
released in this reversal, leads him to formulate a 
theory as to the production of texts and alongside that 
he proposes and uses a series of textual practices 
aimed at moving thought into the closure of 
metaphysics. This philosophical enterprise is to delay 
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the recapture of the text by metaphysics and thereby 
produce an opening. Within this deconstructive textual 
production there emerges a view of how the relation 
between the inside and the outside of metaphysics 
itself reflexively functions in relation to the 
movement of deconstruction. This is precisely the fold 
of reflexivity that has no meta-language in which it 
might express itself: nor can it be expressed before 
it happens in theory and after It happens in terms of 
observation and description -it happens in the Writing 
itself and, allegedly, independently of any authorial 
control. Bearing in mind this transformed view of 
Writing as a differential field in which the identity 
of what is tJ ndecidable, we should read the oblique 
line between the inside/outside of metaphysics as the 
mark of this t, ndecidability. Derrida himself marks this 
tindecidability by the phonic play on et/est in the two 
section headings in his essay Linguistics and 
Grammatologv, "The Inside and the Outside" and "The 
Inside is the Outside", *"'. There is in Derrida's account 
of the inside/outside - an account scattered across a 
number of texts -a sustained ttndecidability 
corresponding to the two moments of his strategic 
deconstruction. On the basis of this duplicity he 
produces multiple readings of the the text at hand, 
which demonstrate both the decisive movements in the 
text, by which it attempts to overcome metaphysical 
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control, and also the points where that control re- 
asserts itself. What might be called Derrida's own 
version of the inside/outside is a function of his 
interweaving of the two strategies of immanent critique 
and continuous change of site, played out at the level 
of the signifier. For such thinking, what was taken to 
be the other of metaphysics is no longer thought in 
terms of an absolute alterity; a transcendental 
signified; otherness as such. Otherness as such is 
understood to be an effect of language here. The issue 
then becomes one of accounting for the otherness within 
metaphysics. Any attempt to express the significance 
(meaning) of the alter-signification without taking 
into account the other-within structure governing the 
'appearance' of this other, in metaphysics, will either 
naively reinscribe metaphysical control (by submitting 
to it) or speak nonsense. 
Heidegger had prepared the ground for the questioning 
of the inside/outside relation by simply pointing out 
that metaphysics occurs as a going beyond itself. In 
his own thinking this is to be seen in the reflexivity 
of Da-sein; it lies at the centre of his understanding 
of thought qua questioning and in the account of the 
ontological difference. As was to be seen in the 
quotation from Differance above, Derrida finds the 
problematical inside/outside coining to the fore 
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(consciously or otherwise) in the thinking of 
Nietzsche, Freud, Saussure and Levinas too. In so far 
as the relation between the inside and the outside can 
be represented, it is also perhaps, " wholly 
metaphysical. It is the very 4tndecidability of another 
signification at the end of metaphysics which refuels 
the thinking of the end, thus keeping in play together 
both the thought of the limit and the excess which 
undermines any conceptual grasp of the limit, for 
example as horizon, time, language, otherness, 
intelligibility, etc., . Such a strategy is intended to 
maintain a kind of openess to the other signification 
without deciding its nature (ie theorizing about it). 
Thinking about the inside/outside, we are in "an 
extremely complex logic", says Derrida'-' 2, and no theory 
can "substitute for the textual work required to 
demonstrate it". The "textual work" is the work of 
sustaining tndecidability vis a vis the text. 
Paradoxically this "sustaining" would appear to involve 
an inescapabable element of authorial controla=`a. 
Authorial control is to be found in at least two forms, 
firstly, and quite straightforwardly, in the form of 
advice as to how the text should, and more often how it 
should not, be read. After all, any writer not seeking 
a posthumous audience has an interest in encouraging 
his readers in this way. The other form of authorial 
control in Derrida is, however, of a different and more 
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significant nature. It is not what might ordinarily be 
called 'authorial' control but we give it that name 
becausetinvolves a certain structural intentionality of 
the text which, although it does not take the form of 
'vocal' intervention, still plays the same role and has 
the same function. If this is true then its presence in 
Writing, as Derrida has given us to understand it, must 
be questioned. This control is to be found in the 
element of ' running commentary' in the form of 
theorizing what is going on in the text as it is 
happening. Such theorizing is never merely one reading 
of the many 'readings' given in a deconstruction. What 
is in fact going on in such instances in the Derridian 
text is best understood in terms of the conscious 
interweaving of the two moments of the strategy 
discussed above; of the combination of the reversal of 
controlling oppositions and abrupt changes of the site 
of the enquiry. In his essay Violence and Metaphhysý ics"l- 
Derrida reminds of "the necessity of lodging oneself in 
the tradition in order to destroy it", all along 
maintaining ones awareness of ones own vulnerability to 
logocentric contamination. On one level Derrida can be 
seen to be taking the first moment of the strategy, 
namely, the adoptive rather than the manipulative 
relation to the reigning conceptuality, quite 
literally. That is to say, that without the 
supplementary theoretical voice; the philosophical 
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voice; the transcendental voice, the deconstructive 
discourse would slip into nonsense. It would be an 
abandonment of metaphysics; it would pretend to be a 
discourse of the outside qua outside, and even worse, 
it would be blind to the fact that this very pretence 
is merely a distraction, a game, whose definition was 
determined in advance by metaphyics. We are not 
suggesting here that Derrida's primary understanding of 
"the necessity of lodging oneself in the tradition" is 
that of the necessity of theorizing, and even less that 
of some kind of textual harmonizing with the 
'transcendental voice'. This is not our suggestion not 
least because one can find in Derrida the most detailed 
arguments for understanding theoretical and 
transcendental texts within a more general account of 
textual production which is capable of explaining their 
own claims to primacy. We have expressed this thought 
here in these terms because it enables us express for 
the first time our reservations with regard to a 
certain neutrality: Is not this interweaving of two 
strategies a holding together of metaphysics and 
therefore a 'leaving everything as it is', in the 
belief that this is the role of the thinker at the end 
of philosophy? Is not this very thought of holding 
together predetermined to be our understanding of the 
necessity by which metaphysics occurs as such, when the 
crisis of thinking is defined in advance as being 
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suspended in the abyss between theoretical excellence 
and mysticism; is it not a moment of the same 
metaphysics, and therefore a refusal of the truly 
other? It is with this thought as a kind of parameter 
that we offer the reading of Levinas to be found in the 
following chapters. Before we move on to that let us 
consider further how we might understand the interwoven 
theoretical claims about what the 'practice' of 
deconstruction is doing, in Derrida's readings of the 
limit-text and its bearing on the thinking of the 
inside/outside. 
The alternatives, we suggest, are the following: we 
could regard this theorizing as being consistent with 
general deconstructive principles in that it is a 
supplementary text and part of what holds the text 
together as such and therefore a trace of the within- 
metaphysics character of the particular limit-text in 
which it occurs. Or, on the other hand, and again 
consistent with what the deconstructive reading aims to 
demonstrate, we could regard such theorizing as the 
measure of a text's latent metaphysical ity. This 
latter, however, is surely not to be expected in 
Derrida's readings given that all along he goes to 
extraordinary lengths to preserve his texts from a 
simple metaphysical reading: we would not expect to 
encounter their metaphysicality in such a blatant form. 
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In fact in both of these alternatives, his theorizing 
would be either a relatively insignificant sub-text, 
given the scope of deconstruction, or, in the second 
alternative, an actual hinderance to the aim of 
deferring metaphysical recapture. We see here a 
'problem' in Derrida's deconstructive approach to the 
Inside/Outside, but do not wish to suggest that it 
fails in its objective, which is to articulate the 
thought of the necessity by which the alter- 
signification's appearance is determined by the other- 
within structure of metaphysics. The problem is with 
regard to Derrida's own understanding of how 
logocentric control operates. In many places he is 
quite explicit about what it consists in, namely, in 
relation to presence, which presents itself as both the 
source of metaphysics and its ultimate value: 
metaphysics is primordially the metaphysics of 
presence. 
"Phonocentrism merges with the historical determination of 
the meaning of being in general as presence, with all the 
sub-determinations which depend on this general form and 
which organise within it their system and their historical 
sequence (presence of the thing to sight as eldos, presence 
as substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal presence as 
the point stigma) of the now or the moment (nim), the self- 
presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co- 
presence of the other and of the self, intersubjectivity as 
the intentional phenomenon of the ego, and so forth. 46 
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This says that the conceptual framework of metaphysics 
is organised and controlled by the arche-concept 
presence. It is the general privilege of this concept 
that deconstruction seeks to undermine. Our point here 
is that Derrida needs to be duplicitous in seeking both 
to describe metaphysics in its manifold manifestations 
of presence and at the same time denying the veracity 
of any such historical determination of presence as 
such. And if this duplicity is . form of 'double- 
writing', then is it not, given the intentionally 
cautious defence of the deconstructive reading against 
recapture, in danger of being a strategy whose meaning 
has always been determined in advance? This criticism 
suggests that Derrida's understanding of metaphysics 
relies too heavily on there being something like 
presence, which, if this were true, would be no 
more 'controllable' by decontstructive indetermination 
than it is by metaphysical determination. Derrida's 
controlled manipulation of the controlling discourse 
requires both the perfection of that control within 
metaphysics, in order to be able to identify 
metaphysics as the metaphysics of presence, and its 
imperfection, in order to represent it as a repressed 
system on the basis of have identified the controlling 
force. Writing as if one could suspend ones own 
disbelief in concepts necessitates a high degree of 
control which in turn requires and implies a thematic 
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grasp of what is essentially metaphysical, namely 
presence. In other words, in order to be able to 
undertake the strategy Derrida proposes one has to take 
presence seriously; one has to make the entirely 
metaphysical move of identifying presence in its 
historical determinations as the centre of metaphysical 
discourse. And it is not clear that such a move can 
escape the charge that it relies too heavily on a 
metaphysical conception of metaphysics. 
We are suggesting that the control which Derrida 
attempts to exert over the reading of his strategic 
manoeuvres is neither an innocent aid to the reader nor 
innocent of metaphysical complicity with metaphysics, 
as he openly admits in the following: 
"We would have to show why the concepts of. production, like 
those of constitution and of history ... remain in complicity 
with what is in question. "- 
Clearly this complicity cannot be suspended by means of 
a double-bluff Cie suspended disbelief in concepts). On 
what basis could we distinguish between suspended 
disbelief and pretended disbelief? Furthermore, we 
suggest that although the deconstructive strategy 
enables us to see better than ever the extremity of the 
control which metaphysics exerts over some (as yet 
unthinkable) broader notion of thinking, due to its own 
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thematic representation of itself to itself as the 
metaphysics of presence, it thinks this closure of 
metaphysics by subjecting the absolutely other to the 
same metaphysics. What is the meaning of the 
thought of a 'broader notion' of thinking or 
metaphysics which 'governs' this deconstruction and 
under which it might be subsumed? With this question in 
mind, in the final introductory section of this chapter 
and in the rest of this thesis, we present the 
following reading of the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas. 
C4 
Lev Ingas reading 
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One thought dominates the entirety of Levinas' 
thinking: the thought of the Infinite. So extraordinary 
is this thought within philosophy that we should 
perhaps hesitate before designating it as (a) thought 
at all. This suggestion is not as outrageous as it 
sounds if it is true that 'we' are designated by it 
before it is thought at all, as Levinas attempts to 
show. The thought of the other (autre) is wholly 
philosophical, it belongs to philosophy, to ontological 
metaphysics, but metaphysics is primordially inspired 
by the Infinite. Levinas retains the word 
"metaphysics", but in doing so implies that the finite 
thought of philosophy (ontological metaphysics) is 
inspired by the Infinite; inspired by something which 
it does not think, but nevertheless signifies. Levinas 
uses the term "metaphysics" and at the same time calls 
us to the absolutely other, the Other (autrui). Within 
his own thesis he therefore names the Other as such, 
but the general gesture or movement within Levinas' 
thesis is not one of denomination. It is on the 
contrary a de- denomination of the thinking subject and 
the making of it a pure accusative -a purely "ethical" 
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response to the Other (Autrui). This is an anarchic 
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obligation; an obligation always already taken on, 
engendered in an originary 'response' to the face of 
the other person. 4 7f&1 Philosophy likewise will be found 
to be a (necessary) response to an older "ethical 
metaphysics", another signification. 
Levinas' philosophy attempts to break with the 
tradition which he regards as a "destruction of 
transcendence"11=`. In doing so he must transcend the very 
distinction between immanence and transcendence. The 
word "transcendence" as it is retained in his work and 
referred to the Other, is intended to take on a meaning 
outside of the traditional couple by means of which it 
is traditionally thought. Derrida, as we have seen 
formalizes such a move sometimes, as the first stage of 
deconstruction. Levinas uses the term the same to 
designate the totality of thought from which no thought 
can escape in the direction of the Other and also 
understands it to coincide with the thought of being - 
ontological metaphysics. We shall see below what weight 
the term comes to bear in his account and not therefore 
pursue a definition of it at this point. It is because 
Levinas sees in modern philosophy a "destruction of 
transcendence" at the same time as presenting his 
critique as the rejection of a thinker such as 
Heidegger, who himself radically questions the role of 
the subject/object distinction in philosophy and the 
entire conceptuality that comes along with it, that he 
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is likely, on first reading, to be taken to be seeking 
a reversal of this trend by reasserting metaphysical 
oppositions. However, Levinas sets out to describe how 
of necessity philosophy lives as the thought of the 
same, but as a thinking which only comes to itself 
because it is disturbed by the Other (autrui)`' . 
Confusion as to his motives in formulating such a 
description revolves around his seeming to assert that 
the Infinite is a positive plenitude standing over 
against the same. It is by considering the important 
notion of the asymmetry- of the same/Other relation, 
unlike the symmetry of relations between the same and 
others in general, that we will see quite clearly that 
Levinas' thinking represents a subversion rather than a 
reassertion of traditional oppositions and 
'oppositionality' itself. 
A thought which is a distancing of itself from the 
tradition must also be a defining or an identifying of 
that tradition, irrespective of whether this move is 
part of a conscious strategy adopted to achieve this 
surpassing of tradition. This tradition does have a 
history, indeed it is a history and this history is its 
being written (and re-written). Even the unwritten 
other of metaphysics is (not to be) found on its every 
page. One could therefore always re-read/write this 
history; always tell another story, ad infinitum. But 
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this ad infinitum of history, of story telling, is 
nothing more than a variation on a theme so long as it 
remains the thought of the same (and it is after all 
the same metaphysics that is in each case retold). The 
history of metaphysics' other signification is a story 
told by the same. It would appear that the other's 
story cannot be told without at the same moment being 
made the same; it cannot be told at all, as such, it 
cannot be said. Levinas calls the Other within 
metaphysics the Saying. We shall come back to this 
below. This notion of the same in Levinas is loosely 
synonymous with totality. The dialectic which 
transcends the distinction between the subject and 
object in the tradition is encompassed entirely within 
the same and the same is not thought in terms of a 
reciprocal negation in relation to the concept of the 
other. The place this notion does play in Levinas' 
account of the relation to the Other will become clear 
in Chapter 2. 
This history of metaphysics (of the same, of 
ontological metaphysics) is interrupted by the thought 
of the Other; it is a totality interrupted by the 
Infinite, says Levinas. That this Infinite exceeds 
metaphysical determination, that despite its 
unthematizability it still signifies within 
metaphysics, inspired both Plato's notion of the Good 
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beyond being and Descartes Third Meditation, says 
Levinas, and he regards these two moments in 
metaphysics as being profoundly significant. They both 
indicate a transcendence older than the thought of 
transcendence itself, in so far as transcendence is a 
concept belonging to metaphysics. 
We could say, at -risk of making Levinas sound more 
Heideggerian than he surely is, that the reading that 
Levinas gives to Descartes Third Meditation recalls the 
noticon of the Infinite from the oblivion into which it 
has fallen. It is easy, and perhaps not entirely false, 
to ; construe Levinas as a thinker who has partly 
adopted Heideggerian motifs and naively misunderstood 
other parts. Nevertheless, coming to Levinas from 
Heidegger one cannot resist the temptation to formulate 
provisional responses to what one finds in these terms. 
This is all the more ironic in view of the extensive 
rejection of Heidegger which Totality and Infinity 
(TI) represents. Heidegger certainly has a special 
place in Levinas' writings and plays both a 'positive' 
and 'negative' role, as will become apparent in our 
exposition. 
In this section I shall look at how Levinas' reading 
of the Third Meditation figures in his own thinking of 
the end of philosophy. We shall see how this reading 
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permeates throughout TI and how it relates to Levinas' 
own thinking of the Other. 
Levinas finds in Descartes the articulation of a 
thought of absolute alterity; the other of metaphysics 
cannot merely be the effect of metaphysics and 
metaphysical language; it cannot merely be a thought. 
Descartes says that the thought of the infinite cannot 
occur in a finite being of its own accord. For them 
both, being and nothing, affirming and negating, are 
not all of metaphysics. Descartes describes a relation 
between thought (ontological metaphysics) and not the 
unthought, but the unthinkable. The infinite is not 
thought through the negation of the finite. 
"The idea of the perfect and of infinity is not reducible to 
the negation of the imperfect; negativity is incapable of 
transcendence. "(TI 41/12) 
For Levinas as for Descartes, the existent being 
cannot have the idea of itself before it has the idea 
of the infinite. 
"The relation with infinity - the idea of the Infinite - as 
Descartes calls it - overflows thought in a wholly different 
sense than does opinion (i. e. subjective thought). Opinion 
vanishes like the wind when thought (i. e. philosophical 
reflection) touches it - or is revealed to be already within 
that thought. What remains ever exterior to that thought is 
thought (verb) in the idea of infinity. It is the condition 
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for every opinion as also for every objective truth. " (TI 
25/xiii) (my additions in parentheses. ) 
Levinas' understanding of the notion of the 
"overflowing" of thought is central to his conception 
of the tradition as a destruction of transcendence, as 
"totalisation"; as the reduction of the absolute Other 
to the same. This overflowing of thought engenders the 
tradition as such, it is not merely an historical 
contingency of the texts of Plato, Plotinus and 
Descartes, the thinkers to whom Levinas directs our 
attention as evidence for the beyond of philosophy. " 
Philosophical thought experiences a moment of 
inadequation between itself and the idea it has of the 
Infinite. The cog-ito, a thought which attempts to 
bracket out all thought of the other in order to attain 
a moment of certainty upon which all thought may be 
founded, finds not only that the idea of the infinite 
is irreducible, but that the self is inadequate to the 
Infinite. This inadequacy is such that the self's own 
self-conception as 'imperfect' is not even the 
imperfect form of the Infinite, for the Infinite is not 
a superlative self, not is it a superlative other: it 
is more other than other -a notion Levinas expresses 
sometimes by speaking of the "height" of the Other, and 
in one place by neologising the word 'transcendence' in 
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relation to height and and saying "transascendence'"". 
At one point he uses the expression "higher than 
height" to draw attention to the fact that the concept 
of height does not adequately (or in any other sense) 
represent the relation of the Infinite to the same. 
This figure of "overflowing" is to be found in Levinas 
as guitars are to be found in the paintings of Georges 
Braque. And far from being the persistent restatement 
of an enigma, we are emphatically reminded, and nowhere 
is it clearer than in Descartes own meditation, that 
this thought begins in reasoning par excellence - the 
thought of the same, the cogi to. Levinas describes the 
inadequation in relation to the Other in terms of 
responsibility, indeed as "infinite responsibility"; as 
a being guilty before the Other for a crime I did not 
commit. He says that thought is already a response: a 
response to the "first word", which is in fact a 
command, "you shall not commit murder""'' . This command 
is addressed to me before I am me as the subject of the - 
cogito. Before the Other I am a pure accusative, 
articulated in Levinas' later work by the expression 
me voici. We shall look at this in detail below. 
Has not all philosophy, reason, the thought of the same 
always been an assimilation of the other to the same? 
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Is it not this very movement which represents the 
liberation from "opinion" as mentioned above? 
"The I of knowledge is, indeed, at the same time the same per 
excellence, the very event of identification and the melting 
pot where all otherness transmutes itself into the same. It 
is the philosopher's stone of philosophical alchemy. This 
identification constitutes its freedom, since the I returns 
to itself despite any otherness that it encounters and thus 
no other either limits or hinders it. " 
The way in which this I' is identified with 
ontological metaphysics for Levinas and how his 
account of it functions in relation to the description 
of the ethical relation, we shall look at in the next 
chapter. 
The necessity of preserving the terms in the relation 
to the Infinite and their asymmetry, and likewise the 
foothold which the 'I' of reason maintains within 
philosophical thought, is emphatically asserted in 
Levinas and associated with Descartes defence of the 
cogito against insanity and delirium (and also against 
the possible mystical interpretation of the relation he 
seeks to describe. )s 
"Theory excludes the implementation of the knowing being 
entering into tha beyond by ecstasy. " (TI 48/19) 
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This also lies at the basis of Levinas' account of the 
separation of the 'I' (see below). Similarly, 
"... Representation does not constitute the primordial 
relationship with being. It is nontheless privileged, 
precisely as the possibility of recalling the separation of 
the I... The knowing being remains separated from the known 
being. The ambiguity of Descartes' first evidence, revealing 
the I and God without merging them as two distinct moments 
of evidence mutually founding one another, characterises the 
very meaning of separation. "(ibid) 
"The ambiguity of Descartes' first evidence" is that it 
announces its secondarity to a relation always already 
entered into. Levinas says: "separation is not 
reflected in thought but produced by it" (TI 54/25). 
The "privilege of reflection", mentioned above, here 
encounters its limit. This limit, however, is not to be 
considered the moment in which metaphysics perceives 
itself to be a "useless passion", but precisely the one 
in which the anteriority of the relation tthe Infinite 
in relation to thought/theory/reason comes to light. In 
other words, the claim is that metaphysical desire is 
'older' than thought itself. This non-logical, non- 
chronological sequence of "events" in Levinas, 
inspired by Descartes, and which he refers to as the 
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anterior posteriori; the always coming after of what is 
logically prior to its coming (into being), is integral 
to the entire metaphysics of TI. Far from being a 
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slipping away from or rejection of) philosophy and 
history)it can be seen to mark the strongest possible 
commitment to them: 
"The posterity of the anterior - an inversion logically 
absurd - is produced, one would say, only by memory or by 
thought" (TI 54/25) 
In this thesis we shall show what form this takes in 
Levinas and the significance it is given (or the other 
way around: the signifyingness that it reveals). The 
thought of the Other is entirely within the realm of 
the philosophical, so any notion of the beyond occurs 
entirely within. It occurs as an interruption or 
disturbance of philosophical thought. We will be 
examining throughout the sense of the Infinite within 
the finite; the In-finite, as this thought is 
articulated in Levinas. 
In the section of TI entitled "The metaphysical and the 
human", Levinas rehearses his conception of this 
relation in very religious sounding language, speaking 
of God, atheism, and revelation. He ends it by saying, 
"everything that cannot be reduced to an interhuman 
relation, represents not the superior form but the 
forever primitive form of religion. " (TI 79/52). The 
section, despite its appearance on first reading, seeks 
to establish the non-theological character of its 
? E-5 
subject matter, namely, the relation between the 
separate, or "atheist" being and the Infinite; between 
the metaphysician and the metaphysical. The other 
person is experienced as that which (he who) exceeds my 
conceptual determination of his existence. The relation 
to the other person is not a relation to an "objective 
existence", but to something which "overflows" all 
determination appropriate to objective existence. It is 
on the basis of an account of this separate "atheist" 
'I' that Levinas presents his radical thesis that the 
relation of the metaphysician to the metaphysical is 
not originally thematization or theology, but "ethical 
behaviour" (TI 78/50); that "metaphysics is ethics 
first" . 
The atheist 'I' is not a 'consciousness' which comes to 
itself by means of reflection. The "taking up of 
existence" by the existent is described in terms of 
"wakefulness" and it is to be contrasted to the 
conscious being. The existent has a life prior to 
reflection, at a "level of life" at which it secures 
its interiority. Objectification and self-consciousness 
are not the product of the encounter with the Other in 
Levinas. He undertakes the task of describing the 
anteriority of the relation to the Other; to the 
(reflective) existential identification of 
consciousness. The existential ach is late in relation 
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to the relation 
by Descartes' 
coincidence of 
commencement of 
For Descartes, 
soul, prior to 
awakening of the 
Other. 
to the Other. Certainty as experienced 
cogito rests on the pre-reflective 
the knower and the known but "the 
the cogito remains antecedent to it. " 
God puts the idea of infinity in the 
this commencement. In Levinas, the 
e 'I' comes from its encounter with the 
"... this awakening comes from the Other. Before the cogito 
existence dreams itself, as though it remained foreign to 
itself. It is because it suspects that it is dreaming itself 
that it awakens. " (TI 86/58) 
The 'I' is awoken from its slumber before it is the 'I' 
of the cogi to, before it is the ' I' of ref lection, 
thematization and reason. In Levinas the encounter 
with the Other has always already occured; it is in a 
sense prior to thought and only known to thought as a 
trace (c. f. Ch. 3) and has never been present to 
thought, it belongs to "a past that has never been 
present" . For Levinas the whole of philosophy is a 
reductionistic gesture in so far as it reduces the 
Other to an idea. Even so philosophy fails to do this 
totally. But for philosophy not to be an 
"unintermittimg psychoanalysis or philology or 
sociology" (TI 88/60) then it requires thought to 
somehow undo the reductionistic movement which it 
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itself is, as it moves. Levinas' inspired treatment of 
this paradox lies in his attempt to stay with it, but 
not as it appears within philosophy qua fait accompli; 
as the always already done. His thought rather holds 
fast to what appears within the tradition as an always 
already being undone (c. f. Ch. 5 below). Philosophy i 
necessarily, but it is not necessarily an 
"unintermitting psychoanalysis or philology" etc. The 
notion of time as a series of instants in Levinas is 
so important for a general understanding of him because 
this being undone does not occur in the time of 
identity at all (c. f. ch. 2) . This constitutes an attempt 
to wrench apart the identification of thought and 
language, in such a way, in such a time, as to permit 
language (speech/address) to interrupt thought, 
enabling the Other to be heard. 
"Speaking implies the possibility of breaking off and 
beginning" (ibid). 
Without this gesture philosophy is at best a stalemate 
and at worst genocide. The oblivion of the Other, 
without recourse to social anthropology, in Levinas, 
has everything to do with the obliteration of other men 
and women. 
"We wish to show... how, starting from knowing identified with 
thematisation, the truth of this knowing leads back to the 
relation with the Other, that is, to justice. For the sense 
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of our whole effort is to contest the ineradicable 
conviction of every philosophy that objective knowledge is 
the ultimate relation of transcendence... (it) lies in 
affirming not that the Other forever escapes knowing, but 
that there is no meaning here in speaking of knowledge or 
ignorance, for justice, the preeminent transcendence and the 
condition for knowing, is nowise, as one would like, a 
noesis correlative of a noema. " (TI 89-90/62) 
The attempt to drive a wedge through thought/ language 
is perhaps the truly philosophical alternative to 
silence (were silence such that it could be considered 
an alternative at all). Raving or madness, could also 
be considered a 'noisy' form of silence as this too is 
a form of solipsism. For such a subject the world would 
remain a spectacle-"'r''. Seen from the position of the 
traditional conceptuality, placing a distinction 
between thought and language at the centre of 
metaphysics may appear as an act of philosophical 
madness. But, trying to think from the position of the 
tradition being- undone, this 'inseparability' appears 
as a cleaving, as a 'being held together'. This 
apocalyptic move in Levinas is indeed an aspect of 
what he has in common with the other thinkers referred 
to earlier in this chapter, whose common ground, we 
have said, is their concern with the end of philosophy. 
The metaphors that one is variously drawn into using, 
and ahus n ", in order to describe the implicit 
philosophical gestures, are themselves very telling: 
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things are "turned on their head" t "twisted free from", 
"undone", "unsaid", "interrupted", "disrupted", "cracks 
appear", the tradition is "shaken". Particularly 
apposite is a repertoire of words with double meanings 
to which Derrida has done more than merely bring our 
attention, in the style of that "delightful" word of 
Hegel' s, Auf heben. 
In this thinking, if we momentarily generalize, 
language has asserted itself as being its own subject 
and object, as both same and other. ' We' , of the first 
person plural, are totalised by language in this 
thinking, but no thought can be said not to be subject 
to this condition. Levinas' attempt to distinguish the 
subject as first person singular from the subject as 
pure accusative, is a part of his attempt to give an 
account of language which enables not the 'I' to escape 
this totalization but precisely the Other. Language as 
spoken by the Other, as the "first word" is otherwise 
than thought; otherwise than we think. 
"Absolute difference conceived in terms of formal logic is 
established only by language. Language accomplishes a 
relation between terms that breaks up the unity of genus. 
The terms, the interlocutors, absolve themselves from the 
relation, or remain absolute within the relationship. 
Language is perhaps to be defined as the very power to break 
the continuity of being or history. " (TI 195/168-9) 
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Language could never be restricted to or by any thesis 
on language. It always signifies in excess of any theme 
or thought that seeks to represent it, it is a solvent 
which dissolves its container. Levinas asks how this 
perpetual dissolution signifies. 
"The word that bears on the Other as a theme seems to 
contain the Other. But already it is said to the Other, who, 
as interlocutor, has already quit the theme that encompassed 
him, and upsurges inevitably behind the said. The knowledge 
that absorbs the Other is forthwith situated in the 
discourse that I address to him. (my emphasis)... In discourse 
the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other as my 
theme and the Other as my interlocutor, emancipated from the 
theme that seemed for a moment to hold him, forthwith 
contests the meaning I ascribe to my interlocutor. "(ibid) 
Language is thus not denied its universality in 
Levinas' scision of thought and language. He seeks to 
describe language in such a way as to account for its 
signifying otherwise than as totalisation. The Other, 
who is not above language, breaches totality by 
speaking, and in doing so requires the intelligibility 
of language, which is to say that the Other signifies 
as a moment of the same necessity by which language 
exists : 
"The formal structure of language thereby announces the 
ethical inviolability of the Other and, without any odor of 
the numinous, his holiness. " (ibid) 
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What was described earlier in terms of a (or perhaps 
the) general concern of philosophy today, namely, the 
limited character of the traditional conceptuality and 
the thought of the possibility of a "new way of 
thinking", for which the 'end of philosophy' and the 
'Inside/Outside' seem appropriate metaphors when 
engaging in discourse on this theme, Levinas considers 
in terms of the relation to the Infinite, to the Other, 
and calls "ethics". This is not intended to be a 
metaphorical displacement of this philosophical theme, 
but, as Levinas' thinking aims to show, it pertains to 
that which is anterior to thematization itself. The 
ethics of which Levinas speaks is not, therefore, 
merely one field of philosophical interest, one to 
which Levinas gives priority and then tries to justify 
this giving of priority. If this were what Levinas was 
doing then it would have to be said that he had 
failed to break with philosophy as an "unintermitting" 
psychoanalysis/ anthropology/ sociology etc. Levinas 
finds that the desire for the absolutely other which 
animates intellectualism and the experience of the 
face, are essentially interwoven in the idea of the 
infinite. The experience of the face of the other 
requires the maintenance of the asymmetry of the terms 
in this relation. It is on his reading of Descartes' 
Third Meditation that this thought is based. The 
finitude of the subject is accounted for in terms of 
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the satisfaction of need, and not through a moment of 
negation of the infinite. This enables the relation to 
the Infinite, to the Other, to be one in which the 
Other is not subject to representation in a theme. 
Contrary to Hegel, finitude is not transcended toward 
the infinite such that the finite is subsumed 
(aufgehoben) within the infinite. In Levinas' 
metaphysics the transcendence of the Infinite is 
maintained, its "height" is not diminished. The face to 
face relation is the relation in which the idea of 
infinity is transformed into approach -a relation to 
the Infinite not thought at all. 
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It may at first seem, having surveyed the ends of 
philosophy scene, that the thinking which seeks to go 
beyond itself becomes engaged in an eternal digression 
about why its limits are non-transcendable and that it 
has abandoned one love - wisdom - for another, paradox. 
Reading the philosophers that we have looked at above 
one gets a sense of the necessity with which thought is 
faced with this paradox to which thinking must needs 
respond. The necessity of thematization can be thought, 
so to speak, both negatively and positively: negatively 
as the necessity of a limit (conceptualisation) and 
positively as the implication of an absolute other (a 
non- or pre-conceptual signifying). So, the question 
about thematization is not simply as to whether a 
philosophy is thematizing or not, for all philosophy is 
thentizing. It is rather one of how philosophy relates 
to this other. We have seen this variously described as 
the presence of the Absolute to dialectical 
consciousness, in the relation between Sein and Dasein, 
in Derrida's textual manipulations of the 
Inside/Outside, in Nietzschean antics, and lastly in 
Levinas' reading of Descartes in terms of an 
'orientation'. It is with this last that the remainder 
of this thesis will be concerned. 
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Levinas claims never to have abandoned what he calls 
the 'phenomenological method', but his relationship to 
Husserl is far from simple. He turns against Husserl' s 
preoccupation with theoretical considerations. 
Moreover, he sees in this a manifestation of the 
philosophical gesture par excellence and in what is the 
true target of his thesis, namely totalisation, a 
'deafness' to the other qua Other. We will begin this 
chapter by looking at how thematization in Levinas is 
identified as the characteristic trait of ontological 
metaphysics and at the role it plays in his thesis. 
The full extent to which the thematizing nature of 
philosophy becomes a focus of Levinas' critique of 
Western metaphysics and the full significance of the 
complicity between thematization and ontology - 
understood as totalisation - is expressed in his two 
major works TI and OTB. However, already in his 
doctoral dissertation of 1930, The Theory of Intuition 
in Husserl's Philosophy (THI), Levinas' criticism of 
Husserl is expressed in terms of his unease with the 
primacy afforded to theoretical consciousness and the 
notion of privileged forms of thematic representation. ' 
In Husserl, by means of the epoch6, we gain access to a 
self-evident pre-predicative experience from which all 
our philosophising must begin, and upon which it must 
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ultimately be based. This pre-predicative experience at 
once marks out the horizon of thinking and constitutes 
itself as the thematic concern of philosophy. In so far 
as it is the thematic concern of philosophy, it is the 
subject of an intentional analysis by Husserl. What 
Levinas objects to is the way in which the series of 
reductions culminating in the transcendental reduction, 
is said to reveal a doxic intentionality upon which all 
other modes of intentionality are grounded. Intuition, 
in Husserl, although quite different from traditional 
epistemics, in that it is intentionally constitutive, 
still reserves priority for knowledge as the property 
of ti. ýoretical consciousness. 
"A signifying intention only thinks about an object, but 
intuition gives us something of the object itself" 
(THI 67/104) 
The knowing is the possession of the object. 
'However, merely signifying acts are not by themselves 
knowledge. In the purely symbolic understanding of a word, 
an act of meaning is performed (the word means something to 
us) but nothing is thereby known (Logische Untersuchungen 
III, 33). Knowledge will be the confirmation by an intuition 
of what was meant in the unfulfilled, merely signifying, 
intention" (THI 69/106). 
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Husserl's phenomenological analysis, which begins with 
the reduction, does not suffer from the naivety 
characteristic of the natural attitude, but 
nevertheless, at the crucial point it fails to grasp 
the connection between intentionality so thought and 
the theoretical attitude. As a result Husserl is 
directed away from the study of the essentially 
problematic nature of the pre-theoretical realm of 
experience, which is taken for granted, towards the 
epistamology of intentionality and intuitive acts. The 
kernel of Levinas' objection to this is expressed in 
the following: 
"Philosophy begins with the reduction. This is an act in 
which we consider life in all its concreteness but no longer 
live it" (THI 155/210). 
He goes on to say that Husserl, in his quest to make 
philosophy scientific and despite his privileging it 
among the sciences, still regards it as occupying "the 
same place in the destiny of man as the exercise of the 
theoretical sciences" (ibid). Husserl does not consider 
the historicity of consciousness; what we find is the 
exer.; ise of a "supra-historical attitude" which is 
taken to support our conscious life itself. It was this 
disregard for the historicity of consciousness that 
drew Levinas toward Heidegger at this time. It is 
important to note that it is not on the ground of 
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Husserl's lack of concern with "the metaphysical 
destiny of man" - eschatology - that Levinas makes his 
reproach: he draws our attention to a straightforward 
phenomenological 'omission'. 
"Husserl does not wonder how this 'neutralisation' of our 
life, which nevertheless is still an act of our life, has 
its foundation in life" (ibid). 
Husserl' s way of justifying the application of the 
reduction - by likening the 'free act' of reduction to 
Cartesian doubt - actually helps clarify Levinas on 
this point. What we see here is the elevation of a 
simple fact of consciousness, namely, that it can 
perform the reduction, into a methodological 
prerogative. This freedom "is taken as primary so that 
Husserl gives himself the freedom of theory just as he 
gives himself theory" (THI 157/222). 
Levinas' relation to Husserl and to phenomenology is 
multi -faceted an,.:: i complex. His concern with the 
reduction is critical with regard to Husserl's 
understanding of it as the method or fundamental act of 
phenomenological thought and yet he does not seek to 
dispute its centrality in thinking as such. His early 
remarks already indicate a concern with how 'meaning' 
and 'motivation' in a philosophical thesis bear upon 
what could be described as the philosophical gesture in 
89 
general. Levinas' reservations with regard to Husserl's 
account of the reduction are at this stage basically 
twofold. Firstly, as we have noted, he is dubious of 
the iiupra-historical attitude adopted in the analyses 
and secondly of the representational structure of 
intuition and intentionality. These two things are 
related in Husserl in such a way as to imply that the 
transcendental or theorizing subject is related to its 
world in the act of representation; the world being 
such that it is essentially representable to 
consciousness in theory. Language, as theory, is 
capable of making these representations to a neutral 
transcendental consciousness. By assuming its own 
essential possibility to be existential neutrality, the 
reduction also assumes that the language of theory is 
existentially neutral with respect to any theory of 
language. By disregarding the historicity of language, 
Husserlian phenomenology fails to consider this 
reciprocity. The reduction which aims to reveal 'pure 
experience' and a neutral 'given' at the heart of the 
philosophizing upon which it is based, only ever makes 
such a revelation within an already determinate 
interpretative framework. It therefore cuts us off from 
this 'given' at the very moment that we postulate its 
existence. If this is true, it could be argued, then 
what is needed is a reduction which is more 
fundamental, one which would attempt to take this 
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necessity into account and not assume the 'freedom of 
theory' just spoken of. Such a reduction would not be a 
reduction of the Husserlian kind because in 
acknowledging the necessity of starting from within the 
historicity of interpretative engagement one would have 
to maintain an awareness of the non-neutrality of the 
theoretical attitude. However, the spirit of the 
phenomenological gesture somehow haunts this 
alternative negatively as the dream from which 
philosophy has awoken, a dream which Derrida might call 
the dream of the full presence of the transcendental 
signified and its re-presentation. It may alternatively 
be suggested that to philosophize intending to maintain 
an -iwareness' of the non-neutrality of theory is 
merely the desire for the full presence of the 
signified in the form of control. 5' Or again, in so far 
as such a thinking remains akin to phenomenology, it 
may remain concerned with the attempt to grasp its own 
fundament. At the outset of Being and Time, for 
example, this does indeed appear to be the task of 
hermeneutics as it figures in relation to 
Fundamentalontologie. Of course, in the development of 
the analyses we find there, the inefficacy of the task 
so conceived comes to light. The internal treatment of 
the problems associated with theorizing, on the basis 
of the historicity of Dasein, effectuates a shift away 
from the problem of the theory as such (that is, away 
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from the logical problem of the relation between the 
predicative and the pre-predicative) toward the 
'positive' acceptance of the interpretative status of 
all theorizing (and the theoretical status of all 
interpretations). Heidegger's hermeneutics thus 
implicitly questions the role of the very notion of 
fundament as it occurs in metaphysics. 
In THI Levinas' criticisms of Husserl are generally 
aimed at exposing some of the assumptions associated 
with the reduction but which, if one recognises the 
non-simple nature of matters to which these assumptions 
relate (such as the relation between theorizing and the 
objects of theory), can be seen to militate against the 
'spirit' of the reduction. In a 1940 essay on Husserl, 
"L' Oeuvre de E. Husserl" : ý', Levinas is less concerned 
with the possibility of refinements to the 
phenomenological method, which might have moved toward 
a 'resolution' of the paradox that inheres within it, 
than with a reevaluation of the significance of this 
paradox born of the necessity of theorizing or 
theoretical consciousness. It is important to 
understand that this necessity is thought in more 
gene-, al terms in the 1940 essay than it was in THI. It 
no longer specifically refers to the necessity by which 
philosophical reflection must take the form of, and 
thereby privilege, theoretical consciousness, such that 
92 
doxic intentionality is thought of as the fundamental 
mode of intentionality. Levinas extends, or rather 
changes his understanding of this 'privileging' so that 
it includes intentional consciousness in general; the 
whole of intentional consciousness qua Sinngebung and 
not merely analytic or reflective modes are thought of 
as thematizing. This was to become a key term in 
Levinas' characterisation of Western metaphysics, as we 
shal come to consider shortly. It refers here to the 
fact that the other, despite its noematic status, is 
always noetically determined by consciousness. 
Husserl's account of the relation between the noema and 
noesis "brings forward the idea of signification and 
intelligibility intrinsic to the content as such, of 
the luminosity of content... " C? I 95/68), and in so far 
as this is true Husserl does allow the other to appear 
outside the thematizing light of consciousness. On the 
other hand the other, despite its noematic 
status, remains noetically determined by the 
intellect and only ever appears by means of noetic 
representation; "it is not certain that this auto- 
representation in the light could have a meaning of 
itself" (TI ibid. In his reapparaisal of Husserl, 
instead of describing the shortcomings of Husserlian 
intentionality, which he associates with priority of 
theoretical consciousness, Levinas uses Husserl in a 
positive way to rethink these notions in an attempt to 
Qa 
discover how it is that their primacy is perpetuated 
despite their radically new formulation and apparently 
different roles. 
Levinas acknowledges that Husserl himself does indeed 
regard most acts of consciousness to be independent of 
theoretical or intellectual acts of reflection. This 
would obviously be crucial for any post-epistemological 
ontology based on such a thesis. Despite this, Levinas 
still finds the thematizing or objectifying moment to 
lie at the heart of Husserlian intentionality: the 
Sinngebung is a synthesising process of identification. 
The object is given in this act of synthesis as an 
ideal entity which is essentially representable. In 
Husserl's account of intentionality "consciousness and 
the world are given at one stroke", as Sartre said 
enthusiastically, seeing in this the final unburdening 
of philosophy of dualisms and epistemologies. He later 
devoted the essay, Transcendence of the Ego, to the 
defence of this early Husserl (with which he was 
aquainted, incidentally, largely through Levinas' 
book) against the later transcendentalist Husserl. If 
we think in the most general historical terms then 
Husserl's intentionality is correctly to be regarded as 
a break with the traditional metaphysics of the 
relation between the subject/object or same/other. Any 
interpretation of Husserl, however, which attempted to 
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adopt Husserlian motifs and further develop Husserlian 
'theories' without raising the question of this 
philosophical gesture in general could be said to be an 
instance of the 'natural attitude', the philosophical 
inefficacy of which Husserl, perhaps better than anyone, 
has demonstrated. 
When we say that Levinas, from his earliest writings, 
was concerned with the significance or the meaning of 
the reduction, this is not to suggest that from the 
first, or indeed at any point, he sets out intending to 
describe the ethical significance of the philosophical 
act. No such presupposition nor simple understanding of 
ethics is at work in Levinas, as we shall see later. 
What he is trying to do in his early work on Husserl is 
to investigate the 'metaphysical conditions' of the 
reduction -a reduction which, despite its intentions, 
Levinas finds to be a process of objectification and 
representation. It is true that in the 1940 essay he 
gives a more favourable reading of intentionality in so 
far as he finds the basis for the essential possibility 
of the reduction to be internally interwoven within the 
fabric of the intentional Sinngebung. It can be 
understood as the exercise of the existential freedom 
of consciousness "I. However, the mere reflexivity of 
consciousness in relation to its own performance of the 
reduction still does not satisfy Levinas that this, or 
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indeed any, phenomenology of the other, starting from 
the ego, can proceed without assuming the framework of 
objectification and representation, unquestioningly 
taking thematization to be the 'medium' of this 
thought. In a sense the very necessity of this 
thematization itself gets bracketed in Husserl: in 
other words, in Husserl' s 'thematic phenomenology' the 
condition for all thematizing, which itself must remain 
unthematizable, is reduced to ' giveness' and does not 
get considered as a theme for interpretation at all. 
Levinas seeks an answer to a question which is 
esse: ttially unanswerable, because it asks about the 
unthematizable; it asks as to what signifies In the 
necessity of thematization. As we shall see, this 
questioning takes the form of a quasi-phenomenology of 
'experience' which examines tli4 certain moments of 
experience which he claims indicate a system of 
relations to be found at a level prior to that of 
constitution, at what he calls the "level of life". At 
the centre of Levinas' phenomenology is an account of 
the relation between the same and the other, which in 
Western metaphysics is subject to an ontological 
representation. Since Parmenides, he says, it has been 
understood as a relation between entities, be they 
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ideal, real, transcendental or empirical etc. Even the 
very concept of 'otherness' from which Levinas' 
account must begin, forces it to speak in the same 
terms that it seeks to put into question. Here we 
arrive again at a general formulation of the 'problem' 
facing any discourse which seeks to take a step beyond 
metaphysics: language cannot speak otherwise than in 
the language of the tradition, and yet it seeks to 
articulate something other than it can represent to 
itself. An implicit 'theory' of language is therefore 
to be expected of any account of the beyond philosophy 
and as we shall see, Levinas responds to this demand in 
his account of the relation to the Other. The notion of 
thematization occupies a key position in Levinas' 
thesis that ethics is older than ontology and in his 
attempt to 'call us to responsibility' -a provisional 
formulation aimed at expressing what is supplementary 
to Levinas' aforementioned thesis. This rather awkward 
reference to the position this particular notion 
occupies, already draws attention to the work it will 
be called upon to do: it is related at once to what 
Levinas identifies as the "primacy of theory", in his 
early work, and whose primacy he rejects in the form of 
giving it a (negative) 'ethical' significance in his 
later work. The concept, therefore, has this double 
role of directing us to and acknowledging the necessity 
of thernatization when we philosophize, at the same time 
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as reminding us that even our abstract philosophical 
concern with this totalisation is a function of the 
relation to the other qua Other. It is from within his 
thinking of the necessity of thematization that we find 
the key to understanding how the 'call to 
responsibility' and the call to philosophy are not to 
be separated in Levinas. We shall see that far from 
representing a rejection of thematizing thought, 
Leviras' ethics requires it. He aims to show that in 
ontological metaphysics the Other always suffers 
subjection to thematic representation (however one 
names or understands this moment). The supposed 
neutrality of theory is understood to be the-- mark of 
an ethically negative thinking of- the Other - as an 
ethical "i-ndifference" with regard to the Other. (Not 
to respond to the Other can be said to be 'neutral' vis 
a vis ethics, but the 'ethical neutrality' which is 
Levines' ultimate target of criticism, is 
characteristic of the thinking'which supposes itself to 
be neutral vis a vis the Other. It is to this second 
neutrality that Levinas could be said to ascribe a 
' negative value' . And it is this very ' ascription of 
value' which is not possible at the level of 
ontological metaphysics. ) For there to be anything in 
Levinas' claims for the ethical, which are themselves 
necessarily thematic representations; for language to 
be able to signify this excess, then it must be thought 
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otherwise than as the medium, or the being, of 
thematization. Exactly how Levinas' theory of language 
figures in relation to the separation and inseity of 
the existent, we shall examine in the third section of 
this chapter. 
We shall now look more closely at how Levinas uses the 
term thematization and at the thought which it is 
intended to articulate. 
"Thematization and conceptualisation, which moreover are 
inseparable, are not peace with the other but suppression or 
possession of the other. For possession affirms the other, 
but within a negation of its independence. 'I think' comes 
down to 'I can' - to an appropriation of what is, to an 
exploitation of reality" (TI 46/16). 
For 'conceptualisation' we can read 'the whole of the 
metaphysical tradition', which when thought of in terms 
of thematization can be subsumed under a single rubric: 
thinking closed to true alterity. The multifarious 
history of metaphysics has been, with the exception of 
certain moments 1, the thought of the same. Despite its 
sometimes explicit concern with otherness, notably in 
Hegel, Levinas says that the other in this tradition is 
subsumed within the system of the same. Theorizing, 
from the Greek then n, to grasp, characterizes 
philosophical theses on the other and is to be 
contrasted to the absolute 'passivity' in terms of 
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which Levinas describes an openess to the other qua 
Other. Levinas' discourse is against the thinking which 
thinks the Other in terms of its inclusion within the 
tradition. It proceeds to rethink the necessity by 
which this is held to be the case and shows that this 
tradition represents the exclusion of the other qua 
Other. He is quite aware of the inability of a concept 
such as ' passivity' , thought always (by the same 
necessity we just mentioned) in relation to its 
counter-concept 'activity', to express the Other as 
such. But the Other, it is simultaneously argued, 
manifests itself ka6' avTo despite its inconceivability 
within the Greek logos. The invisible revealed qua 
invisible? 
C. - "The manifestation of the ka9' avTo in which a being concerns 
us without slipping away and without betraying itself does 
not consist in its being disclosed, its being exposed to the 
gaze that would take it as a theme for interpretation, and 
would command an absolute position dominating the object. 
Manifestation... consists in a being telling itself to us 
independently of every position we would have taken in its 
regard, expressing itself" (TI 65/37). 
This expression (of) the Other, is not, however, 
autopresentation -a coinciding of being and phenomenon 
outside of any relation to the other - though it may 
appear so when Levinas says that this "revelation (is) 
a coinciding of the expressed with him who 
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expresses,.. " (TI 66/37, ). ". The revelation occurs always 
within the I-Other conjuncture in which "the Other 
ti enters -into, relation while remaining ka& avro, where he 
expresses himself without having to disclose himself 
from a point of view, in a borrowed light" (TI 67/39). 
"Revelation", which Levinas also refers to as "absolute 
experience" does not belong to anyone, nor is it 
subject to anyone's "point of view". It is, so to 
speak, the coinciding of a noesis and a noema, or a 
collapse of intentionality out of which two noemas 
emerge in an asymmetrical I-Other conjunction (we shall 
discuss this asymmetry shortly). A relation in which 
the terms are absolutely separate. The I-Other 
conjunction is not, in Levinas, the point of 
multiplication of intentionalities. 
The expression of the . Other is nevertheless, 
in, so far 
as it is thought, subject to thematic representation. 
Levinas talks about expression as if- it were outside 
the---language of being and thematization. The question 
is whether or not this is possible without driving a 
wedge between thought and language. However, simply 
putting the question in terms of the 'possible' and the 
'impossible' might already be to assume rather than 
question the-,. appropriateness of the lazoa 
to the 
discý., urse on the ( her. Levinas' discourse attempts to 
think the expression of the Other antecedent to 
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thematization not by means of a notion of thought 
without language, but as a signifying behind the 
signification that language is, a signifying beyond 
being. Levinas' thinking is concerned with the 
relationship between philosophy and the Infinite. 
Language, as discourse, plays the non-mediating 
'bridge' between itself as conceptualisation and itself 
as expression of the Infinite, which is and is not 
language (itself) to an extent determined by where one 
is on that bridge. We should perhaps move quickly away 
from this metaphor as it makes Levinas' too like 
Heidegger's Hegel, for whom "the absolute has its advent 
with us". 
Instead of language as the becoming of history through 
contradiction and movement, and as involving the 
"dissolution" of the speakers into the neutrality of 
all time, language as "speaking, implies the 
possibility of breaking off and beginning" (TI 88/60). 
Levinas describes the absolute separation of the terms 
in the I-Other conjuncture as the "condition" for 
language. As we shall elaborate further below, the time 
of thematizatlon Its not the time in which the Other 
reveals itself ;- the time of thematization only bears a 
trace of the Other.. 
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"... there must be thematization, thought history and 
inscription. But being must be understood on the basis of 
being's other" (OTB 16/20). 
"Every logical definition - per genesim or per genus et 
differentiam specificam - already presupposes this 
thematization, this entry into a world in which sentences 
resound... The very objectification of truth refers to 
language" (TI 99/72). 
Levinas' articulation of the necessity of 
conceptualisation in relation to thought of the Greek 
logos, of ontological metaphysics, in terms of 
thematization, is as important to his overall thesis as 
are the radical formulations aimed at expressing the 
thought which claims to come from beyond being. Most 
radical is his attempt to show that the latter refer to 
a 'reality' metaphysically 'older' than the former. 
Nye wish to show how, starting from knowing identified with 
thematization, the truth of this knowing leads back to the 
relation with the Other, that is, to justice" (TI 89/62). 
This is possible on the basis of the 'interrupted'' 
nature of thematized thought, and by focusing on those 
moments in which totalization is averted. Thematizing, 
paradoxically, is that through which the Infinite 
reveals itself. 
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The-, parallel with what Hegel says in the preface to PS 
once again comes to mind: the question of, or rather 
the rejection of, the idea that our relation to the 
Absolute is - mediated. For Levinas, however, the 
presence of the Absolute to dialectical consciousness, 
in Hegel, represents the submission of the Absolute to 
thematization. In his own metaphysics he is adamant 
that "the infinite cannot be thematized" Mg. TI 
211/186). However, it would be hasty to judge Levinas 
to be pre-Hegelian, as we shall show. 
For Levinas, objectification is the becoming thematic 
of objects, to which the 'I' in its solitude relates 
in terms of enjQymmn (j ouissance) . He provides lengthy 
descriptions of the sensible nature of the relation of 
the 111, to its ement. Objectification and 
theiv tization already refer to the Other: "The word 
that designates things attests their apportionment 
between me and the others" (TI 209/184). " In distancing 
myself from objects I create a 'space' quite unlike 
that between two objects - objects thus objectified are 
no longer for-me (as they were in the relation of 
enjoyment) but are "designated" by me for-the-other. 
Thematization then is described as the designation of 
beings for the Other, not for-us, because the ' I' 
relates to 'objects' at the level of sensibility, 
otherwise described as enjoyment. 
104 
ATo thematize is to offer the world to the Other in speech" 
(ibid). 
This is the Descartes of the Third Meditation serving 
the rejection of Husserlian intentionality starting 
from me : 
"In speaking I do not transmit to the Other what is 
objective for me: the objective becomes objective only 
through communication. But in Husserl the Other who makes 
this communication possible is first constituted for a 
monadic thought" (TI 210/185). 
It is also considered a rejection of Hegel because the 
Other cannot be designated (for a third); cannot be 
made a theme, the. Other can only be spoken to. This 
relation to the Other, the I-Other conjuncture, or what 
Levinas calls the ethical relation, is said to 'occur' 
outside of thematization and yet without any detraction 
from the necessity of thematization. On the contrary, 
it is said that the Infinite 11 ... signals itself not as 
a theme but as thematizing... " (c. f. TI 99/72). 
Saying that the Infinite signals itself as thematizing 
(thematization though this thought itself inevitably 
is) indicates the attempt to think thematization from 
the perspective of being's other. However we might come 
to understand this ultimately, what it clearly seeks to 
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draw our attention to is philosophy's inability to do 
this. 
"Philosophy which is born with appearing, with thematiaation 
tries, in the course of its phenomenology, to reduce the 
manifest and the manifestation to their pre-original 
signifiotion, a signification that does not signify 
manifestation" (OTB 85/82). 
This, incidently, he would also hold to be true of the 
Heideggerian thought of ontological difference, not 
because Levinas understands Being (Sein) as the 
excellent being (Seiende), but because Being is held to 
be nothing outside of beings. He sees in this 
'coinciding' or ' correlation' of Being with itself a 
totality; a totality characteristic of thematization. 
As we shall see shortly, it is what Levinas understands 
by the 'beginning within' thematized thought that 
enables him to speak about the otherwise than being. 
The signifying is not exhausted in the signified, says 
Levinas. This is attested to by the simple fact that 
3nani f estat ion, or being, occurs as having been 
signified, or, put the other way round - bearing the 
trace of a signifying 'prior' to "the dawn of 
manifestation". (ibid) 1 
"This signifyingness is then conceived in the tradition of 
the west as a modality of its manifestation, a light of 
another colour than that which fills the theoretical 
intentionality, but still a light" (OTB 66/83) 
3A. Achoo 
The tradition conceives the Other to be accessible, at 
least in principle, to a form of reflection; 
apprehensible qua intelligible in a moment of 
intellection. 
Bearing this in mind we shall now look at the role of 
Levinas' analyses of the sensible in his thought of the 
Other. 
-I 1ý 
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Sens ib 111 ty , the 'I' and 
its identification 
The sensible is and is not understood in relation to 
its opposite, the intelligible. That is to say that the 
analyses of the sensible proceed aware of a certain 
fact about metaphysical discourse, namely that it is 
impossible to sever a concept from the conceptual 
framework in general. We have spoken of this already. 
Nevertheless, as Derrida might put it, these analyses, 
on one level, involve giving priority to the 
traditionally underprivileged term within a 
metaphysical couple. The general principle behind this 
being that if the Other is other than the conceptual 
thought of metaphysics can represent, then any thought 
seeking to represent the other's alterity in relation 
to metaphysics must 'distance' itself not only from the 
traditional concept of the absolute other, but also 
from the traditional concept of the (self-same) 
subject. Such a radically new metaphysics must 
therefore also be a new thinking of the subjectivity of 
the subject. Levinas' own term the same does not 
merely refer to the subject as it is to be found in 
ontological metaphysics, but the entire subject-world 
continuum. It has therefore something Heideggerian 
about it, but it is of course presented in an account 
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which ultimately is a rejection of the Dasein-world 
account of 'subject{ vity' . In other words it should be 
read as an alternative rejection of traditional 
conceptions of subjectivity to that of Heidegger, but 
one which has learnt from Heidegger. This will become 
clearer in a moment. This is what is at work in 
Levinas' account of the subject in terms of its 
sensibility. Here we find an account of the subject 
'prior to, its conception in terms of its 
intelligibility, despite the fact that the account 
itself is necessarily presented and read conceptually. 
The account thus creates a tension within our 
conceptual response to it, because it treats the 
subject as if it were separable from the conceptual 
framework in which it is necessarily conceived. In 
fact, what we see here in Levinas is a general 
questioning of the necessity with which thought is 
conceptual. The objection might be made here that 
Levinas' project simply fails to recognise that the 
necessity he seeks to question is also that which 
governs his own language. We aim to show that this is 
something Levinas responds to in his account and in 
any case does not seek to 'reject' as such. We shall 
also show that this account of the subject enables 
Levinas to articulate a thought which, as we have 
already noted, does not consider itself to be non- 
thematizing but in part aims to show that the Other 
4. Y 
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signifies "not as a theme but a thematizing" (TI 
99/72). 
In order to move towards an understanding of this 
remark about the Other, let us first consider the 
account of the 'I' and its identification. 
In Existence and Existents, (EE), Levinas presents us 
with an account of the subject by posing the question: 
How is that which exists constituted? He describes a 
non-thetic subject in terms of its substantivity which 
is to be contrasted with the intelligible subject 
identified on the basis of its transcendence . -and by 
means of negation. His account takes the form of 
-several phenomenological studies) such as those of 
effort, fatigue, gyp, insomnia and hypostasis, which 
can also be seen as being preparatory for the more 
detailed account of sensibility, ins= eityv. and separation 
in TI. These studies can also be read as a polemic 
against the Heidegger of BT (in particular Div. I Sec-3) 
with Heideggerian notions being opposed by Levinas' own 
series of terms, for example: enjoyment is opposed to 
eguinmentality (jouissance/Zeughaftigkeit), love of 
life is opposed to care (amor de la vie/Sorge), living 
from... is opposed to throwness (vivre 
de. .. /Geworfenheit) . 
Enj oyment refers us to a level of 
life' at "which the subject relates to its element in 
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terms of sensibility, rather than to its world qua 
constituted, in terms of intelligibility. For the time 
being let us postpone questions related to Levinas' 
simplification of Heidegger and take this rejected 
Heidegger merely as an internal feature of Levinas' 
thesis. Likewise with the simple objections that one 
could raise and which we have already spoken of in 
relation to the use of terms 'borrowed' from the Greek 
logos. We have also already said that from his earliest 
writings, Levinas' inquiry proceeds aware of the 
importance of moving against the questioning and 
conceptualising which is "already formulated in terms 
of the given cosmos of Greek rationalism" (EE 101/173). 
Enjoyment describes the relation to things, it refers 
to the irreducible corporeity of the existent (person) 
and the possibility of total satisfaction with regard 
to corporeal needs. (Here again, Levinas sees fit to 
oppose this satisfaction to the Heideggerian for-the- 
sake-of,. [ Worumwi l len] . or project of existence. ) 
"Hot everything that is given in the world is a tool. Food 
is supplies for logistics officers; houses and shelters are 
a base. For a soldier his bread, jacket and bed are not 
material; they. do not exist for..., but are ends" 
(BE 43/65). 
Ill 
It is through the satisfaction of need that the 
subject, the existent, "masters" existence and thereby 
effectuates its own separation and an openess to a 
Desire that does not refer to a lack. The absolute 
'independence' of the subject in relation to existence 
in this moment, its ipseity, opens it up to an alterity 
outside the order of essence. The relation of the 
subject to existence is not such that it is a thing 
among things which are related to each other through 
negation. It is rather an interiority which makes its 
upsurge from existence not by- negating an exteriority 
(being-or existence) but through the satiation of its 
needs. Existence in general, or the there is (il y a) 
is a notion in which the traditional emphasis on the 
first syllable of ex-istence is removed. The subject is 
not merely a standing out from a more general 
existence, arbitrarily caught between being and non- 
being; it is wholly separate. The subject's relation to 
the, element suggests a pluralism within existence which 
cannot be reduced to a multiplicity (of beings). Such a 
pluralism also suggests that the alterity of the other 
existent must be thought on a basis other than its 
essential difference. We may anticipate the problem of 
solipsism in association with such a notion of radical 
separation, because it appears that the subject would 
be left with no basis on which to think the other 
existent without falling back on the notions of 
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essence, transcendence and negation. To see why this is 
not a problem in Levinas we must look closely at the 
shift of emphasis in his account of the subject from 
the traditional preoccupation with its identity to the 
'movement' of its identification. In EE the 
preparatory studies for the account of sensibility 
which appears in TI, get underway by placing an 
emphasis on the corporeity of the subject. This could 
be described as an intentionality of the body, but one 
which refers to sensation prior to the appearance of 
the body as a self-identical object of reflection. 
Levinas describes the body primarily as the taking up 
of position. This is not, one must stress, a position 
in relation to other existents, but position in 
relation to "anonymous existence", the there is. The 
upsurge into existence of the subject is not here 
thought of as an ec-stasis but rather as a dia-stasis. 
For example, in the upsurge into existence which occurs 
in the moment of effort, the subject takes up position, 
but in going out from this base the subject 
does not depart from it, thereby effectuating 
transcendence, it occurs rather as a dis-location: it 
is both out there and back here. This is what Levinas 
means when he says that there is a "lag" between the 
'I' and itself. In the upsurge of the existent the 
subject 'appears' but there is an indefinite 
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postponement of identity across this lag: 
identification which does not produce an identity. 
an 
"The body is not posited: it is a position... it is the 
eruption in an anonymous being of localization itself" (EE 
71/122). 
The time of this indefinite identification is thought 
of in terms of the Instant, the Instant in which 
presence is deferred. This lagging behind itself of the 
'I' is characteristic of the dialectic between effort 
and fatigue, it refers to the dis-location and re- 
location of the 'I'. In fatigue the existent "folds 
back upon itself" (EE 81/138) - it sleeps. 
"Sleep re-establishes a relation with a place qua base... it 
is by leaning on the base that the subject posits itself as 
a subject" (EE 69-70/119). 
The use of the word "posits" here does not refer to a 
reflective act of consciousness as it would in Husserl, 
but rather to the sheer physicality of position. 
Although the equation of thought and substance would 
appear to give primacy to 'bodily existence', we must 
remember that it does not do so in the sense of 
'embodiment' or in the sense of organicist 
reductionism. It aims rather to draw out the full 
significance of the fact that thought recollects itself 
here in a head, not by means of an intellectual act, 
114 
but because it never forsook its base. In Levinas the 
body represents the "indissolubility" of the subject. 
Levinas maintains that these studies in EE rely 
entirely on the "phenomenological method", and yet as 
we have seen, it is used to establish a break with 
Husserl, whose own understanding of intentionality 
refers all intentionality to objectifying 
intentionality. Let us look a bit closer at how this 
'method' is at work in the studies we have so far 
referred to. 
In his account of the relationship between existence 
and the existent, Levinas appeals to an 'immediacy' and 
'directness' which are akin to Husserlian appeals to 
pure experience. As his analyses are developed, 
however, we come to see that his notion of directness 
is of a different kind. For example, in the reversal of 
the priority of existence over existents, he says, 
"... there are certain moments in human experience where the 
adherence of existence to an existent appears like 
cleaving". (EE 22/27) 
You notice that he says in (de) experience. Such 
moments, which are decisive with regard to what Levinas 
is trying to do here, are said to be constitutive of 
human experience but are essentially prior to its 
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constitution as such. Experience is in a sense being 
treated as a secondary phenomenon, and the time of 
experience as divisible. Indeed without the account of 
time as a series of Instants it would make no sense to 
say that these moments were 'experienced' at all, 
because they do not 'appear' in a temporal flow or 
ecstasis (the time of constituted objects). Levinas 
says that by putting oneself in the moment of effort, 
for example, one "directly perceives" the taking up of 
existence as opposed to the reflective awareness or 
'intellection' of the experience: one perceives the 
event itself and not merely its "significance with 
respect to some system of references" (EE 30/42). These 
moments are said to occur in "a hitherto unsuspected 
dimension". He directs us toward this "unsuspected 
dimension" and yet at the same time defers any 
transcendental justifications of this method saying 
that the investigations "will bring the necessary 
clarifications of this principle by the application 
they shall make of it". We see in this rather peculiar 
remark an awareness of the difficulties of making 
claims which are simultaneously contrary to and yet 
rely on certain traditional concepts. By bracketing 
questions concerning the theoretical status of what he 
is doing he is, in a sense, blindfolding us. He does 
this so that we might be more sensitive to what cannot 
be seen, to what, due to our preoccupation with the 
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visible, we might ignore. There is a criticism here of 
the heliotropocentrism of Western metaphysics; the 
association of light, illumination and the possession 
(or 'theoretical grasp') of what is; the primacy of 
intelligibility, the panoramic. The suggestion is that 
our desire for comprehension is what prevents us from 
being sensitive to what is 'immediate'. He is saying 
more in this than that his claims will be substantiated 
if we remain patient (although there is an element of 
this), more importantly he is saying that what we might 
ordinarily regard as substantiation may prove to be 
inappropriate. 
If we think again: the accounts of effort and fatigue 
are not presented as interpretations of phenomena - 
interpretations of what is present in experience - but 
as "direct perceptions" of the event of taking up 
existence. The subject does not identify itself by 
saying "I am me" as does the transcendental ego of 
Husserl, which gains possession of itself by doing so. 
With identification at the the level of sensibility, 
the subject is never 'whole' in this sense; it occurs 
as a movement of the body, thereby realizing position, 
which requires recommencement in each Instant. Contrary 
to the Husserlian subject of the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation, the Levinasian subject is not an ego 
amongst alter egos. So as far as 
the account of the 
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subject as a substantive is concerned, the issue of 
solipsism is simply irrelevant. You could say that this 
'I' does not know... and that what is said about the 
substantive subject relates to all such existents. 
The substantivity of the subject, its=f' hereness' could 
be said--to be the=-i condition' for its enjoyment of the 
element: it represents the possibility of its 
interiority and its egoism, as Levinas says. 
Interiority thus has a "foothold in being", but Levinas 
seeks to demonstrate that this does not rest on an 
egological intentionality: it already refers to the 
Other. The alterity of the Other is differentiated from 
the otherness of things. In TI the relation of the ' I' 
to the element is expressed in terms of the otherness 
of things being reduced to the sameness of the 'P. 
"The way of the I against the other of the world consists in 
sojourning, in identifying oneself by existing here at home 
with oneself (chez soi). ... Everything is here, everything 
belongs to me; everything is caught up in advance with the 
primordial occupying of a site, everything is comprehended. 
The possibility of possessing, that is suspending the very 
alterity of what is only at first other, and other relative 
to me, is the way of the same. I an at home with myself in 
the world because it offers itself to or resists possession. 
(What is absolutely other does not only resist possession 
but contests it, and accordingly can consecrate it. ) This 
reversion of the alterity of the world to self- 
identification must be taken seriously; the moments of this 
identification - the body, home, labour, possession, economy 
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- are not to figure as empirical and contingent data, laid 
over the formal skeleton of the same; they are articulations 
of this structure" (TI 37-8/7-8). 
This movement, described as the "upsurge" of the 
existent, for example in effort, is the substantivity 
of the subject and what "must be taken seriously" in 
this formulation is 'the outside world'. It "resists" 
in a manner reminiscent of Sartre's facticity, but the 
relationship between facticity and consciousness in 
Sartre is of course quite different from the relation 
between the ' I' and its element. Earlier we recalled 
that these "articulations" of the 'I' are associated 
with a "lag" between the 'P and itself; this distended 
'I' stretched between itself qua base, position or heg 
and the 'out there' experienced in labour etc. This 
refusal of the- here, characteristic of the III in 
relation to the element coupled with the necessity of 
the return to the here (for example in sleep), and 
sometimes described as the "foothold in being", shows 
that 'the world' maintains its otherness in relation to 
the 'I' or the ego, in Levinas - it is irreducible. 
"Suspension" of otherness is "the way of the same", he 
says. Traditionally this may have been referred to as 
'negation', but what Levinas' studies are intended to 
demonstrate at this point is that negation is not all 
of metaphysics. 
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This mode of negating while taking refuge in what one 
negates delineates the same or the I. The alterity of a 
world refused is not the alterity of the Stranger but that 
of the fatherland which welcomes and protests. Metaphysics 
does not coincide with negativity" 
(TI 41/11). 
Ve may add in passing and by way of further 
clarification that this is presented by Levinas, as a 
critique of the tradition in which Heidegger is 
understood to be included. Levinas' objection to 
Heidegger' s thesis of disclosure is not that the 
identifiable or self-identical subject disappears in 
favour of the anonymous Dasein ( and that this is 
somehow ethically undesirable) but that the disclosive 
'act' of projection (as Levinas apparently understands 
Geworfenheit) reduces the other (in general) to the 
same. On the model of ecstasy in Heidegger, Levinas 
sees no scope for the exteriority of existents 
(beings) ; for a difference which is irreducible to the 
thinking of the same. You could say that f or Levinas 
ecstative temporality is the time of identity. He would 
seef it this way because of the way in which he 
understands the ontological difference in Heidegger. He 
sees the-movement toward the ontological proceeding by 
means of reduction of the ontic, even if this is held 
to be a reduction 'in reverse' "; even if we 
acknowledge that the ontic is 'secondary' in so far as 
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it is based on the precomprehension of Being by Dasein. 
The otherness of the world in being-in-the-world, which 
is disclosed simultaneously with, or as an aspect of, 
what is disclosed through the projection of Dasein, is 
an otherness reduced to the same within this very 
moment. As with Levinas' ego ohez soi, Heidegger's 
Dasein reduces the other to the same, as we have 
already said of the former, at the level of meaning. 
The difference is that for Dasein there is no other 
level (of being). It is the very "autochthony" of the 
' I' , an aspect of the substantivity of the subject, 
which prevents it from producing its own notion of the 
other, in Levinas. In Heidegger, Dasein' s other always 
appears to it as mine, mir eigenes. Here we see 
something that Dasein and the Levinasian ego have in 
common: each is a "suspension" of otherness and each is 
a thought of the same. It is the autochthony of the 'I' 
which guarantees its openness to true alterity: another 
intentionality comes to it independently of its own 
and disrupts the totality of the same closed in on 
itself. We shall now look at how this "breach of 
totality" works in Levinas and how and what it 
signifies. 
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Fxroin the other <autre > 
to the Other <autru i>: 
The iiiterpersvn-mLl im Levinas 
Levinas aims to show that what disrupts the totalising 
thought of the same is the 'encounter' with the other 
person. The relation between the 'I' and the Other 
(person) is the concrete event of the ethical in 
Levinas. Here we find the entire problematic of the 
relation between metaphysics and its other, or another 
signification ' mapped onto' the ethical relation. 
Emphatically, we are not to understand the I-Other 
conjuncture as a metaphor for the metaphysics/other 
relation. We should say that there is no difference 
between the two: metaphysics as the going beyond of 
itself is the ' enactment' of ethics for Levinas. 
The account of the subject that we have just looked at 
may appear to function in connection with the account 
of the relation to the Other as if it were 'the 
condition for the possibility of... ' the (ethical) 
relation. In fact this is not the case at all and we 
come to realise that the thought of the subject, being 
and the "foothold in being" that the subject has, are 
all secondary in relation to what is called the ethical 
relation, a relation which is always already entered 
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into. In the following chapters we shall look closely 
at how this works. We can approach this anteriority of 
the ethical relation from many different directions 
within Levinas' account, but it is useful at this point 
to refer to the account of the subject and its element. 
The satisfaction of need, being-at-home-with-itself 
and the dwelling characteristic of egoist being, 
collectively express the sovereignty of the subject in 
relation to the other in general. This imperialist 'I' 
is a movement which suspends otherness and which, with 
the qualification given above, can be called a 
'reduction' of the other to the same. From the outset 
of Tip; Levinas contrasts the need of the subject with 
what he refers to as "metaphysical Desire". 
The metaphysical desire tends toward something else 
entirely, toward the absolutely other. The customary 
analysis of desire cannot explain away its singular 
pretension. As commonly interpreted need would be a the 
basis of desire; desire would characterize a being indigent 
and incomplete... It would coincide with consciousness of 
what has been lost; it would be essentially a nostalgia, a 
longing for return. But thus it would not even suspect what 
the veritably other is. The metaphysical desire does not 
long for return, for it is desire for a land not of our 
birth, for a land foreign to every nature, which has not 
been our fatherland and to which we shall never betake 
ourselves. The metaphysical desire does not rest on any 
prior kinship. It is a desire that cannot be satisfied" 
(TI 34/3-4). 
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Here once again Levinas is polemicising against 
Heidegger, but whether or not the charge of "nostalgia" 
is really appropriate, the point of what is being said 
is quite clear: the alterity of the Other is absolutely 
irreducible, it comes not from within the circuit of 
sameness of the III at-home-with-itself, but disrupts 
this circuit and surprises this 'I' It interrupts 
this circuit in such a way as to prevent the satisfied 
'I' from becoming absolute, or omniscient. It does so 
not by making a territorial challenge to the subject, 
but by simply (being) otherwise; by being other than 
the otherness which the 'I' can make its own. It comes 
on the scene not as a threat but as the Desired. The 
way in which Levinas describes "metaphysical desire" 
is suggestive of a contiguity between it and the 'other 
person' from the outset. This 'contiguity' and its 
significance is at the centre of Levinas' thinking in 
general, and it is in the thinking of it that the 
entire claim that the going beyond (ontological) 
metaphysics of thought occurs as ethics. The encounter 
with the Other qua other person is not merely a 
phenomenological experience of the social. Such 
experiences, Levinas would maintain, belong to the 
realm to which Husserlian phenomenology- is most 
apposite, namely the realm of the constituted. The 
encounter with the other person is also not a 
metaphor ." 
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In the account of the subject we are provided with a 
model of 'intentionality' at the "level of life". In 
the description of the hypostasis of the subject in 
terms of the "lag" between the ' I' and itself, the 
movement of this substantiation of the subject is 
characterised by recommencement in each Instant. Time 
as a series of Instants was contrasted, at different 
points above, to ecstative temporality, temporal flow 
and 'all time' . These, Levinas would say, are models of 
thinking time appropriate to the constituted, we called 
it the "time of identity", contrasting this to the 
"time of identification" appropriate to Levinas' 
substantive subject. We now ask the question: how is it 
that the time of identification already refers to the 
Other? Levinas makes the relation to the Other even 
' older' than the identification of the ' I' , not merely 
older than its identity in 'phenomenological time': as 
a relation already entered into, the ethical relation 
must be prior to the 'relates' which participate in it. 
The paradox redoubles in that this also requires the 
absolute difference of the two terms to be preserved if 
this relation is truly a relation to the Other qua 
Other. It must always be remembered that the encounter 
with the Other is not the encounter between two ' I' s, 
Levinasian existents or otherwise. The "P at-home- 
with-itself is concerned with the identifiable; it 
takes itself to be absolute. It is in this process of 
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self-identification that it is disrupted by the Other, 
but this transcendental thinking of the same cannot 
think an otherness other than that which it posits 
itself; it totalises the other in the "schema of the 
same". The "absolute difference" Levinas requires 
between the Other and the same is therefore a 
difference not thought of in terms of essence. 
Philosophy, as a questioning of what is other, is a 
questioning across a difference. Levinas would agree 
with Heidegger that the most fundamental gesture of 
philosophy is a questioning in response to what 
astonishes thought, namely the other, but he sees this 
tradition to be the self-interlocution of the same, 
According to his reading of the ontological difference 
this is particularly clear in the case of the relation 
between Sein and Dasein; the ontological difference is 
the basis for a hermeneutical circuit of sameness and 
as such is the mere eddy of the same. As we noted 
earlier, when discussing thematization, Levinas says 
-that 
the manifestation of Being as beings is indeed 
'primary', this is what he means by the same' s concern 
for and possession of what is. Manifestation occurs 
within the time of identity. And in OTB, where this 
thought is expressed more explicitly in terms rejecting 
the imperial role of presence, in ontology, he seeks to 
distinguish his own thinking from this tradition by 
saying that his ethical metaphysics is concerned with 
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"A past more ancient than any present, a past which was 
never present and whose anarchical antiquity was never given 
in the play of dissimulations and manifestations, a past 
whose other signification remains to be described, signifies 
over and beyond the manifestation of being, which would thus 
convey but a moment of this signifying signification" 
(OTB 24/31). 
This notion haunts every gesture in Levinas' attempt to 
demonstrate that "ethics is first philosophy". 
Philosophy as questioning is primordially an address to 
another person; it is conversation. It therefore 
betrays the anteriority of the I-Other conjuncture and 
that this conjuncture is the 'place' where the thought 
of another signification is encountered. At one point 
Levinas says that it is the attempt to describe this 
anteriority that governs his entire research. 
However we come to regard Levinas' peculiar reading of 
Heidegger, we must not think that his remarks are aimed 
merely at redressing the ethical neutrality of Mitsein 
or Miteinandersein or the ethical neutrality that 
Heidegger openly associates with the thought of Being 
in Letter on Humanism. '4 We recall how Heidegger says 
there that "such names as logic, ethics and physics 
begin to flourish only when original thinking comes to 
an end". 'E Levinas seeks neither to re-establish nor 
privilege ethics as it was understood in pre- 
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Heideggerian metaphysics, nor to claim that what 
Heidegger understands by "original thinking" is what he 
wants to call ethics. The relation whose anteriority 
Levinas aims to describe is held to be that without 
which the thought of Being and the philosophy of 
essence and identity could not have 'got underway'. His 
remarks are aimed at directing us toward an orientation 
within thinking, toward what he has referred to as "a 
past which was never present". He claims that this 
orientation is exclusively to be associated with the 
relation to the other person: in the face to face, as 
he calls it, one is oriented toward that which lies 
beyond being, namely the Good. 
It may at first seem extraordinary that Levinas should 
resurrect the subject as a basic move against the 
metaphysical tradition in which it has played such a 
governing role. Indeed all important thinkers since 
Hegel have taken the deconstruction of subjectivity, in 
one form or another, to be a key move in their own 
metaphysics. In fact on one level Levinas' account 
bears some similarity to those of Heidegger and 
Derrida, for example, in that it is based on a radical 
account of time which nullifies presence, or rather 
self-presence as the definitive characteristic of the 
(self-identical) subject. After all, even if Levinas 
does not regard Heidegger himself as being radical in 
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the same sense, surely his critique of Descartes moves 
along similar lines. Also Derrida's notion of time as 
spacing - the silences between words which of 
themselves say nothing but which articulate the 
entirety of thought - is a way of taking up a 
Heideggerian theme and is a de-structuring of the 
subject. Levinas has something in common with these 
gestures recalled here in so far as he offers a 
critique of the subject as ego and as self-identical 
centre of consciousness - we have seen that he calls 
this the same. What Levinas does seek to redress is 
what may be called the de-substantification of the 
subject. The account of the subject as position 
signifies a break with the thought of identity. This 
absolutely separate subject is required for the 
relation to the Other to be maintained and not to be 
taken merely as an 'effect' of the totalitarian 
thinking of the same. The notion of time as a series of 
Instants is crucial to the signifying of the Other; it 
. is in 
the non-coinciding of the subject with itself 
across the discontinuity of time that the ethical 
dimension is to be traced. 
Let us recall that "time is not a succession of 
Instants filing before an 'I "' ; the event of hypostasis 
occurs 'within' the Instant. This is not 
to deny the 
experience of the transcendent 
'I' but this experience 
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occurs within the time of identity -a time in which 
the 'I' is closed to true alterity. Levinas calls this 
time of identity the time of economy, because, he says, 
this is the time in which the events of the past can be 
forgotten in so far as the present always compensates 
by allowing the event to disappear into the logos of 
history: it is the time in which time (having been 
present) passes. 'c Once again, and according to 
Levinas' use of the phenomenological method, we are 
directed towards certain moments which are held to 
signify the anteriority of the relation to the other 
person and which signify in the time of the non- 
definitive subject. Consider for example the caress: 
"The caress of the consoler which softly comes in our pain 
does not promise the end of suffering, does not announce any 
compensation, and its very contact is not concerned with 
what is to come afterwards in economic time; it concerns the 
very instant of physical pain, which is then no longer 
condemned to itself, is transported elsewhere by the 
movement of the caress and is freed from the vice-grip of 
oneself, finds fresh air and a future" (EE 91/156). 
In the caress, the approach to the other person is 
outside the time in which his identity occurs, and yet 
the separateness of the terms in this relation is 
required. `7 Before the -identity of the terms is 
determined, 'the ' I' moves toward the Other, it is thus 
seen to be joined to that toward which it moves before 
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it moves. A being which existed wholly in the time of 
its identity would be incapable of such movement. The 
caress is not determined by the intentionality of the 
same but by the approach of the Other. In OTB Levinas 
calls this proximity. Experiences such as the caress, 
so described, indicate that the thought of the same, 
which Levinas maintains is the thought of Western 
metaphysics in general. (Ititology, is fractured by the 
thought of the Other which 'comes to light' within this 
tradition. Metaphysics is like a container which proves 
too small for its contents. (We shall return to this 
theme of the infinite within the finite. ) In TI the 
ethical relation par excellence is the face to face, 
where it is described as an "irreducible" relation. 
"Our analyses are guided by a formal structure: the idea of 
Infinity in us. To have the idea of Infinity it is necessary 
to exist as separated. This separation cannot be produced as 
only echoing the transcendence of Infinity, for then the 
separation would be maintained within a correlation that 
would restore totality and render transcendence illusory. 
But the idea of Infinity is transcendence itself, the 
overflowing of an adequate idea. If totality cannot be 
constituted it is because Infinity does not permit itself to 
be integrated. It is not the insufficiency of the I that 
prevents totalization, but the Infinity of the Other". 
(TI 79-80/52). 
The face to face encounter is not between two separated 
'V s; the relation is asymmetrical . The 'I' whose 
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"insular sufficiency is accomplished by enjoyment" (TI 
216/191) and thereby its identity, welcomes the Other 
and can be at "host". The face to face is not, however, 
a variation on being-alongside; in the face to face the 
'I' takes up a position in which it is oriented toward 
what lies 'beyond the face'. The face to face is the 
origin of language for Levinas, but we have already 
noted that this origin signifies not in the time of 
self-identical subjects, in the time of economy; it 
signifies in a time whose past was never present and is 
therefore said to be an-archic. In the face to face the 
Other does not present himself to the 'I'; the 
"epiphany" of the face of the Other signifies outside 
of presence and absence. This origin of language is 
thought by Levinas as the disruption of the same, it is 
metaphysical Desire and is ultimately claimed to be a 
'moral summons' which is reflected in 
"... a concrete moral experience: what I permit myself to 
demand of myself is not comparable with what I have a right 
to demand of the Other" (TI 53/24). 
Metaphysics did not begin with this moral summons but 
had already begun before the relata of the ethical 
relation were separate. Separation is nevertheless the 
first event. It is the first event and already 
posterior to the relation to the Other. The temporality 
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of this paradox is expressed by Levinas in terms of the 
anterior posteriority of the ethical relation. The 
relation signifies in the metaphysics of the same as 
belonging to an otherwise than being which is 'older' 
than being, presence, and time itself, which together 
are the articulation of ontological metaphysics. It 
can signify thus, because the subject is not the 
plentitude it takes itself to be. Dis-continuity and 
dia-stasis characterize the subject. The paradox here 
is that the discontinuity itself occurs as ethical 
provocation: 
"The oneself has to be conceived outside of all substantial 
coinciding of self with self. Contrary to Western thought 
which unites subjectivity and substantiality, here 
coinciding is not the norm that already commands all non- 
coinciding, in the quest it provokes" (OTB 114/145). 
The provocation of the Other 'begins' with the "first 
word", which is the phrase "you shall not commit 
murder". This is not a command which calls for 
obedience but one by which the 'I' relates to the Other 
as absolutely irreducible; for Levinas the "absolute 
resistance to murder" (TI 199/173) indicates the 
infinity of the Other's transcendence. The asymmetry of 
the I-Other conjuncture thus signifies as ethical 
obligation, paradoxically: the Other "assigns me before 
I designate him" (OTB 86/109) and yet this "alterity 
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is possible only starting from me" (TI 40/10). We have 
seen how this paradox is maintained in Levinas' 
account, it is succinctly expressed in the following: 
"These differences between the Other and me do not depend on 
different 'properties' that would be inherent in the 'I' on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, in the Other, nor on 
the different psychological dispositions which their minds 
would take on from the encounter. They are 'starting from 
oneself' toward 'the Other'. The priority of this 
orientation over the terms that are placed in it (and which 
cannot arise without this orientation) summarizes the thesis 
of the present work" (TI 215/190). 
Contradictions in the 'formal logic' of this structure 
are of no concern to Levinas here because the claims 
being made will not call for verification within the 
thought of the same. As an alternative to this we may 
provisionally suggest that they seek rather to 
participate in the provocation they announce. The 
absolute otherness which comes to me, comes to me as 
my-responsibility-already-taken-on: I exist this 
responsibilty in the accusative form. This is why, in 
OTB, Levinas expresses the relation to being, hereness, 
as a bare me voici , here I am. ' °'. The subject as the 
accusative me, is not declined from the nominative, an 
example of which, Levinas tells us, 
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is the pronoun . 
for which Latin grammars have no 
nominative. 
The force of Levinas' studies does not rest on any 
logic, and the thought of anteriority is quite openly 
non-logicical. Its closeness to life, as is the case 
with other 'phenomenologies', plays an integral role in 
whether one decides to go further with this thought. 
The accounts of how the Other disturbs me in concrete 
and everyday ways; the hungry face, the outstretched 
hand, the orphan, the widow, hospitality and welcome, 
do not serve to clothe a theoretical structure but are 
where thought of the Other begins. : 20 The studies serve 
to show us how in such experiences I am related to the 
Other not on the basis of his intelligibility (and 
therefore his identity and presence), but first to an 
intelligence. If I ask of the Other whom I address 
the question "who are you? ", then the question reduces 
the 'who' to a 'what' ; the ' who' is reduced to a 
relation between quiddities and refers us to the 
'situation' of the 'who', or the situated-who. When 
Levinas meditates on metaphysical Desire he finds that 
it is already a question addressed to the other person: 
orientation towards the Infinite is an always already 
having entered into the face to face. ý, In taking up 
an absolute position here, the 'I' thereby conceded the 
sovereignty of position to other subjects, but the 
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relation between these subjects in the face to face is 
not an I-Thou, it is a relation to the Infinite. In 
asking the question "who are you? ", the question asks 
as to the ' who-ness' of the one addressed, for which 
Levinas coins the word guisnitv it does not ask as 
to identity but is a relation to a face: there is no 
'I' which of itself could be responsible for the Other 
in the sense Levinas describes. In this we are being 
referred to the 0 origin' of the meaning of 
'responsibility'. A theme we shall continue with. 
Let us rehearse the circularity inherent within the 
paradox which we have before us. The anteriority 
of the ethical relation implies that it temporalizes 
time 'itself'. As such it is even anterior to the dia- 
static hypostasis of the subject, as described above - 
the time in which the lag between the subject and 
itself already refers to the Other (and despite this 
being the movement in which it accomplishes being-at- 
home-with-itself). This says that temporalization 
amounts to the calling to responsibility (by the 
Other). This 'calling to responsibility' signifies in 
two 'directions' at once : in the face of the Other 
it signifies beyond essence and does not refer to 
essential difference, but it also signifies the 
"hitherside" of the subject revealing its dia-static 
substantivity before its identity. That philosophy thus 
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already refers to the Other; that the thinking of the 
same is disrupted by the Other; that the 'I' (of 
identity) conceives respect as a relation between 
equals, but cannot conceive what is wholly other; that 
the I-Other conjuncture is asymmetrical - all these 
things refer us to a notion of responsibility which is 
more "profound than any hegelitarianism Cif we may 
borrow a ruse from Derrida). 
"Under the eye of another, I remain an unattackable subject 
in respect. It is the obsession by the Other, my neighbour, 
accusing me of a fault which I have not committed freely, 
that reduces the ego to a self on the hitherside of my 
identity, prior to all self-consciousness, and denudes me 
absolutely... To revert to oneself is not to establish 
oneself at home, even if stripped of all one's aquisitions. 
It is to be like a stranger, hunted down even in one's home, 
contested in one's own identity... " (OTB 92/117). 
Originary time as the deferment or postponement of 
totalisation (or presence), says Levinas, begins, in 
the sense of ' recommences' , in each Instant and it is 
offectuated by the call to responsibility coming from 
the Other. This account of the I-Other conjuncture 
places it outside of history - which is the time of the 
same - thereby disarming the defence of injustice 
toward the other person in the name of history: I am 
not judged by history but in face of the Other. Each 
Instant is not historically definable or representable 
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on the basis of what it is or comes to be, it is 
meaningful within the face to face as the postponement 
of completeness: the ethical relation triumphs over the 
f ait accompli of history. 
Perhaps this can be made clearer by contrasting the 
eternity realised in each Instant to Heidegger's being- 
toward-death (Sein sum Tode). In Heidegger the 
anticipation of death fixes the finite limit within 
which the question of being is opened and asserts its 
primacy. Within this finite duration, Dasein remains 
concerned with what is its own, with the being which is 
"in each case my own". But the Instant is not a 
definitive gap between the present and the cessation of 
my being, it is rather the indefinite lag between me 
and myself -I face death but never immediately. Across 
this discontinuity, there continues to be the forever 
possible recommencement of the Instant; a time 
remaining in which I am responsible for the Other. The 
infinite divisibility of time renders my death 
insignificant with regard to the meaningfulness of my 
life because my death is infinitely deferred; I always 
have all of time before me such that in each Instant- I 
realise the eternity to which I am committed and 
therefore the seriousness with which that- must be.., 
confronted. = Originary time, says Levinas, is time for 
the Other; this can be characterized by the way in 
138 
which consolation and forgiveness remain the 
possibility of the dying man unto his death. 2a On this 
level the old are no nearer the end of their time than 
the young because each life is contemporary with the 
Instant of the eternal or Infinite. 
We shall close this chapter by referring the work of 
the last two sections back to the first. As we made 
clear in the first section of this chapter, Levinas 
insists on the necessity of thematization and therefore 
history itself. Indeed he says that the Infinite 
"signals itself as thematizing" (op cit. ) . The way(s) 
in which Levinas' discourse locates itself within the 
tradition are manifold and more implicit than explicit. 
They do not lend themselves readily to 11 near 
exposition, Levinas himself not being concerned with 
the 'theoretical' structures of the relation between 
the within and beyond of metaphysics. yO In saying that 
the Infinite signals as thematizing, Levinas shows his 
fidelity to the thought that the Infinite is anterior 
to thematizing, as he puts it in OTB - to the Saying 
before the Said. It also demonstrates the non-mystical 
nature of his claims for the ethical relations in so far 
as we can see here a commitment to ' reason' and the 
necessity for rational thought. However, the discussion 
of reason, for which one could read 'philosophy', 
figures in Levinas' account from the standpoint of 
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being's other. This is in contradistinction to the 
tradition of ontological metaphysics which thinks 
reason in terms of its own theoretical excellence. To 
this Levinas says: 
"When the 'I' is identified with reason, taken as the power 
of thematization and objectification, it loses its very 
ipseity" (TI 119/92). 
From the 'way round' that this remark is structured it 
is at least clear that Levinas intends to centre his 
thought on how it is that the otherwise than being 
signifies rather than with its possibility or 
sayability. We are provided with an account of the 
subject's ipseity, and how this figures in relation to 
the signification of an otherwise than being and how 
without this the subject would remain closed to true 
alterity. To think the tradition from this other 
'perspective' is to think it otherwise than it thinks 
itself, but it is not to stop 'dealing' with it. How 
does the traditional conception of reason bear on the 
relation between individuals? 
"Reason makes human society possible; but a society whose 
members would be only reasons would vanish as a society. 
What could a being entirely rational speak of with another 
entirely rational being? Reason has no plural; how could 
numerous reasons be distinguished? " (ibid) 
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In Levinas, anterior to reason in the sense we have 
looked at, is the face to face; reason is a latecomer 
to the face to face, but it nevertheless is what refers 
us to society and therefore to justice. Reason arises 
with the arrival of a third party (le tiers) to the 
face to face. Does the arrival of the third party 
compromise the face to face? Levinas says it does not. 
In fact he says that the relation to the Other "founds" 
reason (TI 203/178). Discourse, which has its 'origin' 
in the face to face, both effectuates the separation of 
the 'I' and the Other and yet maintains the face to 
face as a relation without relation, that is, as a 
relation always already entered into prior to the 
identification of the terms. Elsewhere, Levinas 
emphasises that it is the orientation of the relation - 
beyond the face of the Other - which has priority over 
the terms placed within it (TI 215/190-1). 
Within the face to face the face of the Other brings 
the first signification; in speaking the Other 
thematizes - in the terminology of OTB, the Saying is 
Said ----Cc. f. TI 207,218/182,193-4). Interrupted in each 
Instant by language (which Levinas recognises to be all 
of thought), the face to face is both signifying and 
signification; anterior to the arrival of the third 
party it is 'pure' signifying, but interrupted in each 
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Instant by language (thought), it also occurs as 
signification and is already a reference to the Others. 
"... the face brings the first signification, that is, the 
very upsurge of the rational... in the welcoming of the face 
the will opens to reason" (TI 218/194). 
Signifying forever recommences in each Instant and in 
recommencing it resists totalization. Levinas says that 
language comes from the Other. We have seen how this 
requires a notion of the subject as substantive: a 
subject (thought) in terms of its sensibility; one 
which does not thinly itself; a subject whose 
identification is prior to its thought - not a thinking 
subject but an enjoying subject. In OTB the subject is 
described as an absolute passivity "more passive than 
passivity". The will of such a subject is necessarily a 
response to the Other: 
"... it is not free to refuse this responsibility; it is not 
free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of 
the Other has introduced it... Language is not limited to the- 
maieutic awakening of thoughts common to beings" 
(TI 219/194). {' 
The third party does not compromise the face to face, 
but compensates for the radical asymmetry in which it 
is 'constituted'. The third party refers us to the 
community in which justice is possible; equality, 
characteristic of justice, has a political rather than 
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a fundamental value. The third party is implied with 
the first interruption of the face to face, not as an 
empirical intrusion of the intimacy of the face to 
face, but because the "third party looks at me in the 
eyes of the Other - language is justice" (TI 213/188). 
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CHAPTER THR. E. 
TRANSGRRSS IQN. S 
LE V INA. S, DH. RR IDA AND THE ©THE. R 
Read 1 rig Cs > and Writing 
Derrida's two major essays on the thought of Levinas, 
along with his shorter articles, make him Levinas' 
most important commentator. Any thesis on Levinas 
stands to benefit by drawing upon the incisive reading 
which Derrida has given of Levinas' work. The 
limitations implicit to the genre of the thesis tend to 
be forgotten unless some kind of precaution is taken. 
This gesture is itself an aspect of Derrida's reading 
of other philosophical texts. Although the name 
'Derrida' itself is no precaution against falling into 
metaphysical traps, his readings forestall any 
simplistic critical response to the texts he considers. 
One prevalent feature of Derrida's reading is the 
exposure of metaphysical presuppositions at work in the 
text. We shall see that this is also the case in his 
essay Violence and Metaphyss ics. In this essay Derrida 
situates Levinas between a reading which effectively 
places him within the tradition of western 
metaphysics, and another which emphasises the sense in 
which his discourse is outside the tradition; as 
caught between the two. Placing him outside the 
tradition paradoxically further confirms the efficacy 
of the first placing, by showing that the 
alternative is "unthinkable, impossible, unsayable". 
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Levin _is' thought, o. --cupyi ng the space 
'between' these 
two, a space which is produced by their difference, is 
an integral part of what it is, for Derrida, to be a 
thinker of the end of philosophy. In other words, this 
double reading of Derrida's/Levinas' is never intended 
to be merely a critical distancing of Derrida from 
Levinas, nor is it aimed at reducing Levinas' 
thinking to the purely traditional. In fact the 
ambiguity of both these relations is preserved in 
Derrida's reading. This in fact indicates a kind of 
fidelity to Levinas, because like Levinas' text 
itself, Derrida's does not seek to dismiss or refute 
the claims put forward in the text. 
By examining Derrida's reading (s) of Levinas we shall 
gain a better understanding of the notion of 
transgressive discourse, in which both thinkers, in a 
sense yet to be clarified, are engaged. What is being 
transgressed? The text of western metaphysics, a drama 
from which no thinker can simply withdraw, is being 
subverted. This subversion itself, however, is not its 
aim - an anarchic upsetting of the applecart merely to 
see which way the apples roll. Nor for that matter is 
it part of a plot with a telos. We know this not least 
because the subversion of which we speak in this 
context has been going on throughout the history of 
thou ht as much a_; if it were a function of history 
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itself. What is so important in the work of Derrida is 
in fact not the identification of instances of rupture, 
which might verify the account of history, as say the 
subversion of identity (in other words, of metaphysics 
by itself). Equally important is recognising the 
significance of this; appreciating the extent of the 
potential effect. So we can see that talking of a telos 
behind the strategic deconstructon is not only 
inappropriate because the term is so metaphysically 
determined: it is inappropriate because the effect of 
the subversion is to be found in every recess of the 
text of Western metaphysics, and given the claim that 
there is nothing outside the text, we may expect that 
nothing will remain the same: its effect is general 
rather than particular. ' 
This proximity between Derrida and Levinas can be 
accounted for in terms of their understanding of what 
it is to be held within the tradition in such a way as, 
at the same time, to be seeking to subvert that grasp. 
Derrida's essay Violence and Metaphysics (VM) , upon 
which we shall focus here, is an invaluable supplement 
to TI, as it does a great deal to expose the text's 
importance for philosophy and indeed its 
philosophicality. We shall ask: What is the price paid 
for this retention of the text for philosophy, in 
contradiction of the themes it clearly develops in such 
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a way as to transcend philosophy (ontological 
metaphysics)? And, to what end is such a retention, so 
masterfully performed, leading, when this thought seeks 
to justify itself within terms of its own necessity, 
and referring to nothing more (and nothing less) than 
the "inseparability of thought and language"? 
These questions and related ones will guide this 
examination of Derrida's reading of Levinas, but they 
should not be seen as part of an attempt to 'put the 
ball back in Derrida's court' using a Levinasian 
racket, because they are already to be associated with 
those questions which Derrida, at the beginning of VM, 
says are "the only questions today capable of founding 
the community, within the world, of those who are still 
called philosophers"(VM 79). (A community whose 
founding fathers, Derrida says, include Hegel, Marx, 
Nietzsche and Heidegger. ) In other words: unlike a 
merely good academic essay, the limit-text anticipates 
certain 'responses' to the closure in which Derrida 
locates the Levinasian text. Conceding the legitimacy 
of certain questions will not be a problem because the 
'better' the question or process of questioning is, 
the more welcome it is in a philosophical community 
founded on "unanswerable questions... problems put to 
philosophy as problems philosophy cannot 
resolve" (ibid). Indeed the questions which concern the 
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end of philosophy are, according to Derrida, just as 
much questions Levinas puts to us as the other way 
around. The "unanswerable" questions which Derrida 
quotes and says are capable of founding a community of 
"responsible" philosophers today; questions philosophy 
puts to itself with regard to its own end, arise ice, 
relation to a 
"... strange certainty about an other absolute origin, another 
absolute decision which has secured the past of the question 
(and) liberates an incomparable instruction: the discipline 
of the question". (VM 80) 
The maintenance of this question sa question, says 
Derrida, is the responsibility to which philosophers 
are called today. Called in particular by Husserl and 
Heidegger. They are also called by the thought of 
difference in thinkers such as Marx, Freud and Levinas, 
says Derrida in his essay Di. fferance, as we have seen 
above. In VM he refers us to "the difference between 
philosophy as a power and adventure of the question 
itself and as a determined event or turning point 
within this adventure. " (VIII ) The difference between 
these two returns us to the thought of the other ; the 
other of philosophy. One formulation places the other 
outside of philosophy and the other places it (somehow) 
within. However, as has been made clear and stated 
several times already: it is the difference which is 
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the concern of thinking in this philosophical 
community. Indeed it is difference (writ large, or even 
with an 'a') which enables us to distinguish between 
the thought of Husserl and Heidegger; it makes the 
conversation which is philosophy audible. We shall see 
how one aspect of the difference in approach between 
Levinas and Derrida is that the 'questions' of which we 
have just spoken, are in Levinas as much the implicit 
framework of the text as they are ever the explicit 
subject matter (indeed if they are ever the latter at 
all). One wonders about the nature of this difference, 
because the making explicit of what is implicit does 
not leave the implicit untouched. Nor is such 
theorizing itself a neutral process in the general 
context of these questions, as we made clear in 
Chapter 2. 
A general synopsis of Derrida's approach to Levinas, 
which we shall expand on below, is expressed in the 
following: Levinas is a thinker of difference, and this 
is evident in the themes to which he addresses himself 
and in his treatment of these themes. The title of his 
book Totality and Infinity alone indicates a concern 
with the relation between philosophy, described as 
totalising, and its other, infinity. The relation 
between the two is everything (perhaps literally) and 
will provide either the key, or illustrate the lack of & 
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key, to the beyond of philosophy. Derrida seeks to 
show, among other things, that Levinas fails to 
recognise certain parameters that determine the 
possibilities open to philosophy within what he calls 
the closure; that Levinas cannot really say what he 
says without simply repeating certain metaphysical 
themes and that he fails to recognise this ensnarement 
as a result of not addressing himself to the tradition 
in its most inescapable pervasiveness, namely as 
metaphysics of presence. This reading of Levinas does 
not take the form of a straightforward critique, but 
seeks, as is characteristic of other deconstructive 
readings by Derrida, to find the points in Levinas' 
text at which the presence of presence makes itself 
felt. The significance of this for Levinas' account of 
the primacy of 'ethics' would be that it requires the 
veracity of what it seeks to put into question; it 
requires the totality (reason/being/the same) to be 
precisely what it claims to be, but this would 
radically exclude the possibility of the (absolute) 
Other. Levinas' project, says Derrida, requires that 
the beyond being be thought and said at the same time, 
which is impossible. Furthermore, this "impossible" 
functions at a much more profound level than that of 
formal contradiction. 
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In Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas declared 
that the aim of his thinking was to accomplish a break 
with "Parmenidean" metaphysics; the metaphysics of the 
unity of being. The "guideline" taken in going about 
this task was the Platonic notion of The Good situated 
beyond being, what he elsewhere refers to as the beyond 
being- or Infinity. In Totality and Infinity in 1961, he 
announced that this aim had been achieved: "We thus 
leave the philosophy of Parmenidean being" (TI 
269/247). In the same place he says that "Philosophy 
itself constitutes a moment of this temporal 
accomplishment, a discourse always addressed to 
another". The dialogue between Levinas and Derrida 
which finds expression in Violence and Metaphysics, 
helps us to understand this idea better, and it is 
worth noting straightaway that this is an indication of 
the way in which the "break with Parmenides" in 
Levinas, is inscribed within philosophy and discourse 
rather than in silence. It does not show, of course, 
that this "break" is what it claims to be, but it 
demonstrates Levinas' challenging of the classical 
Inside/Outside structure of all discourse, something 
which Derrida in other places too, has so well 
described. Derrida it would seem, does not think that 
Levinas does this in a satisfactory way. In Violence 
and Metaphysics he goes about demonstrating this by 
first giving a reading of Levinas' own readings of 
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other philosophers, namely, Hegel, Husserl and 
Heidegger. These 'readings' are themselves no more a 
critical 'surpassing' of these thinkers than are texts 
by Derrida. Such a philosophical gesture would in any 
case be inapproriate here, as each of the thinkers in 
question challenges the primacy of reason, in their own 
way. Furthermore, Levinas has a profound affinity with 
Husserl and Heidegger in that they all place 
experience at the centre of philosophising, albeit 
changing the meaning of 'experience' in each case. 
Indeed it is this appeal to experience to which 
Derrida is so allergic. In so many of his essays he 
goes to great lengths to show that it is a notion which 
is conceived entirely within the metaphysics of 
presence. For that reason one would expect it to be the 
most unlikely notion to be appealed to in any 
attempt to transform/transcend that metaphysics. In 
Grammatol ogy, for instance, the primacy afforded to the 
immediacy, or immediate experience, of speech by the 
tradition, is challenged in the name of Writing-, whose 
authority does not rest on any appeal to experience. 
The authority of speech rests with the author; the 
self-present hearer of the sign which is said, whereas 
Writing, first thought of as the antithesis of speech, 
refers to the absence of any author and gains its 
authority from its context, its interpretations and its 
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generating of dif Terence in the form of multiply-- 
fractured signs. This to the point where there may be 
more 'truth' to be found in a contradiction in Writing 
than in the voice of any authoritative author. Writing 
is only first thought as the antithesis of speech. The 
reversal of this priority produces more than an 
inversion (as do the significant 'reversals' in all the 
thinkers that Derrida would describe as thinkers of 
difference) because it transpires that speech could 
never have been what it took itself to be in the first 
place. In this sense Writing is capable of exposing 
speech to itself as a pretender to the throne of truth. 
At the same time, it becomes clear that Writing could 
never merely have been writing, namely, the graphematic 
representation of phonetic speech. The emergence of 
Writing, Derrida would say is 'epochal'; it marks the 
closure of the metaphysics of presence - but it does 
not simply transcend it. 
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On the trace arid difference 
In the summary which Derrida offers at the beginning of 
VM, of the philosophies of Heidegger and Husserl, he 
says 
"The archaeology to which (they both) lead us by different 
paths entails, for both, a subordination or transgression, 
in any event a reduction of metaphysics". (VM 81) 
The transgression is against metaphysics; against the 
Greek logos the one and only philosophical _ 
language. 
This being the only philosophical language implies that 
the philosophical dialogue between Husserl and 
Heidegger, the "two Greeks", can only be said and 
understood from within this language. Questions about 
the future of philosophy in view of its death or dying 
nature together with the recognition of the 
inescapability of the Greek logos are the two basic 
concerns of thinking capable of founding the 
"philosophical community" Derrida speaks of at the 
beginning of his essay, and to which we referred above. 
The thinking of the future would, under this rubric, be 
transgressive in the sense of making the limit of 
philosophy (namely, its 'Greekness') a thematic 
function of philosophizing. This is not to say that the 
'limit' of philosophy must always be the subject matte 
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but it does imply that any thought which undertakes an 
internal critique must respond to this 'limit' as its 
internal parameter. Such an internal critique, governed 
by the two basic principles recalled above, certainly 
seems to be the basis of at least one of the readings 
of TI undertaken by Derrida himself, in VM. This 
reading focuses on the treatment Levinas gives to 
Husserl and Heidegger. We have already indicated and 
discussed in part, Levinas' relation to Husserl, and 
his seemingly peculiar insistence (accepting what we 
have just reiterated about tie Greek Ii2gna) on how his 
analyses rely entirely on the "phenomenological 
method". We saw in Ch. 2 also how this 'phenomenology' 
refers us to the level of life rather than the world of 
constitution. Let us recall for a moment how Derrida 
often reminds us of the dangers of supposing that we 
can escape the consequences of using metaphysical 
language merely by redefining a few key terms, and at 
the same time let us note that it is precisely the 
transgressive character of TI which makes it an 
appropriate context for such reminders. 
The reduction of metaphysics that Levinas undertakes, 
"... seeks to be understood from within a recourse to 
experience itself. Experience itself and that which is most 
irreducible within experience: the passage and departure 
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toward the other; the other itself as what is most 
irreducibly other within it: Others. "(VM 83) 
As we saw in Chapter 1, in both Hegel and Heidegger the 
end of philosophy was marked by a disruption of 
thinking. In Hegel this is the moment when 
consciousness experiences the participation of the 
absolute in each step along the road to absolute 
knowing; that the road to Science is already Science. 
In Heidegger the disruption occurs as the 'failure' of 
thinking to bring metaphysics to its end (Vollendung); 
the failure of the thinker to provide the name for 
Being. For both of them the end of philosophy is 'in 
relation' to the other. In Hegel this becomes the 
subject's "self-recognition in absolute otherness". In 
Heidegger this is expressed differently in different 
stages of his thinking: it is the otherness of Being 
experienced in original anxiety. For each of them the 
end of philosophy is entirely within metaphysics and 
belongs to metaphysics. We shall see how different this 
is in the case of Levinas. Levinas very firmly places 
the 'experience' of the other within the totality (of 
everyday conceptual thought/experience) and this partly 
accounts for the rather idiosyncratic retention of the 
vocabulary of phenomenology. The concrete daily 
experience of moral consciousness is, in his 
descriptions, of no small significance, as we shall 
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come to reflect upon below. And when one considers that 
in his thinking he also seeks to revert the destruction 
of the subject/object distinction; "the dissolution of 
the 'I "' (c. f. Ch. 2) , then it is less surprising that 
Levinas sometimes uses what appears to be very 
traditional language. The issue is not as to whether 
one may. use traditional language any longer, the idea 
that we do this of necessity is not a difficult one to 
understand. Accepting this, the question should now 
help us discover what makes one kind of use (or abuse) 
of the Greek logos more 'productive' than another in 
the discourse of the end of philosophy. This goes hand 
in hand with a questioning of the neutrality of this 
"productive". 
At the end of his 1968 lecture "The Ends of Man"-*, 
Derrida says that for the philosophy of the future to 
overcome the tradition, it must weave together two 
possible responses to limits imposed upon it by 
tradition. They were, namely, "to attempt a 
deconstruction without changing ground... (and) to 
decide to change ground, in a discontinuous and 
eruptive manner". We agree with R. Bernasconi's finding, 
in his essay "The Trace of Levinas in Derrida", that 
such an interweaving strategy is to be found in VM, in 
the 'double' reading given of Levinas' work there, and 
when he says, 
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"Derrida interweaves a reading of Levinas in terms of his 
intentions, with another where the emphasis is placed on the 
limitations imposed by the fact that he cannot evade 
philosophical discourse. " s 
As Bernasconi shows, what might at first sight appear 
to be critique, can on reflection be seen to be 
Derrida's compensation for Levinas' writing as if one 
could simply shake off the tradition. In other words, 
what appears to be Derrida's attempt to restrict 
Levinas' discourse of the beyond being, should rather 
be seen as the provision of a 'strategic' balance to 
it. The reminder of the restrictions, or parameters for 
thinking concerned with the end of philosophy is not 
here intended as a criticism of an oversight, but 
rather as one aspect of what a limit-text, a text of 
the closure of philosophy, must be concerned with. This 
kind of reading is typical of the textual 
deconstructions which Derrida was to produce in the 
following years. 
In stressing the limitations imposed by philosophical 
discourse, Derrida does at least supply the reader with 
an insight into what the issues are in thinking the 
end of philosophy. If it were true that Levinas' text 
exhibited the tendency to 'forget' the limitations of 
philosophical discourse then this thematic insertion of 
these issues into his text, might 'save' the text for 
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philosophy. A text which might otherwise drift off into 
obscurantism? Surely not. Nor does Derrida suggest 
this. At least not at the level of Levinas' intentions: 
"The complicity of theoretical objectivity and mystical 
communion will be Levinas' true target. The prexmetaphysical 
unity of one and the same violence. An alternation which 
always modifies the same confinement of the other. " (V1M 87) 
Derrida is emphatic that, 
"... all our questions already belong to ( Levinas') own 
interior dialogue, are displaced into his discourse and only 
listen to it, from many vantage points and in many ways. " 
(VDI 109) 
This second quotation here serves very well as a 
general description of what is going on in Derrida's 
reading of Levinas. We should, nevertheless, perhaps 
add the qualification that although Derrida says that 
the questions already- ady belong to Levinas' interior 
dialogue, he would not in general be so keen to make 
any radical distinction between what is brought to the 
text and what is found there. What is the nature of the 
questions (im)posed in the (con)text? Derrida says 
they are "questions of language: questions of language 
and the question of language" (ibid). Having accredited 
TI with being a text into which such questions may be 
displaced/are to be found, we come to a point at which 
Derrida makes a straightforward claim about something 
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that Levinas' text does not do: it does not pose 
" formally and thematically" the question of the 
relation between the tradition and transgression of the 
limits of tradition. Thisiswhat he says, 
"... the attempt to achieve an opening toward the beyond of 
philosophical discourse, by means of philosophical 
discourse, which can never be shaken off completely, cannot 
possibly succeed within language - except by formally and 
thematically posing the question of the relations between 
belonging and the opening the question of closure. " (VM 110) 
If this is not the basis for a critique, it at least 
appears to be some kind of redress for an omission. 
Again it raises the question as to whether the formal 
and thematic questions of the closure constitute the 
supplementary text brought by Derrida to TI and whether 
Levinas' text is such that it can be receptive to them. 
Also, is it the case that the "double strategy" 
described above is already a function of TI? We have 
already expressed our reservations about reintroducing 
a distinction that has long since been dispensed with, 
between the text and the reading being given and it 
would be pointless to seek to resurrect it here. But 
with regard to whether TI exhibits an appropriate and 
adequate sense of the within to compensate for the 
gesture towards the k. yond is not, we shall argue, a 
question of small consequence. Firstly this would imply 
that the motive for supplying the 'supplementary text', 
as we described it above (the formal and thematic 
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questions of the closure) was other than we had first 
thought, namely, "saving" the text for philosophy. 
Alternatively, Derrida's formal and thematic questions 
of the closure might be shown to be superfluous to 
ethics as Levinas would have us understand it. It may 
even prove that the ethical relation necessitates a 
rethinking of the closure, such that insistence on the 
formal and thematic would be seen to be purely 
academic (neutral). If this is true then it implies, 
firstly, that the signification of the Other within the 
tradition is 'non-philosophical' (or general). 
Conversely, (that is, seen from the other side) this 
would effectively imply that there is no privileged 
discourse in relation to the Other. Levinas might 
express this by saying that all discourse is always 
already an address to the Other; the relation to the 
Other is the 'origin' of language. We shall return to 
this in Chapter 4 in the discussion of the face-to- 
face. 
It might be that at this time Derrida did not believe 
that TI exhibited a satisfactory notion of the within 
to compensate for the discourse on the beyond being. 
And when he says, 
"We are wondering about the meaning of a necessity: the 
necessity of lodging oneself within traditional 
conceptuality in order to destroy it. "(VM 111) 
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the implication is not that this is what Levinas has 
intentionally done in TI. What is it, we are wondering, 
to be lodged in the traditional conceptuality 
intentionally or consciously when the one thing that 
seems to be clear is that thought is so 'lodged' of 
necessity. It seems that however we may come to 
understand this, to be a thinker of the end of 
philosophy, one must have incorporated this thought in 
a reflective way into the internal structure of one's 
thesis; one must have made this "reflexive turn" the 
decisive moment in thinking the end of philosophy. The 
question remains, however, as to the effectiveness with 
which this has been done. To have done it but 
ineffectively, would be to expose the gesture toward 
the beyond of philosophy to likely 'recapture' or 
'neutralisation' by the traditional conceptuality, 
thereby divesting the text of its 'positive 
possibilities'. 
The general aim of the incisive reading of texts, of 
the parasitic intrusion into the text with precisely 
such questions as those of the closure of philosophy, 
is to make the text 'signify' in the direction of 
another text. This is possible, it is said, because the 
text bears the trace of this other text within it. In 
one sense this style of reading the text could be said 
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to be a 'technique' for exposing the latent 
metaphysicality of the text. The technique would 
therefore be of special value in dealing with texts 
which are oriented toward the'beyond' of metaphysical 
discourse - it could show the points at which 
metaphysicality persists/returns. (One may ask if this 
is not precisely what Derrida's appropriation of the 
trace involves - it traces/marks out these parameters- 
for thinking, thereby holding the closure open). At the 
same time such a reading effectively produces a text 
which indicates, blatantly rather than latently, in the 
direction of the beyond of metaphysics whilst 
maintaining itself, literally within the metaphysical 
text. The question will be: is this resj natiwi to 
metaphysics closed to the thought of the Other? This 
is the most important question in our consideration of 
the dialogue between Levinas and Derrida. This incisive 
reading of the text draws our attention to the 
difference between the text as it signifies within 
metaphysics and this other signification of the text 
which does not find its 'expression' within the 
metaphysical text, but nevertheless signifies as a 
trace of that other text. 
In his 1968 essay " Differance" Derrida names five 
thinkers in whom the thought of difference is 
foremost and in the context of whose texts 
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differ8nce can be silently traced. Bernasconi 
demonstrates very clearly that the notion of the trace 
could just as well have served to unite the theme of 
Derrida's article as the notion of dlfferance 1. In a 
similar way to which the term differance " imposed" 
itself on Derrida-f the term trace seems to have imposed 
itself on the discourse of the end of philosophy, at 
least in Heidegger, Levinas and following them, 
Derrida. Between the three there is considerable cross- 
influence in interpretation of the term; between 
Levinas and Derrida (both having learnt from Heidegger 
and Derrida having learnt from both). The term, trace, 
perhaps like all of language, functions in relation to 
the metaphysics of presence and absence. In ordinary 
usage of the term a trace marks the absence of 
something which was once present. As with difference, 
which Derrida emphasises is neither a word nor a 
concept (but which in fact always becomes one in the 
text) the trace similarly is a marker in the text of 
metaphysics of something of which being cannot be 
predicated. In fact difference is not: differ8. nce is a 
trace (of difference. ) The trace signifies the other of 
metaphysics within the text of metaphysics, whereas 
differ$nce (is) the other (but only as a trace). This 
is all rather convoluted but I wish to make clear that 
the trace and differ$nce are not the same for 
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Derrida. Let us look briefly at the trace in Heidegger 
and Derrida. 
In Diff erance Derrida discusses Heidegger's The 
Anaximander Fragment'=. In The Anaxi. nder Fragment, 
Heidegger gives an account of the ontological 
difference in terms of the difference between presence 
and (the) present. This forgotten difference is marked 
in the text of metaphysics, and here in the fragment of 
Anaximander, not by a trace as such f or the trace is 
not a thing or substance; it is neither present nor 
absent in the text of metaphysics. 
"The trace is not a presence but 
presence that dislocates, displ 
itself. The trace has, properly 
effacement belongs to the very 
otherwise it would not be a 
substance. " (SP 156) 
is rather a simulacrum of 
aces, and refers beyond 
speaking, no place, for 
structure of the trace; 
trace but a monumental 
Let us recall that the reading of Heidegger's text is 
given here in order for Derrida to show how the 
thinking of differ$nce can distance itself from the 
thought of ontological difference. Briefly, he does 
this in the following way. He says that differ'nce is 
older than the ontological difference because it cannot 
be thought within the horizon of Being. Heidegger's 
recalling of the ontological difference from the 
oblivion into which it had fallen, takes place within 
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metaphysics and it discovers that metaphysics 'begins' 
with the forgetting of this difference. However, the 
genesis of this difference is not recallable within 
metaphysics because it is 'older' than metaphysics; 
older than language. Derrida's difference is a non- 
word, non-concept referring to the non-origin of the 
ontological difference, which, once it has fulfilled 
the task of 'referring' , as it does in Derrida' s text, 
can only itself be referred to as a self-effacing trace 
(of a trace). Why does Derrida unleash differwnee into 
this discussion of the ontological difference in 
Heidegger? Is it to demonstrate a realm of the 'older 
than old', an origin? On the contrary, he says, 
"Not only is there no realm of differance, but differance is 
, 
even the subversion of every realm. "(ibid 153) 
Derrida uses the notion of difference to show how the 
thinking of the ontological difference in Heidegger 
calls us to a repetition of metaphysics but does not 
prepare us for our own "venture" beyond the mos. He 
recognises the necessity of the "passage" through the 
thought of ontological difference, that the thought of 
differance is not possible without it, but he does not 
believe in the 'recuperabilty' of that other, of that 
which "has no name", for thinking. For him this is 
Heidegger' s "nostalgia". The trace of differ-nce in 
Derrida does not indicate the recuperability of 
differance, nor even the recuperability of the trace. 
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Diffe. r$nce is what enables the text of metaphysics to 
be read; renders it intelligible. It does so in a 
similar way to which the spaces between words make them 
identifiable. In Derrida, the play of difference is 
endless: one does not track down things - "one tracks 
down tracks". 
For Derrida, thinking within the ontological difference 
produces two kinds of texts: texts which do not 
adequately take into account the necessity of being 
held within the tradition in their attempt to think 
against the logos and texts which fail to recognise the 
way in which from within the thought of ontological 
difference we are referred "beyond the history of 
Being, beyond our language as well, and beyond 
everything that can be named by it" (ibid. 157) It is 
Heidegger's account of the ontological difference that 
has opened up this space for thought. The ontological 
difference confronts thought with the un hinkab liit-y_ of 
the difference between Being and beings; the 
unthinkability of the difference between the within and 
the beyond of metaphysics. Heidegger' s thought is 
ambivalent in this respect: 
"To the extent that... logocentrism is not totally absent 
from Heidegger's thought, perhaps that thought (is still 
held) within the epoch of onto-theology, within the 
philosophy of presence, that is to say, within philosophy 
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Itself. This would perhaps mean that one does not leave the 
epoch whose closure one can outline. The movements of 
belonging or not belonging to the epoch are too subtle, the 
illusions in that regard are too easy, for us to make a 
definite judgment. " `' 
For Derrida this space which is opened for thought by 
Heidegger's meditation on ontological difference is a 
place of "indecidability" and it is, therefore, the 
point at which a deconstructive reading is likely to be 
most 'productive'. I"" The trace is what 'spaces'; what 
holds open the opening for thought at this point and 
therefore Derrida seeks to preserve (aufheben) its 
indecidability. This is why 'interpretation' of the 
trace is so crucial in the thinking of the closure. 
In Derrida the trace is always of another possible 
text; it effectuates the call 
"in the language of being - (for) the necessarily violent 
transformation of this language by an entirely different 
language" (SP 158) 
In Levinas, the trace is always the trace of the Other, 
the infinite, the Good beyond being. It is the trace of 
a 'realm' in which the ethical relation to the Other is 
entered into prior to the realm of being, identity and 
difference. We shall now look at why the trace is so 
central in our consideration of Derrida's reading of 
Levinas. 
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The trace in Levinaý 
Levinas first explicitly employed the notion of the 
trace in the two essays "The Trace of the Other" 
(1963) ' "' , and "Meaning and Sense" (1964) ' °' . He employs 
the term to extend and deepen his meditation on 
alterity; an otherness not conceived on the basis of 
difference. The general thrust of these studies begun 
in the 1940's and developed and 'repeated' in various 
works since then, remains the same : to give an account 
of the relation to anOther (autrui) whose alterity in 
relation to the same cannot be expressed or 
experienced, within metaphysics of being, more 
precisely, on the basis of the difference between 
beings. In a section entitled "Eros" in Time and the 
Other (1947)Levinas already explicitly raises 
questions such as the following, 
"In civilised life there are traces of this relation with 
the other which must be investigated in its original 
form. Does there exist a situation in which the other would 
not only have alterity as the reverse side of his 
identity, would not only obey the platonic law of 
participation where every term contains a sameness even 
though this sameness contains the other? " '', '- 
The use of the term trace here does not have the 
meaning it bears in the later essays, but it is, 
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coincidently, used in a place which begs a questioning 
of how the relation to the Other is reflected in 'the 
world', in morality. This passage is cited here to 
remind us of the longstanding sense of the necessity of 
breaking with the "cosmos of Greek rationalism" , 
which resonates throughout Levinas. In the The Trace of 
the Other, Levinas does not give us a formal and 
thematic account of the trace, he rather attempts to 
show the manner in which the trace signifies. 
The article begins with the sentence: 
"The Me is the best kind of identification. It is the origin 
of the phenomenon of identity. " "-, -- 
In Chapter 2 we discussed in depth the moment of the 
identification of the 'I' in Levinas and explained how 
the separation of the 'I' was necessary for the I- 
Other conjuncture. Discussion of this theme, in both EE 
and TI, in a sense, concentrates on 'this side' of the 
conjuncture. We have speculated on the sense in which 
this account was a feature, and one instance among many 
in Levinas, where we see evidence of the commitment to 
the "foothold in being" (EE); to the tradition; to what 
Derrida in one place calls his respect for "a zone or 
layer of traditional truth" (VM 132). The discussion of 
the trace in The Trace of the Other refers us to the 
'other side' of the I- Other conjuncture. It thinks 
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from this 'other side' in so far as the discussion 
elucidates the manner-in which the Other signals within 
the same whilst maintaining its alterity - it signals 
as a trace. Polemicizing against Heidegger's ecstasy of 
Dasein, as he had already done TI, he says: 
"Does there exist a meaning of signification which will not 
be equivocated by the changing of the Other into the Same? 
Can we have here a thing so strange as an experience of the 
absolutely exterior, a thing as contradictory in terms as a 
heteronomous experience? "'t-' 
The 'experience' Levinas has in mind here would be 
contradictory in the sense that it would not be, 
through the return of the 'P to itself - the circuit 
of selfness -a negation of the experienced. This 
suggests that the word 'experience' is rather 
inappropriate for what Levinas will seek to describe. We 
remember that in the studies which described how the 
existent accomplished its separation, in EE and TI 
(discussed in Ch. 2) the word 'experience' was 
inappropriate there, too, when it came to naming the 
movements of the subject. The word event was preferred, 
avoiding the reference to reflection implicit in the 
concept of experience. Surely then, the movement 
toward the Other, without return, would similarly be 
better designated by another word. 
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"The heteronomous experience for which we are looking - will 
be an attitude which cannot be converted into a category and 
in which the movement toward the Other will not reclaim 
itself by an identification, will not return to its point of 
departure. I' 1 =' 
The 'attitude' Levinas speaks of here, he characterizes 
as ingratitude. As the ' I' does not found itself in 
relation to the Other, but dwells solitudinously in 
relation to its element, it does not, in its 'relation' 
to the Other, reduce the Other to the same. 
"The desire for the Other 
nothing is missing. " °'! C°' 
is born in a being for whom 
The first three sections of the essay all deal with 
themes that had been dealt with in greater detail in 
TI. In the context of what follows on the trace1 of 
particular note is that: 
"The Other is present in the cultural complex and is 
clarified in this complex as a text is by its context (my 
emphasis)... The Other does not come to us only through 
context; he has a significance of himself without mediation. 
Its cultural signification reveals and is revealed through 
the historical world in which it belongs... The Other is 
given concretely in the totality... "ý'' 
The discussion of the trace in The Trace of the Other 
will help us better understand the way in which the 
Other signifies within the totality; in what sense it 
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still refers us to the play of presence/absence, within 
hi ory. By looking at that now we shall follow a route 
that will bring us back to the main themes in 
Derrida's reading of Levinas in VM. Levinas puts the 
question thus: 
"How is it that the countenance is not simply a true 
representation where the Other renounces his otherness? To 
answer this, we are going to study the exceptional 
" significance of the trace and the personal order where such 
a significance is possible. "ý'= 
At this point Levinas describes several aspects of the 
encounter with the countenance of the Other. 
"Why do shivers run through me when I pass 
indifferently beneath the gaze of the Other?.. The presence 
of countenance... puts an end to the detachment of 
consciousness... The epiphany of the absolutely other is the 
countenance where the Other calls out to me and signifies 
for me an order on behalf of his nudity and his 
destitution. "' 
When he refers to the "detachment of consciousness", he 
is referring to the ' I' in its solitude. This ' I' , as 
we explained above is said to "take up its existence" 
and "dwell" in the element. The accomplishment of this 
being-at-home-with-itself (chez-soi) of the 'I' is the 
'condition' for the relation to the Other, the etýiiaa 
relation. Paradoxically, the ethical relation is prior 
to this identification of the ' I' ; prior to the sojourn 
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of tue 'P in the world qua constituted. In TI it is in 
his attempt to elucidate this paradox that Levinas 
introduces the notion of the anterior posteriori. The 
ethical relation is 'older' than 'I' qua existent; the 
'I' which is present. The world of the constituted 'I' 
is posterior to the ethical relation, but to this 
' I' , which is the 'I' of conceptual thought, it appears 
a priori, hence the description anterior posteriori. 
Within the thinking which Levinas describes as 
'ontological metaphysics' the Other appears, as a 
trace. This is the point at which Derrida would object 
that the trace does not appear at all, because it is 
al waysa trace which effaces itself as it traces. We 
shall come back to this shortly. Before that we shall 
now look at how Levinas' thinking of the trace can be 
seen as an attempt to "speak from beyond being". This 
will eventually lead us to an appraisal of his claim to 
have broken with "Parmenidean metaphysics". 
We can see from what has been elucidated above that the 
model for thinking from the 'other side' has no 
pretentions to dispensing with, or diminishing the 
place of the logos (the 'side' of the same) in 
thinking. Nor does Levinas' thinking ever truly 
separate the finite and the infinite: the finite is 
always to be heard in the in-finite. What Levinas does 
do i. s to challenge the omniscience of the logos. The 
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discourse on the trace aims to show the anteriority of 
the ethical relation (N. B not the Other 'itself') to 
the ontological 'realm', by appealing to the trace of 
something 'older' than chronology itself; not thinkable 
(In time) but 'encountered' in the ethical relation. 
This is the trace which ruptures the totality according 
to Levinas. 
Levinas' assimilates his thinking on the trace to the 
trace of the One in Plotinus, the notion of the Good 
beyoi: d being in Plato and Idea of the Infinite in 
Descartes. We want to show that his own meditation on 
the trace does in fact involve what Derrida would 
describe as a "double strategy", thus acknowledging the 
necessity of thinking from within the tradition. 
We shall show that, this thinking undertaken from 
within the trace, which is beyond being, goes farther 
than demonstrating this necessity and its meaning for 
thinking at the end of philosophy. It does not seek to 
describe the inter-dependency of being and the One/the 
Good, nor to describe a hierarchy of two, the Good and 
being, which could be thought by means of the metaphor 
of height: The Good beyond being is "higher than 
height". Collectively the analyses could be held to 
demonstrate that the thought which holds itself in the 
closure of philosophy but which takes the "double 
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strategy" of thinking simultaneously from within and 
beyond philosophy and which describes a 'parity' of the 
two, remains closed to the trace of the Other. It would 
refuse utterly the presence of the Other in the trace 
and thus remain closed to true al teri ty. In Levinas, 
contradictory as it may seem, the Other, because it is 
truly Other, can tolerate (and requires) being made 
'present' in the trace; the alterity of the Other does 
not suffe r in the ethical relation, on the contrary it 
is accomplished in the face-to-face. What we are saying 
here is that when Derrida reads Levinas and stresses 
the necessity of thinking from within the tradition 
(something Levinas expresses in terms of the infinite 
within the finite: the in-finite), as if to compensate 
for the excesses of a thought claiming to come from 
beyond being, he is effectively rejecting what Levinas 
has to say about the asymmetry- of the 
finite/infinite. : ý"'- 
The Other La capable of 'participating' in presence. 
"Do we not answer in the presence of the Other to an order 
of which the significance remains irremediably 
disrupted... Such a signification is the signification of the 
trace. The beyond from which the countenance comes signifies 
as trace. The countenance is jr. the trace of the 
Absent... "(ibid) 
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Thought from within the thinking of the trace, in 
Levinas, the traditonal conceptuality has been 
disarmed, at least to some extent (if one can speak of 
'extent' here) of its omniscience, so its two master 
concepts, whose names are used here, do not bear the 
values that they formerly possessed. Metaphysics is not 
thereby pacified, violence is not in this moment 
suspended or postponed: this text is still philosophy. 
Only in the ethical relation is the violence of history 
deferred. The "absolutely Absent" from which the Other 
"proceeds", is of course not simply absent in the way 
which the absent would be absent for a thought which 
had not come to think the possibility of another 
signification than that of the Greek logos. Having 
attained the thinking of the trace, need Levinas be so 
allergic to these words which, in one way or another, 
are scare-quoted all along: why not, indeed, dress up 
in the "devils patches" when there is nothing else to 
wear? When philosophizing we must wear our clothes. It 
is not insignificant that the encounter with Other, the 
ethical relation, is the place in Levinas where the 
metaphor of nudity and nakedness is used so 
effectively. Could it be that at this point Levinas is 
more ready to accept the necessity of "using the stones 
of the house in order to destroy it" than Derrida 
himself? Probably not and not least because it is 
Derrida, more than anyone else, who has given us to 
178 
understand the nature of this necessity. Why then is 
Levinas less wary than Derrida in his use of them? The 
answer is that as the target of his criticism of the 
Greek logos is not explicitly (nor "formally" and 
"thematically") to expose it as the metaphysics of 
presence, but to demonstrate how the Other signifies 
within the totality: the emphasis is simply placed 
elsewhere (we will not say yet that is of another 
nature) 
What Derrida seems least willing to accept is that the 
trace can be said to be present and that it is also 
what he would call a "self-effacing trace", which 
for Levinas it also clearly is. 
"The unhiddeness which restores the world, leads back to the 
world, and is the property of the sign or of a 
signification, abolishes itself in this trace"°r' 
Levinas certainly does think of the trace as somehow 
being 'present' within the totality, as we have said, 
not in any simple sense, but neither is it such that it 
'remains to be determined' by philosophy. It cannot 
become a substance (In fact, as in Derrida, it is not 
anything as such at all). He says the trace "obliges 
us in relation to the Infinite". In OTB he says the 'I' 
becomes a mere accusative before the Other (c. f. chi 
f. n. 47a). 
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H is-tory and the tra cý 
A crucial point in the dialogue between Levinas and 
Derrida revolves around Levinas' presentation of the 
trace within metaphysics and how this bears upon any 
understanding of history. The contradiction (and let us 
not forget here Levinas unashamed rejection of "formal 
logic") acceptable or unacceptable as it may prove to 
be, is expressed by Derrida in the following: 
"Doubtless this encounter with the unforeseeable itself is 
the only possible opening of time, the only pure future, the 
only pure expenditure beyond history as economy. But this 
future, this beyond, is not another time, a day after 
history. It is present at the heart of experience. "(VM 95) 
The contradiction arises because, 
"Language cannot make its own possibility a totality and 
include within itself its own origin or its own end. " (ibid) 
The sense in which the trace is 'present' within 
history, for Levinas, can be referred back to the 
notion of overflowing which we looked at in relation to 
Descartes, ird Meditation in Ch. 1 Sec. 4. 
"What counts is the overflowing of objectifying thought by a 
forgotten experience from which it lives. " (TI 28/xvii) 
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This forgotten experience is reflected within the 
totality asa, trace. That Levinas does not digress into 
a systematic scare-quoting of all the terms of his 
discourse nowhere reflects a 'carelessness' with regard 
to the ineluctable logos. For him it is not directly an 
issue to show that the risk of metaphysical 
reappropriation is ineluctable.: "'' In VM Derrida often 
speaks as if Levinas' aim was to make this 'experience' 
accessible within metaphysics. What he says implies 
that Levinas misses the sense in which the absolutely 
other cannot be absolutely other and be represented in 
the text of metaphysics; 
"... (the) "absolutely other" cannot be stated and thought 
simultaneously; it cannot be absolutely exterior to the same 
without ceasing to be other. .. "(VM 126) 
"Or, at least 
cannot be, or be anything ; and it is indeed the authority 
of Being which Levinas profoundly questions. That his 
discourse must still submit to the contested agency is a 
necessity whose rule we must attempt to inscribe 
systematically. (VM 95f. ) 
Once again Derrida calls us to the thought of 
subverting the text as a means of forestalling its 
reappropriation by metaphysics. This is a theme to be 
found in. many different places in the writings of 
Derrida (at least when he concerns himself with the 
closure as a fie. ) as he does in the following: 
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"We must elaborate a strategy of the textual work which 
every instant borrows an old word from philosophy in order 
immediately to demarcate it... This is why I so often use 
the word 'history' but so often too with quotation marks and 
precautions that may have led to the attribution to me 
of... a rejection of 'history' ."°: '=-' 
The opening for thought achieved by Heidegger's 
thought of the ontological difference is to be held 
open by means of textual devices: this deployment of 
technical devices within the text of metaphysics is the 
kind of disruption that has a chance of deferring the 
moment of metaphysical reappropriation; it is a 
disruption of history which is a re. -spicing of the 
Text. 
Derrida often writes as if what we are confronted with 
in Levinas is an unacceptable "rejection" of history; 
an unacceptable digression into eschatology. He says 
that to relate the trace to experience is to make 
experience itself eschatological. Continuing from the 
citation above, he says that the Other 
".. is present at the heart of experience. Present not as a 
total presence but as a trace. Therefore, before all dogmas, 
all -conversions, all articles of faith or philosophy, 
experience itself is eschatological at its origin and in 
each of its aspects. "(VM 95) 
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Derrida is making the point about the "rejection" of 
history in the con, '-text of TI. In other places in VI'!, 
in another 'readinS', he draws attention to the manner 
in which TI does not reject history but is engaged in 
the reinterpretation of history at the end of 
philosophy. For Derrida the greatness of the work is 
to be measured according to the extent and manner in 
which it can be the con-text of this question. (This is 
of course what we were talking about above in reference 
to the opening remarks of VM). Let us go back now to 
Levinas' discussion of the trace to see in what ways 
the work it does in the Levinasian text, "in breach of 
the totality", differs from the work it does by being 
inscribed within the closure in Derrida. 
Towards the end of The Trace of the Other Levinas uses 
the term illeity, he-ness, in referring to the beyond 
being. The term emphasises that the encounter with the 
Other is an encounter with a4. Other and not with an 
impersonal One. (And yet the Other and the Good are not 
identical. ) In TI, in the face-to-face, I am oriented 
towards the Good; I am oriented beyond being, towards 
the Good. In TO , in the same place, 
Levinas also 
refers ill ei ty to the third 4ierson; ill el ty a 
reference to the third. But in TI, the role of third 
party is to refer the face-to-face to reason: society 
is not a relation between two. In TO the third seems to 
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be used to refer us to the beyond rather than 'back' to 
society. The notion of illeity is held to transcend the 
distinction between my relation to the Other in the face 
to face and my relation to the other person who enters 
upon the scene qua third party. My relation to the 
third party is through my objective knowledge of him; 
the relation to the third is the archetypal, or even 
empirical, encounter with the other person, but already 
refers us to the face to face. The place of the third 
in TI is and remains, in our view, ambivalent and we 
shall undertake a more detailed analysis of this term 
in the following chapter in connection with the 
discussion of the lace-to-face. 
The section of TO entitled "The Trace and He-ness" 
begins thus: 
"If the meaning of the trace consists in signifying 
something without causing it to appear; if the trace 
establishes a personal and ethical relation with he-ness but 
does not uncover this relation - then the trace does not 
lend itself to phenomenology, to the understanding of 
'appearing' and 'dissimulating'. Then, at least, there is 
another way to approach the trace, by locating its meaning 
'": =' in relation to the phenomenology which it suspends. " 
In relation to the discussion above, this passage 
reminds us immediately of three things. 
Firstly, a 
signification which does not cause appearance reminds 
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us that the Other is 'present' within the totality but 
not in any a-em-a-e, representable in the logos. Secondly, 
saying that the trace is "beyond phenomenology" does 
not mean that Levinas will not continue to use, what 
he refers to in several places as, "the 
phenomenological method". In Chapter 2 we saw how his 
analyses of work, fatigue, sleep, insomnia etc., showed 
them to be "non-phenomena" . Thirdly, when he says we 
can "approach the trace, by locating its meaning in 
relation to the phenomenology it suspends", we can note 
this could equally be said to be a description of the 
'method' involved in using the trace to (a) work a 
system of displacements in the text of metaphysics and 
(b) simultaneously raise the question of the relation 
between this displacing and the thinking it displaces. 
In other words, what we see here is the sense in which 
the Levinasian trace can be referred to the closure of 
philosophy, which is, as Derrida would be the first to 
say, at the level of thought. 
As we said before: in Levinas, the trace is not, 
however, referred to a text, the Text, the displaced 
text of philosophy: it is the trace of the Other. The 
trace functions within the text of philosophy as sign 
but it does not 'belong' to philosophy; it does not 
belong to "the world"; 
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"The trace is not a sign like any other. But it does play 
the role of a sign, can be taken for a sign... The authentic 
trace... disturbs the order of the world. ". '' 
The trace of the Other is a mark, in history, of his 
having passed bv. We spoke of the ' self-effacing trace' 
above in relation to both Derrida and Levinas. Now we 
can see how this notion of the trace is found in both 
of them but with a different significaton. In Levinas 
it is the trace qua sign; the trace as it appears in 
the text of philosophy which is self-effacing. In this 
self-effacing the "authentic" trace of the Other is "to 
be seen"/marked as the trace of "He (who) has passed by 
absolutely" (ibid). This trace is not, cannot be 
effaced. No sooner has Levinas said this than he adds, 
"But every sign is, in this sense, a trace. " 
The "authentic" trace was distinguished from other 
signs only to be likened to them a few sentences later. 
This may appear at first sight to be a blatant 
inconsistency, and at the level of "formal logic" it 
may in fact be so. However, it is consistent with the 
claim, worked and reworked, deepened and resaid in so 
many different ways, in Levinas, 
ethical relation is' older' 
metaphysics. 
that "ethics" /the 
than ontological 
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"... Over and above what the sign die the sign in ontological 
metaphysics) signifies, is the passage of the person who 
left the sign. The significance of the trace duplicates the 
meaning of the sign put forth in communication. The sign 
finds its consistency in this trace. "(my parentheses) " 
The relation to the Other, in the trace, is what 
conditions/makes possible, communication at the level 
of signs, namely, communication in the Greek lQgos: 
'communication' is a priori. At least we could say that 
were the a priori not a reference to the chronology of 
the logos. We have already referred to the notion 
Levinas uses to transcend this contradiction: it is the 
anterior posteriori. Levinas provides us with an 
apposite example at this point; 
"In a letter, for example, the significance is in the 
writing and the style of the letter, in everything which 
shows that at the time of the very sending of the message, 
which we grasp from the language of the letter and its 
sincerity, someone passes purely and simply. This trace can 
be taken once more for a sign. " =' ` 
Any text, though a letter serves well as an example, is 
addressed to the Other(s): the relation to the Other is 
beyond the Text of philosophy. My communication/ 
discourse Q the Other, is already for the Other in 
this sense. Writing is first an address: addressing the 
Other 'I' am pure accusative, voci : the text is a 
Signature. It may look as if Levinas has taken a long 
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route back to empiricism at this point: that the Pnd of 
philosophy in Levinas is literally an end to 
philosophizing. This is not so.::: ` L(? cri nas' account 
of the trace does not refer u-; back to the collectivity 
of being with others as in Heicý-gger's mi teinandersein. 
The relation to the Other in Levinas is not to be in 
the presence of the other in the sense which is 
characteristic of miteinandersein. The trace in Levinas 
"is the presence of whoever, strictly speaking, has 
3S 
never been there. In Levinas the trace is 
a "passage" (la passe) towards the Other. The thinking 
of the trace is not a thought which would bring 
philosophy to an empirical halt, on the contrary: 
"Trace as trace does not lead into the past. It is a passage 
itself toward a past which is farther removed than any past 
from any future, a passage which is still taking place in my 
time. "ý°' 
Thinking, meditation on the trace, is thus a mode of 
being in the trace of the Other. Such is the philosophy 
of the trace in Levinas, however, the ethical relation 
does not occur at the level of thought, it is located 
only in the face-to-face. 
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H ii=-; tc ry , rupture and the Ir1EtaT1t of 
interruption 
We have seen how for Derrida what is called history is 
a 'play of differences', like other concepts it is an 
effect of this play. That history can never present 
itself as "absolute history" is because the 'play of 
differences' "remains in complicity" with the log-Qs. In 
other words: if history is a 'circle'; if history is a 
totelity, then it is not possible to say whether it is 
a finite or an infinite totality, precisely because 
within it there would be nothing to differentiate the 
two. ýý4' Levinas' 'rejection' of history, for Derrida, 
takes the form of relegating it to the order of the 
same (VM 93/4). It becomes the quasi-history of the gQ 
as it takes up existence in relation to the element. At 
this point Levinas only has the notion of Enjoyment to 
support his rejection of the charge that this 
-'dialectic' of the Instant "entails a certain 
negativity" (VM ibid. ) This leads Derrida to say, 
"One wonders whether history can be history, If there is 
history, when negativity is enclosed within the circle of 
the same, and when work does not truly meet alterity, 
providing itself with its own resistance. One wonders 
whether history itself does not begin with this relationship 
to the other which Levinas places beyond history. The 
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framework of this question should govern our entire reading 
of Totality and Infinity. " (V1( ibid. ) 11 
The logical consequence, which Derrida draws our 
attention to, is that a metaphysics of absolute 
separation, such as Levinas', must think the Other as 
a positive plenitude, but it cannot be stated and 
thought at the same time. This thought does indeed 
govern Derrida's reading of the work and is 
characteristic of the gesture of deconstruction: it 
seeks out the point within the text under scrutiny, at 
which it attempts to found itself on a transcendental 
signified, or directs us to an 'origin' (arche). In 
doing so it seeks to show not only how this notion of 
arch6 is logocentric, but also how the questioning of 
the thought of arche remains in complicity with the 
logos. The logos is ' unescapable' ; speaking against it 
always confirms it. Derrida is correct when he 
suggests that Hegel is the figure "on trial" in 
Totality and Infinity. Levinas understands this 
criticism well and responds to it in OTB by stressing 
the an-arche of the trace. 11 
In fact the an-archy of the relation to the Other, in 
the face-to-face, was already clearly to be seen in TI. 
Ironically, it is the ability of the an-archic trace to 
'defer' presence which led Derrida to adopt it into 
his own later writings'`' and indeed into VM in the way 
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of alterations to the text for its 1967 publication, 
albeit with a "Heideggerian intention". "' Despite the 
functioning of the trace in Levinas, Derrida charges 
Levinas' text with thinking the Other as a positive 
plenitude and its consequences: the ethical relation, 
the face-to-face, is to be in the trace of the Other; 
it occurs (entirely) within history. Levinas claims, 
to the contrary, that in the face-to-face I am uprooted 
from history" "°' - history is 'suspended'; history is 
put in brackets. In fact this epitomises the ethical 
"To think and to speak is to interrupt the course of 
history. To live an eternal life is to be able to judge 
history without waiting for its end. "`": -'' 
Both Levinas and Derrida have a discontinuous notion 
of history. For Derrida history is "fractured" it is, 
despite its own self-understanding, incapable of being 
a whole. History always bears within its "margins" 
another text. What then is the difference between 
Derrida's notion of history as 'rupture' and Levinas's 
'interruption' of history in the ethical relation ? 
This difference must in the first instance be referred 
back to the diatribe on the Inside/Outside, namely the 
necessity of the inside/outside structure of language. 
We shall ultimately see that the difference between 
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Levinas and Derrida can be expressed in these terms 
(or in the apparently similar terms of the in-finite). 
Lets put it briefly, now, in the following terms: for 
Derrida the inside (of metaphysics) ý. s the outside, a 
model for which the image of the Klein bottle, a 
topological paradox, comes to mind. For Levinas, 
emphatically it is the preservation of the absolute 
difference of the terms in the relation which is 
crucial to the breach of totality. For Levinas there 
are no 'decisive' ruptures of the totality. Sometimes 
it may appear that there are: for instance, those 
marked by the 'emergence' of the trace in the text of 
metaphysics in the form of the trace in Plotinus, the 
Good in Plato and the idea of the Infinite in 
Descartes. These would then constitute decisive moments 
in a "history of the Face", as Bernasconi suggests. " 
The danger here would be, as Bernasconi points out, 
that this is too readily likened to the history of 
Being in Heidegger, in fact it is in a sense dependent 
on it. What must not be forgotten is the radical sense 
of ' anteriority' ascribed to the face-to-face, which we 
shall return to shortly. The relation to the Other, the 
ethical relation, is effectuated in each instance of the 
face-to-face. And it is by referring back now to the 
notion of the Instant in Levinas, discussed in Ch. 2, 
that this difference between Levinas and Derrida can 
be best understood. 
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In the previous chapter we looked at how the notion of 
the Instant related to the "identification of the ' I' "; 
how it functioned in relation to the same. At various 
points we have tried, with reference to relevant points 
in Levinas' text, to show the sense in which his 
thesis thinks 'from the perspective' of the Other. In 
each case this is a kind of thinking in two directions 
at once - we have seen how the notion of the anterior 
posteriori is a paradigm of this paradox. On the same 
model, the Instant does not of course only refer to the 
"identification of the 'I'", which is both anterior 
and posterior to the ethical relation - in the sense we 
have explained. The Instant is equally the time of the 
otherwise than being. As we have seen, the Instant is 
prior to the ' I' of identity, but it is also the time 
of the Other: in the Instant, I am responsible for the 
Other, not in such a way as would be determined by 
history, but absolutely. It is a time in which I always 
have time, like Zeno's arrow, whose flight is eternal, 
for the Other. 
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CFHAFT. ER FQ UR 
T'RANSASCRNDRNGJF 
THE FAGS TQ FACH, LANGUAGE AND 
TMR THIRD PART Y 
Tra. nýr. - a*-=, cendence 
"This absolute exteriority of the metaphysical term, the 
irreducibility of movement to an inward play, to a simple 
presence of self to self, is, if not demonstrated, claimed 
by the word transcendent. The metaphysical movement is 
transcendent, and transcendence, like desire and 
inadequation, is necessarily a transascendence. " (TI 35/5) 
The title of this chapter takes its name from a 
neologism coined by Jean Wahl and borrowed by Levinas 
in TI to capture in one word the sense of the 
transcendence and the elevation of the Other. Having 
mentioned the term in this context Levinas does not 
employ it systematically in the analyses he then goes 
on to present, showing the sense in which the 
transcendence of the Other is a transcendence unlike 
that thought by the tradition, he simply ' borrows' the 
word 'transcendence' from the tradition. We wish to 
show in this chapter the sense in which the term as 
used in Levinas is both/is neither a verb and/nor a 
noun: the Other is Transcendence and transcendence is 
the movement, or taking up of an orientation by the 
same toward the Other in the face to face. 
In examining the face to face and its relation to the 
third party in Levinas we are focusing on one of the 
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formulations of what might be said to be the 
philosophical problem with which his work grapples. 
This is not merely to describe the relation to the 
beyond being but to demonstrate how the thought of this 
beyond refers to society: the face to face is not a 
'beautiful experience'; worship, but the concrete event 
of the ethical. The thought of beyond being in Levinas 
would never subscribe to the existentialist "I find 
myself a thing amongst things" as a vision of ultimate 
reality, but it would to the emphasis on being "a man 
amongst men"; it is a thought which takes the external 
world seriously. Indeed, it sets about thinking the 
exteriority of the Other at the same time as attempting 
to forestall the reductive retrieval of the Other by 
comprehensive thought. The face to face (in Levinas' 
text) is a" difficult" thought to follow and one which 
takes us to the heart of (one of) the most important 
tasks of philosophy today, which is, in Levinasian 
language, to free ourselves of an "hypocrisy"; to heal 
the "rending of a world attached to both philosophers 
and prophets" (TI 24/xii). The face to face is also, in 
this same thinking, said to be the moment in which III 
do not .k at all -I 
listen. I hear a Saying 
'before' it is thought by me qua Said. 
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The facE (in > relation : 
the face to fame 
"The face is still a thing among things. " (TI 198/172) 
As such it can still be the object of a phenomenology 
which would attempt to think it in terms of a 'posited 
object' ; an intentional noema relative to my noetic 
gaze. But the face, it can be argued, is an 
intentionality in reverse: I encounter it as what looks 
at me - the face is a Itnoema without a noesis". I am 
aware of the face of the other as a face before I am 
aware that I am a face, too, and for the other. It is 
the case, therefore, that the experience of the face is 
always within a face to face relation, but it is also 
true that there is an asymmetry in the face to face in 
so far as my experience of myself as face occurs only 
if I withdraw from the encounter of the face of the 
other. The 'I' and the Other are not equals in the face 
to face; the face of the Other is 'experienced' before 
the ' I' has time for reflection; before I ckm me - and 
it would therefore be claimed - prior to thought. The 
experience of the face is originary , but not in the 
sense of arch6, a concept belonging to ontological 
metaphysics. From what has been said above, the reader 
will have more than an inkling of the manner of 
operation of this apparent contradiction in Levinas' 
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work. The face is only ever experienced in the face to 
face; in a relation between the 'I' and the Other. The 
third party interrupts the face to face but yet plays a 
crucial role in the representation of the face to face 
as a relation between two.. (See below) The third party 
signifies reason and the , social. Reason only krc w the 
face in the same way it knows anything else; for reason 
the face is indeed a thing among things, at best it 
' knows of' the Face (i. e. face qua Other). Within the 
face to face the relation between the terms is ethical 
rather than epistemological. The relation between the 
'I' and Other in the face to face is neither immediate 
nor mediate; it is neither a communion nor strictly 
speaking a relation at all in so far as that implies 
two relata sharing the same, namely ontological, 
status. It is a "relation without relation" (c. f. TI 
80,295/52,271). It is a relation entered into before 
the ontological determination of the terms arises. The 
difference between the two 'terms' is accounted for in 
ethical language, for example, in terms of obligation, 
and responsibility, as we have already seen. 
Primarily at issue in Levinas' account of the face to 
face is how this relation can be thought and said at 
the same time. ' The importance of this question has 
been made clear particularly by Derrida, as we saw in 
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the last chapter. Is not the face to face, which echoes 
the Husserlian emphasis on what is lived but not known, 
ultimately open to the very same criticism which 
Levinas- himself makes of Husserl when he accuses him 
of having given himself the "freedom of theory"? In 
other words: if the face to face is such that it can be 
made the object of a theme, as it is in Levinas' text 
(of necessity), how can it be 'originary' in the sense 
he claims for it (or indeed in any sense)? This 
question would bring us back to a discussion of the 
theme in terms of history, and specifically with regard 
to whether Levinas goes back on the Heideggerian 
insight into historicism, which he once took to heart 
in his work on Husserl. Is not the Face simply absent, 
despite the implicit scare-quoting, which we reflected 
in the discussion of the trace in the last chapter? Is 
not the face to face relation destroyed in each 
thought of it? These are some of the questions which we 
shall explore in this chapter. In doing so we will see 
how the thinking of Levinas progresses in movements 
which may appear to be 'circular', but which, in 
reality, are not equivalent to a linear exposition, not 
even one bent back into a circle. The deepening of the 
exposition undertaken by Levinas which defies 
linearity, is faced with the difficulty of representing 
a movement which does not (itself) have time for 
reflection (nor can it be reflected). It is therefore 
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an essentially speculative thought ' for which 'staying 
with its subject matter', is a keeping up with it, a 
' running commentary' -a staying with the thought of 
the Infinite without arresting that thought, which is 
pure movement, an absolute transcendence. Let us begin 
our examination of the place of the face to face in 
Levinas' exposition by recalling the images of it, 
provided in TI. 
Images of the fe ce 
If the face of the Other in the face to face is the 
face of any Other (and considering that it is not 
Levinas' aim to provide criteria for deciding what is 
and what is not Face), then it may seem strange 
that he provides us with examples of particular faces 
at all. In giving an account of the "ethical 
relation", the face to face, Levinas seeks above all to 
describe the ethical height *- of the Other, elsewhere 
described in terms of the asymmetry of the I- Other 
conjuncture, and to show how before the face of the 
Other the 'I' is put into question. We shall say more 
about this in a moment. The faces Levinas 
draws our 
attention to in specific parts of his account are 
those 
of the poor, the widow, the orphan, 
the destitute, all 
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of whom are "strangers". He also draws our attention to 
the face of the "teacher", or "master"; the Face is 
instruction. A further example of the face to face, 
which we shall consider below in reference to our 
discussion of the role of the third party, is that 
encountered in Eros. Let us consider first the faces of 
the stranger and teacher. 
Firstly let us note that the image of the poor, the 
widow and the orphan - the destitute are emotively more 
powerful images in a general account of responsibility 
to ones fellow human beings than say that of the fat 
cigar-smoking capitalist or truncheon-waving riot- 
policeman. Once again we find ourselves touching on the 
question of the use of pathos in Levinas. Prior to 
exposing the legitimacy of presenting these examples 
one can only say that in so far as what Levinas is 
doing is "phenomenology", then the experience of the 
face of the destitute is the appropriate experience of 
the ethical on which to focus. In a similar manner one 
could question the centrality of the phenomenon of 
anxiety in Heidegger, claiming that an analysis of joy 
could be shown to be of greater ontological 
significance. Without going any further with this 
digression, which surely indicates the road to an empty 
relativism, we wish only to point out here that the 
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'legitimacy' of focusing thought around an 'experience' 
in phenomenology can only be measured by what it 
enables philosophy to go on to show. 
The face of the destitute is the face which disrupts 
the 'I' at-home-with-itself (chez-soi). The ipseity of 
this ' I' , we remember was accomplished in relation to 
the element; in relation to the other (autre), which 
can satisfy its needs. 'Then' the Other appears on the 
scene: 
"The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the 
idea of the other in me, we here name the face. This mode 
does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in 
spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an 
image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and 
overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing 
to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum - the 
adequate idea. It does not manifest itself by these 
qualities, but kaG aVro. It expresses Itself' (TI 50/21) 
In facing the Other the 'I' learns that the idea of the 
other it has is inadequate to the Other. This is the 
point at which the central notion of separation can be 
seen to signify in two directions at once: the "insular 
sufficiency" of the I, its ipseity, marks its 
separation from existence, the other in general, but it 
learns, in facing the Other, that this otherness on 
which its separation is founded is merely derivative, a 
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mere idea, of the alterity which it now faces. It is 
the face which "teaches the infinity from which this 
insular sufficiency is separated. " (TI 216/191) The 
second direction in which separation signifies is, 
therefore, in relation to the Infinite. 
In Levinas' 'system' the face to face is the centre 
through which his entire analyses flow and to which 
they return. Its centrality in his thesis reflects the 
status he attributes to this 'experience' as it is 
lived; he calls it "the ultimate situation" (TI 81/53), 
experience par excellence. He makes it the origin of 
language and meaning (TI 206/181). Significantly, when 
we examine this centrality we find that it is actually 
a da-centering of the self, of consciousness, of the 
noetic act of self-identification, and a severing of 
the noesis and the noema - it refers to the arrival on 
the scene of an Other which "is by itself without 
reference to system" (TI 75/47). This de-centering 
refers to the asymmetry of the face to face; the face 
to face is not a relation among equals. The sovereignty 
of the subject is only to be found in its relation to 
existence, as we have seen, at the "level of life". 
This is not the "level" at which the encounter with the 
Other takes place. It is precisely the sovereignty of 
the subject in its relation to the other that the Other 
disturbs in facing me. In his essay Transcendence and 
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height, Levinas calls this putting into question 
Idle: 
"The event of putting into question is the shame that the I 
feels f or its naive spontaneity, for its sovereign 
coincidence with itself in its identification as the Same. "ý' 
Although the ethical relation is not a relation 
between equals, it is asymetrical, the uniqueness of 
the ' I' is as equally important as the alterity of the 
Other in the face to face. Were this not the case then 
then there would be no adequate sense in which the 
responsibility engendered in the face to face could be 
said to be mine. 
"The epiphany of the absolutely other is the face where the 
other challenges me and commands through its nakedness, 
through its destitution. It challenges me through its 
humility and from its height... the putting into question of 
the same by the Other, is a summons to respond. The I is not 
simply conscious of a necessity to respond, as if it were a 
matter of an obligation or a duty about which a decision 
could be made; rather it is in its very position 
responsibility through and through. "(op cit ibid) 
This is another clear indication of how separation 
introduced in the account of the 'I''s accomplishment 
of its ipseity, can now be seen to be 'constitutive' of 
the uniqueness of my position in face of the Other and 
therefore makes the responsibility in question mine. 
204 
Levina. s gives a name to this situation of the ' I' : he 
calls it election. Elected, in the face to face "I can 
recognize the gaze of the stranger, the widow and the 
orphan only in giving or refusing". (TI 77/49) 
The images of the face to which Levinas gives pride of 
place, aim to show that the encounter with the Other is 
not an experience of threat and fear but one of my 
unlimited responsibility in face of the demand which 
the Other places upon me. The face of the hungry, 
therefore, is not an arbitrary choice by Levinas, nor 
for that matter is it Face in the ultimate sense, 
because it is in his and in this text, obviously a 
schema to aid understanding rather than an instance of 
an actual face to -face. The face of the hungry is the 
example chosen because it is, in an important sense, 
more representative of the Face (even though the Face 
cannot be represented at all). Hunger, it may be said, 
in an instant, goes beyond the political causes of 
hunger in general; the hungry one places a demand upon 
me- and not upon society. (We shall turn to the role of 
the social in relation to the face to face below). The 
demand placed upon me in the face to face is not a 
threat not because the Other is weak but because it is 
the nature of my responsibility with regard to this 
demand that is older than the moment in which the ' I' 
identifies itself as i. Before I am me I am 
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responsible for the Other: to be me is to have already 
withdrawn from the primordial face to face. In the 
Instant in which the Other faces me, I do not return to 
myself as in the moment of self-identification, I take 
up an orientation toward the Other, face to face. This 
orientation toward the Other can be said to be 'older' 
than the identification of the 'I' because the movement 
Levinas earlier called "the upsurge" of the subject 
into existence is essentially a movement toward the 
Other, even if it were taken to be merely a relation to 
the other in the reflective act of consciousness - the 
thought of which the self-identified ' I' , in folding 
back upon itself, is capable of. Separation of the 
subject in relation to the element is the condition for 
the face to face because it secures the separation from 
the infinite other, the Other. The face to face is not 
a communion between the 'I' and the Other, but it was 
already entered into before the 'I' folded back on 
itself: the ethical relation is older than the terms 
that constitute it. A proposition as acceptable or 
unacceptable as the notion of the ý, t eri or posteriori. 
Levinas not only presents the face of the stranger and 
destitute as a paradigm face of the Other but also 
describes the very condition of being in the world as 
Other a strangeness- destitution (6trangete-misere), 
he 
7 the 
says: "Existence kx& cxd o 
is, in world, a 
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destitution". (TI 75/47) The Other appears as face, 
stripped of all attributes, qualities and form - it 
does not appear as such. It is pure nakedness, says 
Levinas: "nudity disengaged from every form, but having 
meaning by itself, 1ra6? aQro, signifying before we have 
projected light upon it " (TI 74/47) 
Through the descriptions and repetitions and 
reiterations of metaphors in all this, Levinas is not 
struggling to describe the experience of what it is ti 
be- Other in the world as if it were possible to 
literally speak from the 'perspective' of the Other. It 
is also clear by now that in attempting to give an 
account of the face to facer his discourse no longer 
takes the form of a phenomenology appropriate to 
the description of the ego - an egological 
phenomenology, such as was employed very effectively, 
for example, in EE, in describing the substantivity of 
the subject. If speaking from beyond being means 
anything at all in Levinas, then it is a speaking from 
within the face to face and in so far as he attempts to 
do this he is clearly not involved in a phenomenology 
of the face. Since the Other is not an alter ego for 
Levinas ', it is not surprising that the attempt to 
account for the beyond being is beyond the scope of 
'egological phenomenology', which is only ever, Levinas 
would say, a reflection restricted to the domain of the 
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same. The other qua Other is only encountered in the 
face to face. The question then is: how can one speak 
from within what is claimed to be the ultimate 
relation, a relation between two. Again this is an 
issue we can refer back to Derrida's general objection 
that the Infinite cannot be thought and stated at the 
same time. With this we have jumped backwards and 
ahead, and before we go onto . to consider the relation 
between the third party and the face to face we shall 
reflect first on the other image of the face employed 
in Levinas' account, namely, that of the master or 
teacher. 
If the images of the face that Levinas presents us with 
are intended to convey the height of the Other and the 
demand placed upon us in the face to face then, the 
face of the master or teacher might seem an obvious 
choice for representing the height of the one above the 
other. A teacher is ahead of his pupil and can guide 
him. In so far as Levinas' remarks about the face of 
the teacher and teaching figure in his overall critique 
of ontological metaphysics that ensues therefrom, they 
are above all a rejection of philosophical dialogue as 
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"Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the 
exterior and brings me more than I contain. " (TI 51/22) 
I neither learn infinity from the Other nor learn to 
discover it within me; as in Descartes Third 
Meditation, the Infinite thinks itself in me. 
"The Cartesian notion of the idea of the Infinite designates 
a relation with a being that maintains its total exteriority 
with respect to him who thinks it. It designates the contact 
with the intangible, a contact that does not compromise the 
integrity of what is touched. (TI 50/21)... In its non-violent 
transitivity the very epiphany of the face is produced. " 
(TI 51/22) 
What is so apposite in my face to face with the teacher 
is that he addresses me, he speaks (first) and in so 
doing introduces me to something which is entirely new; 
"he opens other perspectives (and) brings us to a 
notion of meaning prior to my Sinngebung and thus 
independent of my initiative and power. " (TI ibid). 
In speaking to me the Other teaches me his alterity, 
not as a fact but because the epiphany of the face is 
the coincidence of the "revealer and the revealed" (TI 
64/35f), the teacher and the teaching (TI 70/42); he 
reveals himself ka61 avro. Polemicising against 
Heidegger, Levinas opposes the notion of revela Lion to 
ýi,, c-1 osure, which, he says, is always disclosure 
in a 
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borrowed light, because it always refers to "the 
horizon of him who discloses" (TI 64/36). For similar 
reasons Husserl's account of the relation to Others 
would also miss true alterity. This is one of the 
points in VM at which Derrida seeks to demonstrate that 
Levinas fails to respond to a certain limit of the 
language in which both his critique of Husserl and his 
account of the ethical relation are presented. He says: 
"Levinas... speaks of the infinitely other, but by refusing to 
acknowledge an intentional modification of the ego - which 
would be a violent and totalitarian act for him - he 
deprives himself of the very foundation and possibility of 
his own language. What authorizes him to say infinitely 
other if the infinity of the other does not appear as such 
in the zone he calls the same, and which is the neutral 
level of transcendental description? " (VDI 125)(my emphasis) 
It is interesting at this point to consider what sort 
of criticism this is. Is Levinas being criticised for 
not making the infinitely other appear? Something which 
he is at great pains to demonstrate is not appropriate 
to the 'nature' of the Other, and a demand whose 
legitimacy the entire discourse on the face challenges. 
And what is the authority to which Derrida refers here 
if it is not the authority of the loogos_? And finally 
may we make a similar observation to the one made by 
Derrida in relation to Levinas' reading of Husserl, a 
few pages earlier in VM, when he implies that Levinas 
overlooks the sense in which Husserl had already 
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addressed himself to the issues at hand vis a vas the 
Other: Derrida's discourse at this point is inscribed 
within Levinas' thinking on the face. Of course to 
say more about this one could turn to no better source 
than the Derridian corpus itself where the entire 
problematic of being inside or outside of a discourse 
is dealt with perhaps more explicitly than anywhere 
else. Throughout, Levinas is quite insistent that in 
the face to face the terms "absolve themselves of the 
relation"(ibid); both the same and the Other preserve 
their integrity. 
The face to face is the origin of language. And it is 
in speech that the ethical relation is paradoxically 
held both to be effectuated and the relata are said to 
absolve themselves from the relation. Levinas seemingly 
freely uses such expressions as the "origin of 
language" and "origin of meaning" that we, having 
learnt from Heidegger and Derrida, tend to be allergic 
. to. In the last chapter we suggested 
that Levinas might 
have been more careful in his choice of terms, given 
that some can be shown to be exceptionally forceful in 
perpetuating the totality his thinking seeks to defy. 
On the other hand, without making the force of onto- 
metaphysical language the theme of his work, without 
thematically seeking out the role of the notion of 
arch& in totalising metaphysics, for example, he does 
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go to great lengths in his elliptical descriptions of 
the face to face to show the sense in which, in so far 
as it can be said to be the origin of language/meaning, 
this is in a non- or an-archical sense. "` Similarly, 
although he does not make the authority of the logos 
his theme, this could not be more directly challenged 
than by the account of the authority of the Other, 
expressed in the "ethical language" which imposes 
itself. What is it to articulate this notion of 
'ethical authority'? And what is the significance of 
this articulation for philosophy as such? It is my aim 
in this thesis to show how these two questions belong 
together in Levinas and what their belonging together 
is held to signify. 
Levinas' account of the face to face as the origin of 
language exhibits, perhaps one should say 'maintains', 
an ambivalence, or an irreconcilability of 
'perspectives' appropriate to the radical asymmetry he 
holds to be characteristic of the I- Other 
conjuncture. On the one hand the 'first word', 
addressed by the Other to me, puts my sovereignty, my 
freedom, into question by suspending it with the 
command : "Thou shalt not commit murder" (TI 199/173). 
A command which announces the limits of my power - 
namely their restriction to the domain of the same. 
This command comes from on high; it is mg1, ia. On 
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the other hand, in the face to face as it stands in 
relation to the Stranger, which we described above, the 
response of the 'V to the demand placed upon it 
restricted the freedom of the 'I' but did not suspend 
it: the ' I' is "free to give or refuse" (TI 77/49). In 
the first version the response appears to be that of 
the Other -a response to a threat, in the second, the 
response appears to be that of the 'I' confronted, for 
example, with the face of the hungry. Is the 
axiological asymmetry subtending the face to face here 
on the point of collapsing into a mere dissymmetry, 
that is, a contingent dissymmetry? To answer this 
question let us consider further how the language of 
the face to face refers to thematization and recall 
what we said earlier '° with regard to Levinas' 
account of the necessity of thematization. 
In Ch. 2 we were concerned with the part of Levinas' 
account which conveys the sense in which the totality 
was breached - how it was possible that totalisation 
was not complete. If Levinas' analysis came to its 
conclusion with this thought then he would be a thinker 
of the breached-totality 'I rather than the beyond 
being. The thought of the beyond being, centered on 
the face to face holds that it is only because the 
absolute alterity of the Other is guaranteed that the 
other qua Other is not annihilated within the thought 
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of ontolological metaphysics, but is preserved as a 
trace 
We can look at how the two images of the face function 
in relation to one another, now, and at the same time 
see how the face to face refers to the world. * 
"I can recognize the gaze of the stranger, the widow, and 
the orphan in giving or refusing; I am free to give or to 
refuse, but my recognition passes through the interposition 
of things. (TI op cit. my emphasis) 
... Teaching does not simply transmit an abstract and general 
content already common to me and the Other. It does not 
merely assume an after all subsidiary function of being 
midwife to a mind already pregnant with its fruit. Speech 
first founds community by giving, by presenting the 
phenomenon as given; and it gives by thematizing. " 
(TI 98-9/72) '' 
My Les on nse might be to give bread which would equally 
be to speak. Speech, like the face itself, which 
Levinas says is pure expression, is and is not of the 
world. Discourse - face to face - does refer us to the 
world, and it does so on the basis of a signifying 
which never becomes a signification; the Other does not 
present himself in a theme: "... the first teaching of 
the teacher is his very presence as teacher" (TI 
100/73) His non-thematizability is the 'condition' 
for discourse which, of necessity, passes through the 
interposition of being(s) We shall come back to this 
at the end of this chapter. 
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Things , Giving and Objectivity 
Passing through the 'interposition of things', it might 
be thought is inappropriate to the face to face, as we 
have been led to understand it: it is after all said to 
be a "relation without relation" (TI 80/52,295/271) and 
things are essentially relational. 'I Levinas' 
discussion of things both in EE and TI occurs in a 
polemic against Heidegger' s notion of Ze-u. & and 
Zeughaftigkeit and das Worumwillen as presented in 
Being and Time, 915,16 & 18. In EE' '-ý and TI the thing 
was described in terms enjoyment , living from... (in 
which things are 'ends in themselves'). This account 
belongs to the phenomenological analyses describing the 
substantivity of the subject. In the section entitled 
"Objectivity and Language" in TI, the polemic against 
Heidegger' s thinking of Zeug is continued, but this 
time the emphasis is on the difference between the 
thing as it enjoyed by the subject and the means by 
which it attains its objectivity. Objectivity, says 
Levinas, 
". . . is posited in a discourse, in a conversation 
(entre- 
tien) which proposes the world. This proposition is held 
between (se tient entre) two points which do not constitute 
a system, a cosmos, a totality. "(TI 96/68) 
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We can see here the sense in which the thing is a gift 
: the thing is a proposition put forward in discourse, 
whose originary form Levinas calls the face to face 
It not surprising that if Levinas is going to call the 
face to face the "origin of language" then there is 
also going to be a sense in which it is the origin of 
the thing and indeed everything. What then does his 
polemicising against Heidegger in this context 
achieve? Firstly let us recall that Levinas wants to 
show the manner in which the face to face relates to 
'the world'. But to do this involves taking up a 
critical distance to the dominant 'totalitarian' 
thinking of the world and the worl. dhood of the world, 
of which, for Levinas, Heidegger is the most advanced 
proponent. His own understanding of the Infinite is not 
a supplement to Dasein's ecstatic dwelling in the 
world. In so far as he speaks of the Infinite within 
the finite, which he also seeks to express in terms of 
the concrete relation to the human, then he has to have 
some way to mark out his own sense of the finite from 
that of the tradition, and this is part of what is 
going on in his polemic against Heidegger at this 
point. '',:: ' 
The formula which thinks the face to face as that which 
breaches totality is in fact an inversion of what is 
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actually being claimed: the face to face is older than 
the 'realm' of being, it is therefore more accurate to 
say that the face to face is interrupted by the 
interposition of things. But seen this way around, from 
beyond being, the interruption does not appear as that 
which fatefully prevents the face to face from occuring 
; it is not prevented from 'completing itself' is 
the totality - seen from the side of the totality 
itself. This is the meaning of the difference between 
the finite and the infinite-in Levinas. 
Setting aside the question of the 'legitimacy' of the 
polemic against Heidegger ", what does it aim to 
establish? As we saw in Chapter 2 Levinas challenges 
the idea that meaning comes to the world through the 
Sinngebung of the subject in favour of the I-Other 
conjuncture. In relating the face to face to 'the 
human' Levinas obviously wants to distinguish precisely 
between the world of things and the social world in 
which the plurality of Others is governed by reason. 
It is on this referring of the face to face to society 
in Levinas' account that so much seems to depend. It 
is crucial in relation to philosophy because it is only 
in thinking the relation between the finite and the 
infinite that it can free itself from the alternatives 
of the blind repetition of the metaphysics of being and 
mysticism. . '`` 
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Within his own account, what is at stake is the 
possibility of justice, which does not itself belong to 
the face to face; justice is 'in view of' the Others., a 
'perspective' represented in Levinas by the third 
party. In "formal logic", there is of course a 
contradiction here, perhaps the contradiction and with 
it the entire concept of contradiction. Its 
'resolution' is not, however, what Levinas is seeking. 
His account attempts to show how the contradiction 
only arises and is given a negative value in 
ontological metaphysics, in the time of the logos. The 
sense of the Infinite within the finite, in Levinas, 
requires the maintenance of the integrem of the face 
to face as a relation between two and yet the integral 
reference to the third party. In the images of the face 
we have examined up to now, those of the stranger and 
the teacher, which show the face to be both demand 
and command, we are at the same time reminded that the 
Face has its point of reference in the human (face). 
That the problem of the infinite within the finite, 
refers to the human, is expressed in the following way 
in TI: 
" To posit the transcendent as stranger and poor one is to 
prohibit the metaphysical relation with God from being 
accomplished in the ignorance of men and things. The 
dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face. "(TI 
78/50) 
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The Infinite (God, the divine) must pass through the 
human ('realm' of being) and the "interposition of 
things" as we mentioned above. This is a good point at 
which to reflect on the way in which the priority of 
the ethical involves a reinterpretation of the 
phenomenon. We see the sense in which even things and 
the meaning of things (their 'thingness') is to be 
referred to the ethical - "ethics is older than 
ontology". Making the divine pass through the human 
does not, however, demonstrate the necessity of the 
human for the divine. Moreover, as Levinas stresses at 
various points, in particular with reference to 
Descartes thinking of the Infinite in the Third 
Meditation, the thought of the infinite starts from 
me, from the idea of the infinite in me. Not to show 
this necessity would be, despite the fact that things 
and thingness, for example, are claimed to have an 
ethical meaning, to think the face to face starting 
from the Infinite, which, if that can be said to have a 
=meaning' at all, is mystical. It would be a communion 
with the Infinite but would not guarantee justice. 
Justice is guaranteed by the presence of the third 
party to the face to face. He seeks to show how reason, 
or rational society, is paradoxically already governed 
by the thought of the face - the idea of the infinite: 
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"The art of forseeing war and of winning it by every means - 
politics - is henceforth enjoined in the very exercise of 
reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to 
naivete... " (TI 21/ix) 
And yet politics can also be the absence of war, for 
example, in the form of commerce, which is warlike, but 
nevertheless a peace in which "the Good has already 
reigned" 
"Only beings capable of war can rise to peace (TI 222/197) 
War... can only be produced where discourse was possible: 
discourse subtends war itself... "(TI 225/200) 
War can be thought of as the absence of peace, but not 
vice versa. The notion of (messianic) peace here is not 
a 'state of being', nor is it thought as such; it is in 
a time which is time-out from being, in the gap between 
what is now and what is yet to come, in the 
postponement of future being; it is otherwise. That 
"Violence can aim only at a face" (TI ibid) does not in 
anyway diminish the "ethical resistance" of the faceto 
violence, because it always has time to do so (in each 
Instant, c. f. Ch. 2). To examine further the sense in 
which reason is not merely a contingent supplement to 
the face to face but that without it the ethical 
relation would be but a "mystical communion"; that it 
is a relation effectuated not "in the ignorance of men" 
but "beginning from me", let us look now at a third 
figure of the face to face - Eros. 
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Eros and the third party 
The analysis of Eros in TI is somewhat surprising. The 
relation to the Other in Eros is seemingly less than 
the face to face because the desire I have for the 
Other, being a satiable desire, is what Levinas 
regards as need as opposed to metaphysical Desire. On 
the other hand, in so far as it refers, but negatively, 
to the society from which it is a withdrawal, then it 
is a deficient mode of the face to face. Why is much 
of the account of the erotic relation to the Other 
described 'negatively' within a consolidation of the 
formula which posits the face of the Other as the 
"intersection of the divine and the human" °'` ' at the 
same time as declaring the feminine (i. e. face of the 
Other in Eros) "presents a face that goes beyond the 
face"? (TI 260/238) Why is there a lack of exteriority 
in the relation to the feminine, to the point where the 
feminine is not to be regarded as Other? And the 
relation to the feminine as a "dual egoism"? 
(TI 266/244) 
In TI the discussion of Eros proceeds into the 
discussion of fecundity and time. In the context of 
this chapter, however, we are examining the account 
because it also serves to demonstrate how, in Levinas' 
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thinking, the relation to the Infinite requires the 
supplementarity of reason: as we cited above - that 
"the divine opens forth from the human face. " In so far 
as Eros "excludes the third party" <TI 265/242), does 
it represent the temptation and the attempt at 
accomplishing the metaphysical relation to the Infinite 
without passing through the human? This would seem to 
be a false assumption not least because Eros is 
certainly to be described as a relation to at least one 
other 'human being' The predominant terms used to 
describe the "pure experience" of the erotic are 
voluptuosity and profanation. The experience is said to 
be a profanation because it represents "the revelation 
of the hidden as hidden" (TI 260/238). We recall from 
above that Levinas opposes disclosure "in light" to 
revelation, which is a revealing prior to 
objectification. '` -Although the account of Eros does 
not speak in the terms of sensibility and enjoyment 
which were used in the account of the identification of 
the subject, and although my relation to the other 
person in Eros is not to be reduced to that of my 
relation to "anonymous existence", the notion of a 
relation to the other prior to objectification 
described there bears significant similarities to the 
"pure experience" of voluptuosity, and we shall look at 
these in a moment. Levinas makes this quite explicit 
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in the section preceding the discussion of Eros 
entitled "The Ambiguity of Love", when he says: 
"The possibility of the Other appearing as an object of need 
while retaining his alterity, or again the possibility of 
enjoying the Other, of placing oneself at the same time 
beneath and beyond discourse - this position with regard to 
the interlocutor which at the same time reaches him and goes 
beyond him, this simultanaeity of need and desire, of 
concupiscence and transcendence, tangency of the avowable 
and unavowable, constitutes the originality of the erotic 
which, in this sense, is the equivocal par excellence. " 
(TI 255/233) 
The most peculiar thing about the account of Eros is 
that it introduces an ambiguous figure of the face 
which is immediately described as a deficient mode; it 
is a face which "fades" and in contradistinction to the 
expression associated with the face earlier, the face 
of the beloved is "non-signifying". Consistent with the 
claim for the primacy of the ethical, Eros must, of 
course, ultimately be related to the face to face 
, 'positively' and that is to be seen 
in its relation to 
fecunddit. y-~", and, somewhat equivocally, both within 
Eros itself and in Levinas' account, in voluptuosity. 
But it is its 'negative' signification, or rather, non- 
signifyingness that we are more interested in here. 
Levinas calls it . femininity. 
(Of course to distinguish 
between the two nodes of the equivocation is an 
abstraction that the erotic moment will not tolerate, 
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further below we shall characterize it as the 
withdrawing of the 'I' from profanation - as a re- 
establishing of ethical rectitude; orientation to the 
Other qua face. ) By considering the non-signifyingness 
of the erotic relation, we can better understand the 
positive role of the third party in the face to face. 
We can see how Levinas thinks of the presence of the 
third party within the face to face, not as a 
destruction of the face to face, but, on the contrary, 
as being necessary to its status as expression, or 
signifyingness. 
Why does not the erotic at least express the love of 
the lover for the beloved? Levinas says that in a 
certain sense it does express love but "it suffers from 
an inability to tell it" (TI 258/235). The carnal is 
e: pure vitality in which "the body quits the status of an 
existent", and again the comparison is invited between 
a certain mode of being of the subject in relation to 
the anonymous existence of the there is (il y a) 
'without' the subject, and the relation to the other in 
Eros. Let us recall briefly the analysis of insomnia in 
EE in which the subject's substantivity is reduced to 
the ° point where, in the night of insomnia, the 
distinction between subject who "watches" in the night 
and the night itself disappears, such that one might 
say that it is the night which watches; 
224 
a 
"In this anonymous nightwatch where I am completely exposed 
to being, all the thoughts which occupy my insomnia are 
suspended on nothing. They have no support. I am, one might 
say, the object rather than the subject of an anonymous 
thought... 11 (EE 66/I« ) 
It is a moment in which all intentionality is 
suspended. In 
associates the 
the erotic wi 
substantivities 
as such. It is 
the discussion of Eros, Levinas 
"searching", groping intentionality of 
. th this reduction of the subjects' 
=; ' to the point of their disappearance 
a movement, like all movements of the 
subject in this sense, towards the other, which, as we 
have learnt, is ultimately related to the ethical. The 
erot!. c, like the hypostasis of the subject is a 
movement prior to thought, a movement t bought only 
'afterwards'. The erotic, however, unlike the general 
movements of hypostasis, is at the outset a movement 
towards the other qua Other, and it is in this fact 
that its equivocation lies: I relate to the other qua 
Other but not yet as face. The erotic is an 
"aspiration" which "stays in the midst of essence" (OTB 
177/224); it is a relation to the Other in his being as 
other: equivocation. It is a falling away from the face 
to face, a falling away from discourse and therefore 
"lacks seriousness" (TI 263/241). We can see this in 
the way in which the meaning of the saraas differs in 
P 
Eros compared to the caress within the face to face. 
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Firstly let us say that the caress of the consoler 
and the caress of Eros, are essentially similar, are 
both a movement towards that to which I am in relation 
before I move at all; before I am What the two 
caresses have in common is that they are a form of 
participation in being. The erotic caress, however, 
lacks the "sincerity of intentions" characteristic 
of consolation. It begins as a movement toward the 
other/Other, but never gets beyond the other it enjoys. 
It is therefore selfish, a kind of self-seduction in 
voluptuosity. :; "=' It is a movement outward from self, 
which will return to self but one whose return is 
suspended in a moment of blind experience of the other. 
It lacks therefore the or entation taken up in the face 
to face proper. The signifyingness of the subject slips 
away to the extent that its substantivity is 
indiscernable. That is what we meant when we said that 
Eros lacks exteriority - "exteriority defines the 
existent as existent" (TI 262/239) - it lacks the 
_exteriority of 
the existent which is accomplished in 
its taking up a position qua substantive. Eros is 
therefore not the ethical relation but neither is it a 
totalising relation. The discussion of Eros enables 
Levinas to make it quite clear that it is only a being 
(le the existent) capable of the face to face that can 
also be capable of murder: "violence can only aim at 
the face". It can only be aimed at a face by the 
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substantive subject, the existent, whose separation is 
already a fact. As we have seen, this implies that "the 
Good has already reigned" because only the separate 
existent can be attentive to the prohibition against 
murder-which is language. 
"Language source of all signification, is born in the 
vertigo of infinity, which takes hold before the 
straightforwardness of the face, making murder possible and 
impossible. " (TI 262/240 my emphasis) 
Just now we described the movement in Eros as a return 
to self which has within it a moment of suspension. The 
return to self is in effect the readoption of the face 
to face following the interruption of its respite from 
ethical responsibility and "seriousness". In speaking 
to the Other, the erotic is made possible as such in a 
gym. The erotic caress turns into a caress akin to 
the caress of consolation, it becomes for-the-other, 
even in mutual two-way caressing -a caress which is a 
looking the Other in the face, where the third party 
already "looks at me in the eyes of the Other" 
(TI 213/188) 
We have already noted how the third party in Levinas' 
account represents variously, society, reason, and 
justice. We shall now look in greater detail at its 
precise signification. Let us recall briefly that the 
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account of the subjectivity of the subject, its 
relation to existence gave us a subject capable of a 
relation with transcendence. All along, of course, it 
is to be understood, this very thematization is only 
possible because the relation to transcendence is 
already entered into; it is 'older'. The thinking of 
this transcendence in Levinas is an "intentionality 
in reverse": To consciousness, thematization itself, 
and therefore everything that thematization can think, 
it appears that a 'reduction' is being performed in the 
direction of the Other, but from the point of view of 
the face to face this reduction takes the form of an 
interruption of this relation. The thought of the other 
starting from me, encounters the Other and understands 
that what it has taken to be its object is the mere 
derivative of the Other. In the same moment it learns 
that thought is not a form of access to the Other qua 
experience.. It is rather a falling away from the 
originary encounter with h, im. In relation to the face 
to face, language signifies in two directions at once: 
it effectuates the separation, or absolution, of the 
subject from the relation and it accomplishes the 
relation to the Other. In one formula the subject 
speaks - he "tells" the face to face to a third; he 
thematizes the face to face in discourse. In the other 
formula he listens In OTB this is given in the 
expression me voici which is not the utterance 
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of a subject as such, but indicates the moment in which 
the subject is as a mere accusative in relation to the 
Other. Language so described appears to have two 
distinct moments and significations: language as 
thematization and language as the originary locution 
prior to the sedimentation of thought. Originary 
obligation and the me voici are not inversions of one 
another; the 'I' and the Other do not 'take it in 
turns' to address each. other as equals, they are to be 
understood in relation to the asymmetry of the I-Other 
conjuncture. That is why breaking off and speaking, for 
the subject is always a speaking to a third party. In 
the attempt to describe both moments of language and to 
distinguish between them, it sometimes seems that in TI 
Levinas is driving a wedge between the two as if 
thematization, philosophy, were merely a defective form 
of the originary speech of the face to -face. 
In his 
later work, OTB, where the relation between the two is 
expressed in terms of the relation between the Saying 
(le dire) and the Said (le dit), this is much more 
explicitly not the case. (We shall come back to the 
shift in terminology between TI and OTB below). That 
thematization is not merely a defective form of speech 
in the face to face is made quite explicit, if indeed 
in a somewhat contradictory manner, in both TI and OTB 
in the account of the third party. It is apparently 
contradictory because in some places Levinas emphasises 
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the exclusion of the third party frone the face to face. 
For instance, in the expression of the Other in the 
face to face, one of Levinas' ways of describing how 
the discourse of the-face to face remains unseen by the 
third party (TI 201/176). To the third party the two in 
the face to face are equal terms whose meaning is 
derived from the, totality in which they function 
(irrespective of whether the totality is a finite or an 
infinite totality). The third party does not perceive 
the asymmetry of the face to face (TI 35,251/56,229). 
In the analysis of Eros above, we saw how Levinas 
describes the absence of the third party as a pmx 
experience or profanation and as the deficiency of the 
erotic in comparison with the face to face, in that it 
lacks a reference to society. In this contradiction we 
can see something of the role the third party is being 
called upon to play between the "violences of mysticism 
and history". Is the face to face compromised by the 
third party`? Indeed, can the face to face be 
compromised without the claim for the primacy of the 
ethical collapsing? And, who is the third party in all 
this? These are the questions with which we shall be 
concerned for the rest of this chapter. 
In the opening pages of OTB Levinas says that "In 
language qua said everything is conveyed before us, be 
it at the price of betrayal" (6/7). In the same place 
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we are warned against assuming that this betrayal is 
tantamount to what might be described as a "compromise" 
of the ethical relation. To ask whether the face to 
face is compromised by the presence of the third party 
would be to assume their equal participation in being, 
or, their being in the same time. This distinction is 
best understood in the context in which we have 
approached this question by returning to the example of 
Eros. The interruption of the erotic relation which was 
described as a return to self of the subject was a 
breaking off which results in the taking up of a 
position in relation to the Other and hence re- 
establishes the face to face. There seems to be a sense 
here in which in answering and in speaking to the Other 
I am the third party. This 'answer' is not the 
accusative me voici, which is one of Levinas' ways of 
expressing the 'response' within the face to face. ""' 
Within being the response to the other person is 
rational, it takes form within the "impersonal 
structures of reason" (T1208/183). Society is, 
nevertheless, referred to the face to face, precisely 
in being interrupted, in being thematized. It is, of 
course, "compromised" in being said, but in each 
instant, it is re-established. (See below here and in 
Ch. 5) 
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"Like a shunt, every social relation leads back to the 
presentation of the other to the same without intermediary 
of any image or sign, solely by expression of the face. " 
(TI 213/188) 
If there is an implicit contradiction in this account 
then it simply reflects the way in which the 
"impersonal structures of reason" by which society 
governs itself cannot 'resist' the demand for justice 
(cannot resist the demands being made) even if justice 
itself is not granted. That this demand can be heard in 
society is by the grace of the ethical resistance of 
the face, even in its refusal. 
Levinas' account of the relation of the third party to 
the ethical relation changes little in his later work, 
OTB. Some of the terms most commonly used in this 
context are changed, for instance the face to face is 
rarely mentioned, instead the relation to the Other is 
expressed in terms of pro--<im! ty, approach and 
substitution. These terms work together putting less 
emphasis on difference within the ethical relation. 
Signifyingness, or Saying emanates from the event of 
proximity qua relation and cannot be so readily 
misunderstood as the 'voice' of the Other. In fact 
proximity is so strongly associated with the movement 
of the subject to the neighbour, the Other, in 
approach, that that particular confusion is no longer 
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possible at all. He develops most notably the thinking 
of the subject as a pure accusative, in relation to an 
originary obligation and; me voici. These studies lead 
Levinas to propose a notion of absolute responsibility 
"to the point of substitution for the other". In this 
the third party is more clearly understood as the limit 
(OTB 157/200) of that responsibility I have for the 
other in the world; it represents the possibility of 
justice. However, the ambiguity of the third party in 
relation to proximity is still evident. 
"In proximity a subject is implicated in a way not reducible 
to the spatial sense which proximity takes on when the third 
party troubles it by demanding justice... "(OTB 81-2/103) 
The arrival of the third party is, in the first 
instance, an annihilation of the non-spatial asymmetry 
of proximity. The third party here represents 
symmetrical dealings between individuals in their 
pursuit of justice. Justice is called for precisely 
because the face to face occurs within a society of 
Others. Reason is that by which my responsibility, 
which is incalculable within the face to face, can be 
calculated in a world where responsibility (for the 
Other) is shared among the Others. The face to face 
both transcends this pluralistic society and yet occurs 
within it. Each interruption of the face to face by the 
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third party is a re-establishing of the face to face 
elsewhere (OTB 158/201, TI 213,295/188,271)ý'i 
In this it becomes clear that the interruption of the 
face to face by the third party is not a fateful 
capture of the face to face by totality, but the very 
means by which it escapes totalisation. The third 
party demands justice (OTB 82/103), and therefore 
represents the end to all idealism, even though it 
remains ignorant of this fact. The third party is not 
In a relation to the truth on which the calculations by 
which society 'deals out' justice can be said to be 
grounded. This 'truth' is beyond being, it is the Good 
beyond being, it j as orientation -----> (in a 
direction_ "starting from me" toward the other; said as 
orientation). It (is) <----- (in the other direction) 
Signifyingness, Saying. In other words and with no 
symbolic scare-quoting: thought from the perspective of 
the beyond being, the directionality of the 
signifying/Saying indicates its "ascendency" over the 
signified/Said, and the priority of ethics over 
ontology. This is what Levinas' location of the third 
party within the face to face means: without society 
and reason the face to face would not be a relation to 
the Other qua Other. In the terminology of OTB Levinas 
would say that the trace of the Other=:; L' could not be 
traced. As in TI, in OTB the third party is what 
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introduces distance into the ethical relation (OTB 
157/200), but whereas in TI the Other was characterized 
as the stranger, in OTB the use of the term neighbour 
does not so radically exclude the third party from the 
idea that he is anOther with whom the face to face can 
be re-established. The third party in OTB is not so 
readily interpreted as being an absolute outsider. The 
third party is both "visage and visible" (OTB 160/204) ; 
the same in the other, a situation Levinas also calls 
the one-for-the-other, and is said to be the very 
structure of proximity. It is thus that the third 
party marks by its own "permanent entry, into the 
intimacy of the face to face" (OTE ibid>''`:: `, the 
extraordinary occurence of the Infinite within the 
finite. But who is the third party? 
The third party is not simply the other human being 
who approaches the two engaged in the face to face. The 
approach of the third does not signal a degradation of 
an initial duo into a trio, <OTB 159/203). It is not an 
empirical other. This at least was clear in our example 
of how the ' I' in its withdrawal from the face to face 
is itself a third party, And we might add now that in 
so far as "the other is from the first the brother of 
all other men" (OTB158/201), they are all neighbours to 
each other, not simply alongside one another and 
therefore are also involved in third relations. On the 
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other hand justice is enacted in the dealings between 
empirical subjects. To deny this would be to deny the 
entire thesis. It seems, the two way signification 
aspect of all the structures supporting, that is 
constituting, Levinas' thesis is to be found and re- 
echoed here once again: in so far as the third party 
is a structure of proximity it has literally no point 
of reference to the empirical, to society, but the 
third party does refer to the empirical in that it is 
itself the very referring of that proximity to society 
of empirical subjects in the form of a demand for 
justice. To grasp this we have to be willing to 
entertain both the thinking of the face to face and of 
the notion of pry oximity at once. The shift does not 
represent a turn in Levinas' thinking but a change in 
approach. We will make a short digression at this point 
on this theme, as it bears directly on our discussion of 
the third party. 
TI attempts a philosophizing from within the face to 
face. In this thesis we are trying to show how this 
approach is to be assimilated to and differentiated 
from a broader understanding of thinking the end of 
philosophy. Chapter 3 was centered around the dialogue 
between Levinas and Derrida and Derrida's VM was 
described there as being "supplementary" to TI (in his 
own special sense of the term), precisely because it is 
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such a penetrating study of the theoretical 
"difficulty" (and perhaps the impossibility) of 
this thought. The difference of approach in OTB, partly 
in response to this, is, firstly, to use a terminology 
which is less (ontologically) metaphysically-laden, but 
more significantly, is more concerned to describe 
structures of subjectivity which, despite all 
'objections' "14-, already indicate transcendence from 
this side. Most importantly, we should recall it is the 
thinking of the trace which, above all else, enables 
Levinas to think the "betrayal" of the Infinite within 
the finite; enables it to be thought as such. In OTB 
the notion of the neighbour refers to both the 
empirical and to the relation of proximity. The 
empirical other, the other person, demands justice but 
does not trouble the face to face because qua `empirical' 
he does not know the face to face. The demand is here 
a demand addressed to equals, the others alongside. 
The third party does disturb the face to face in so far 
as he is also an Other. In proximity, 
"The other stands in a relationship with the third party, 
for whom I cannot entirely answer, even if I alone answer, 
before any question, for my neighbour. The other and the 
third party, my neighbours, contemporaries of one another, 
put distance between me and the other and the third party" 
(OTB 157/200) 
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In this situation, says Levinas, the question arises 
as to what I have to do with justice and with it I 
' come down to earth' . Here it is clearer than it ever 
could be in TI that the limit of my responsibility is 
not simply that in the empirical world an infinite 
responsibility is unbearable. Perhaps giving the 
impression that Levinas sought there to describe the 
superiority of the face to face. In this account in OTB 
it is the disturb nce of the ethical relation by the 
third party (which taken 'as a whole' is the situation 
of proximity) which calls me to my responsibility 
society. That is the sense in which Levinas claims T 
that this proximity, the ethical, is what founds (the 
being of) justice. And for that matter (in his sense of 
the term) the being of beings. It also gives us the 
sense in which we should understand the following 
remarks: 
"Justice is at the origin of the claims of ontology to be 
absolute, of the definition of man as an understanding of 
Being" (OTB 191f . n. 2) . 
and 
"Order, appearing, phenomenality, being,., are produced in 
signification, in proximity, starting with the third party. 
The apparition of a third party is the very origin of 
appearing, that is, the very origin of an origin" 
(OTB 160/204) 
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Despite the differences of approach between TI and OTB, 
that they complement one another is clear from some of 
the concluding remarks of TI: 
"The face to face is not a modality of coexistence nor even 
of the knowledge (itself panoramic) one term can have of 
another, but is the primordial production of being on which 
all the possible collocations of the terms are founded. The 
revelation of the third party, ineluctable in the face, is 
produced only through the face. " (TI 305/282 my emphasis) 
The face marks the "intersection of the human and the 
divine". It is not a metaphor, it is both the face of 
the empirical other and the face of the Other; pure 
Face. The relation between the two is thought, in 
Levinas, otherwise than on the basis of the ontological 
difference. : ýY 
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We have seen in the account of the substantivity of the 
subject and its hypostasis (Ch. 2), how the quasi- 
phenomenological descriptions there aim to account for 
various existential structures at a level prior to that 
in which they are reflected in consciousness. For 
example with regard to dwelling (TI 152f/125f): 
"The event of dwelling exceeds the knowing, the thought, and 
the idea in which, after the event, the subject will want to 
contain what is incommensurable with knowing" (ibid) 
The discussion of dwelling in TI is part of the account 
of the subject in terms of his being-at-home-with- 
himself (chez soi); his interiority. Is the discussion 
of dwelling metaphorical? Does it work in the way a 
metaphor works to help us think something which is 
conceptually distant - interiority - by means of 
something which is near - the home? Undeniably, it does 
at least do this, but it is also true that this the 
thinking of this ' metaphor' goes in both directions at 
once. Does it not also work as a deepening of our 
thinking of the home in human existence? 
"The analysis of enjoyment and living from... has shown that 
being is not resolved into empirical events and thoughts 
that reflect those events or aim at them 'intentionally'. To 
present inhabitation as a becoming conscious of a certain 
conjuncture of human bodies and buildings is to leave aside, 
240 
is to forget the outpouring of consciousness in things, 
which does not consist in a representation of things by 
consciousness, but in a specific intentionality of 
concretization-The whole of the civilization of labour and 
possession arises as a concretization of the separated being 
effectuating its separation. But this civilization refers to 
the incarnation of consciousness and to inhabitation - to 
existence proceeding from the intimacy of a home, the first 
concretization. " (ibid) 
The rejection of the empirical here is very reminiscent 
of the phenomenology by which one moves from the ontic 
description to the ontological. And indeed, we see in 
this passage an instance of Levinas using him. 
understanding of the ontological difference: the being 
of the existent being referred to a level prior to its 
reflection in consciousness. The empirical is thus 
referred to its meaning in relation to the 
'subjectivity' of the subject rather than to world 
<, 
perceived by consciousness. It is therefore not a 
rejection of the empirical but an affirmation of it at 
a 'fundamental level'. Dwelling is not understood to be 
a metaphor for interiority, they have an 'existential' 
meaning in relation to one another. 
"Because the I exists recollected it takes refuge 
empirically in the home. Only from this recollection does 
the building take on the signification of being a dwelling. " 
(ibid) 
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The event of habitation visible to consciousness 
is secondary to the event of habitation as a 
structure of the hypostatic subject, and it appears in 
this formulation that one arrives at the latter by 
means of a reduction of the former. However we may see 
this, what is important is that they are the same, in 
the sense that this reduction as such occurs entirely 
within the same. 
The "reduction" in the direction of the Other in terms 
of the Said---> Saying, from the Signified---> 
Signifyingness, is of a different nature because it 
moves f rom the same to the Other, but nevertheless it 
bears a resemblance to the reduction outlined above 
with regard to its handling of the empirical. We shall 
examine this notion of reduction in the form of an 
unsaying of the said in detail in the next chapter. 
Before we do that we shall consider the suggestion that 
at bottom Levinas' thesis is open to the charge of 
being an empiricism, which like all empiricisms forgets 
that the being of language has its own dialectic, has a 
being of its own. Or, as Derrida puts it when 
presenting the suggestion at the end of VM: "Empiricism 
is thinking by metaphor without thinking the metaphor 
as such" (VM 139). 
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The charge could for example be directed toward the 
central notion of the face, when he says such things 
as: "The face... Is by itself and not by reference to a 
system" (TI 75/47), or when he emphasises how the face 
is not a metaphor (op cit), and in the description of 
the face as ka6' avro (eg. TI 51/21) ; pure 
expression, and the face to face as experience par 
excellence. In association with these kind of remarks, 
as we have seen in the placing of the third party, 
Levinas is quite explicit that neither the face of the 
Other in the face to face nor the third party are to be 
mistaken for empirical others. In OTB Levinas 
specifically warns against mistaking the original 
communication of the ethical relation (which he does 
actually call conversation in TI) for a dialogue 
between empirical beings Despite all this and in 
apparent contradiction to it, there is a very profound 
sense of relation to the Other going through the 
relation to the other person in all of Levinas' work, 
to the point where one might say that this is what it 
Is about. : 31-' Sometimes the spanning of the empirical 
and the transcendent is made a theme, for example: 
"Separation ... is not only an empirical 
fact" (TI 
173/148 my emphasis). Derrida's assimilation of 
Levinas' thought of the Infinite to empiricism is on 
the basis of his simply not having the thought of 
Being. 
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"From his point of view, the origin and possibility of the 
concept are simply not the thought of Being, but the gift of 
the world to the other as totally-other" (VM 148) 
In fact throughout VM Derrida attempts to demonstrate 
how, not having the thought of Being, Levinas 
presupposes the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl 
which he seeks to put in question (VM 118f), confirms 
Hegel as soon as he speaks against him (VM 120) and 
"By refusing, in TI, to accord any dignity to the ontico- 
ontological difference, by seeing in it only a ruse of war, 
and by calling the intra-ontic movement of ethical 
transcendence (the movement respectful of one existent 
toward another) metaphysics, Levinas confirms Heidegger in 
his discourse: for does not the latter see in metaphysics 
(in metaphysical ontology) the forgetting of Being and the 
dissimulation of the ontico-ontological difference? " 
(VM 142) 
Derrida sees this absence of the ontological difference 
in Levinas' thinking of being as committing him to a 
thesis which, ironically, in seeking the Other beyond 
Being, actually implies the unthinkable unity of truth 
and Being can be thought, and that this is the thinking 
which is traditionally called metaphysics. To speak of 
a beyond this unity is therefore to resign oneself to 
an "incoherent incoherence". 
I 
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"... the true name of this inclination of thought to the 
Other, of this resigned acceptance of incoherent incoherence 
inspired by a truth more profound than the 'logic' of 
philosophical discourse, the true name of this renunciation 
of the concept, of the a prioris and transcendental horizons 
of language, is empiricism. " (ibid) 
The achievement of Levinas' thinking would therefore 
not be to have given us the thought of the beyond 
being, but to have renewed empiricism and inversed it 
"by revealing it to itself as metaphysics" (VM 151). It 
is very interesting to note that despite Levinas' lack 
of the ontological difference, according to Derrida, 
he is in all but name, here being accredited with 
having carried out a very Heideggerian meditation on 
'metaphysics', albeit without realising it. Caught like 
a fly in a spider's web without knowing it. For the 
spider as much as the fly, the web is all of thought. 
Derrida actually speculates on the proximity of their 
"... two 'eschatologies' which by opposed routes repeat and 
put in question the entire philosophical adventure issued 
from Platonism. Interrogate it simultaneously from within 
and without, in the form of a question to Hegel, in whom 
this adventure is thought and recapitulated. " (VM 149) 
The difference between the two thinkers (or are there 
three, four or five at issue here - representing the 
entire history of thought (and its other) and 
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difference in general, is to be thought in terms of 
their thinking of the necessity of "an Irreducible 
conceptual moment, and therefore a certain violence" 
(VM 148 my emphasis). This is what Derrida more than 
anyone has given us to understand. Indeed, is this not 
from amomg the readings proffered in VM, what is most 
irreducibly Derridean? He is correct to say that 
Levinas would not deny this necessity and therefore 
this "certain violence" ="'', but the "reduction" from 
the Said to the Saying in Levinas' later work, as we 
shall examine in the next chapter, is in fact a denial 
of the supposed irreversibility Z'0I of the conceptual 
moment. 
Finally let us juxtapose two thoughts which will give 
us, if not convince us of, the Levinasian understanding 
of the ethical neutrality of the movement of the 
concept (through) history 
"... empiricism has always been determined by philosophy, 
from Plato to Husserl, as nonphilosophy: as the 
philosophical pretention to nonphilosophy, the inability to 
justify oneself, to come to one's own aid as speech. " 
(VM 152) 
"The difference between 'to appear in history' (without a 
right to speak) and to appear to the Other while attending 
one's own apparition*, distinguishes ... my political 
being 
from my religious being. "(TI 253/231) 
(* ie as third party) 
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In various places we have recalled how in Levinas 
language is both the 'breaking off' from what he here 
refers to as the 'religious', that is, being in 
relation to the Other, and the 'accomplishment' of that 
relation. We have also seen how the interruption of the 
ethical relation by the third party, described as the 
demand for ustiQe, produces the interminable 
recommencement of the ethical relation and the 
app ranc e of justice in a pluralistic society. 
Language, speaking, in Levinas' account is not, and 
does not pretend to be a justification of Onp5elf, 
nor is it a coming to one's own aid. The o nself in 
Levinas already has the structure one-for-t he-other, 
and the " first speech" is what is beard by the oneself. 
Derrida's 'conclusion' in VM (i. e. the final reading in 
the text), therefore, that in Levinas' "empiricism" we 
see a classical inversion of metaphysics which only 
repeats metaphysics, albeit exposing the 
metaphysicality of metaphysics, the religiosity of the 
religious, the metaphoricity of metaphor, etc., 
consciously or unconsciously on the way (which is a 
metaphysical distinction itself), misses the sense in 
which the two moments of language are seen as an 
"undoing" of conceptuality, a dethematization of the 
theme. Derrida is saying that Levinas' thesis shows 
that metaphysics has been a search after the being of 
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beings, this much has Heidegger's student learnt, but 
without accepting, or understanding the thought of the 
ontological difference. He therefore repeats 
metaphysics (as did Hegel for example according to 
Heidegger's Concept of Experience, which we looked at 
in Chapter 1 and as does Heidegger, according to 
Derrida in Ousia and Gramme). In his later work 
Levinas responded to this criticism, not by adopting 
the ontological difference into his thinking, but by 
thematically addressing himself to the reversal of 
conceptualisation mentioned above, thought of as an 
Unsaying the Said (dedire du dit), and expressed in 
other terms such as dethematization, undoing, 
retraction, reverting. This is a continuation of the 
project of TI which the following, from the preface to 
TI, demonstrates, and which is surely about as un- 
Hegelian a remark about "the preface" as one can get. 
"The word by way of a preface which seeks to break through 
the screen stretched between the author and the reader by 
the book itself does not give itself out as a word of 
honour. But it belongs to the very essence of language, 
which consists in continually undoing its phrase by the 
foreword or exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to 
restate without ceremonies what has already been ill- 
understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the said 
delights. " (TI 30/xviii) 
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CHAPTER F IVR 
©PE11T I"NGS 
The Opera irig of OpEn irig 
Levinas' thinking of the Other claims in TI to 
represent a breach of the totality of ontological 
metaphysics. It indicates a fissure in the text of that 
metaphysics; an opening on the beyond of metaphysics. 
This breach of totality, however, is not to be thought 
of as the contingent effect of a thought which goes 
toward the other and in doing so accomplishes this 
breach, such that a 'slip' could result in an 
irreversible moment of absolute totalisation. It is 
implicit in Levinas' account that the totality isin 
fact, in certain moments, absolute, but also 
reversible. It is absolute in so far as it is conceived 
within the tradition, but this does not mean that it is 
not resista ble by the Other. The totality is absolute 
but, in relation to the Other, finite. Philosophy, 
thematization, is one form, perhaps the form of 
totalisation. It occurs with a necessity with which we 
are by now familiar. In what sense does this 
thematizing thought fail to complete the totality and 
permit the trace of the Other to appear in metaphysics? 
We want to show how in Levinas, thematized thought is 
not so much reversible as already a reverse movement 
relative to the transcendence toward the Other. 
Transcendence gives rise to a perspective which thinks 
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thematization in reverse and sees it as an "undoing" of 
the representation of being in themes. We wish to 
indicate how Levinas' thinking does not break with 
philosophy in a sense that would involve denouncing 
thought as thematization, and therefore, as we put it 
above in various places when interpreting Derrida, 
"driving a wedge between thought and language". The 
thinker would only wish to denounce metaphysics if he 
failed to distinguish between philosophy as 
totalisation and philosophy as the voice of the 
totality itself. Philosophy occurs necessarily as 
totalisation, but it only necessarily leads to totality 
as such if it understands this necessity as the unity 
of (truth and) being. This is precisely what the 
thought of the transcendence of the Other in Levinas 
challenges. The distinction can be thought in terms of 
the difference between metaphysics and the 
metaphysician. ' The metaphysician is not commanded by 
the necessity of what his thinking thinks, he is 
interrupted by the Other in that meditation and 
experience thus transcends the difference between what 
is thought and what is outside of the thought of the 
same. Levinas' thinking 
"... seeks to be understood from within a recourse to 
experience itself. Experience itself and that which is most 
irreducible within experience: the passage and departure 
toward the other; the other itself and what is most 
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irreducibly other within it: Others. A recourse not to be 
confused with what has always been called a philosophical 
enterprise, but which reaches a point at which an exceeded 
philosophy cannot not be brought into question... (it 
designates) a space (which is) a hollow within naked 
experience ... this hollow space is not an opening among 
others. It is opening itself, the opening of opening, that 
which can be enclosed within no category or totality, that 
is, everything within experience and which can no longer be 
described by traditional concepts, and which resists every 
phi l osopheme ." (V1M 83) 
In Chapter 1, in our cursory examination of the meaning 
of the end of philosophy in the thinkers referred to 
there, we saw how the notion of reversal figured in 
each. In our reading of Levinas we have seen how he 
understands the reversal in thinking as a reversal of 
the priority of ontological metaphysics over "ethics". 
His account describes the thinking of the same as 
totalitarian and accounts for a movement or thinking 
which breaches the totality describing its 'movement' 
in the other direction, and is a movement which is 
older than ontology. 
'transcendence', a 
distinction between 
This movement Levinas calls 
term held to transcend the 
and noun: the Other is (a) 
Transcendence. The reversal articulated in Levinas' 
thinking is not merely an absract term referring 
us to one branch of philosophy amongst others 
and a valorising of it. Nor is the claim for the 
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priority of 'ethics' based on the identification of any 
'historically' decisive moment within metaphysics as 
such. It refers us, ultimately, to the experience of 
the Other, or rather it never leaves the site of this 
experience. In so far as this is true of Levinas' 
thesis it is indeed a 'phenomenology'. The ethical in 
Levinas' sense does not represent a rejection of 
history but a transcendence of history which respects 
the necessity of history, and therefore metaphysics as 
ontology. We have seen what form this claim takes and 
it marks a further similarity between the thinking of 
Heidegger and Derrida, for example, and Levinas, 
rather than a difference. It is by referring us to the 
ethical relation and by placing this notion at the 
centre of his thesis that Levinas' thinking attempts to 
distance itself from the thinking which accepts the 
necessity of the tradition, and the role meditating on 
this necessity plays in relation to the the end of 
philosophy, but which still thinks it in terms of the 
unity of Being. In preserving the unity of Being at 
this point thinking foils its own attempt to accomplish 
a decisive reversal of the tradition - the very 
gesture by means of which it envisages its future. 
Levinas draws our attention to the ethical neutrality 
of the thought of Being and relegates Heideggers' 
thought of ontological difference to the thinking of 
the same. He does something similar in his short 
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commentary on Derrida's thinking , where, whilst 
praising the rigour of deconstruction, accuses it of 
"failing to recognize the signification effected by the 
very inconsistency of this procedure". Throughout 
TI, it is in view of and against Hegel's thinking, in 
particular, that in his reading of Descartes the 
subject is resurrected. This sweeping gesture is 
supported in that work only by a handful of elaborate 
phenomenological studies, a Cartesian meditation on the 
Infinite together with a developed thinking of the 
trace and a meditation on the face. We have seen above 
how these relate to one another in Levinas' work. We 
have also appealed to passages in the later work, OTB, 
in our elucidation of several aspects of Levinas' 
thesis originating in earlier works. This cross- 
reference is possible because, as we have said, the 
shift in OTB is a shift in approach and emphasis rather 
than aim, in response to the reception TI received and, 
in particular perhaps, that of Derrida. 
A recurrent concern in Heidegger scholarship is the 
theme of the relation between his later and earlier 
work; whether or not the shift represents a break or a 
continuity, or how the early work undertaken in BT was 
a necessary ladder to the later meditative work on 
language and what significance is to be drawn from the 
fact that Heidegger abandoned the project of what was 
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to have been Section 3 of BT. There is similarly a 
significant relation between Levinas' later work, OTB, 
and his earlier work TI in that the later work bridges 
a gap between the tradition and the claims for the 
ethical put forward in the earlier work. We are 
suggesting that there is a sense in which this reflects 
the relation between philosophy and its other, which 
his work as a whole attempts to describe. Speaking from 
beyond being, as TI apparently attempted to dog is 
complemented by the work of OTB which provides more 
explicitly the 'way back' to philosophy. We've seen how 
Levinas' thinking of the trace is central to this. The 
work of OTB is not, however, a regression; a withdrawal 
from the claims for the ethical relation. In fact in 
speaking of the 'way back' to philosophy what is 
actually involved here is the recognition of a movement 
that is already in reverse. It could be said, 
therefore, that the 'way back' is also a movement of 
transcendence toward the Other. The difference of 
emphasis then between the work of TI and OTB is the 
difference between talking about Transcendence as such 
or the Other as such, f or which Levinas was strongly 
criticised, by Derrida among others, and talking about 
transcendence as a "movement" toward the Other. This 
difference is a recurrent structure if not a theme in 
Levinas: the "amphibology" between verb and noun. 
Strange as it may seem this structural aspect of the 
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two major works taken together seems to reflect the 
claim for the anarchy of the ethical relation. In other 
words, the philosophical account of the movement toward 
the Other makes the Other older than the origin of this 
movement, which is the logos. To compliment and 
compensate for what might have been taken for a 
traditional emphasis on the presence of the Other, the 
denominated Other in TI, in OTB Levinas shifts the 
emphasis onto the verbal movement of transcendence. At 
the same time, as we examined in Chapter 3, the 
thinking of the trace serves to disrupt any 
understanding of presence of the Other in history as 
simple presence. 
In Chapter 3 we mentioned the difference between the 
Heideggerian/Derridian notion of history as rupture and 
Levinas' interruption of history in the Instant. The 
notion of time as a series of Instants remains implicit 
in OTB, but there the emphasis is on the diacbrony of 
. 
Saying, which is to be distinguished from the synchrony 
of the Said (see below). The Instant, it might be 
added, in this context is the time of the Saying and 
gives rise to the non-coinciding of the subject with 
itself (it will be recalled from Chapter 2). 
" This being torn up from oneself in the core of one's 
unity, this absolute non-coinciding, this diachrony of 
the 
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instant, signifies in the form of one-penetrated-by the- 
other. " (OTB 49/64) 
Saying is a signifying which does not become a 
signification. For Levinas philosophizing at the end 
of philosophy is (should be) a form of reduction of the 
Said (signification) in the direction of the Saying. 
This reduction, beginning from the Said, the speech of 
the same, leads back to the Saying, which is not the 
ncýh of the Other, but has the structure of the 
Other-within-the-same. 
In TI the description of philosophfZ.. ing as a reduction 
of the th ematized was less an issue than that which 
cannot be represented in a theme, but nevertheless it 
was posed (as a theme), for instance when Levinas 
speaks of "thematization turning into conversation" (TI 
51/22). The conversation here is not only the 
conversation of philosophers and the claim is general. 
It is one point at which the closeness to life of 
Levinas' thinking is very striking. The reversal of 
ontological metaphysics occurs in the form of a 
relation to another person, in each Instant, it is not 
held to herald another 'epoch' , but the (infinite 
time 
of the) Other; a time (to be) for the Other. 
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The Saying and the Said 
The account of the relation between the Saying (le 
dire) and the Said (le dit) in OTB' continues the task 
undertaken in TI of describing the anteriority of the 
ethical relation to any thematic representation. In 
OTB, in a section entitled the "Saying without the 
Said", Levinas says: 
"This saying has to be reached in its existence antecedent 
to the said, or else the said has to be reduced to it. We 
must fix the meaning of this antecedence. What does saying 
signify before signifying a said? Can we try to show the 
crux of a plot that is not reducible to 
phenomenology... Saying signifies otherwise than as an 
apparitor presenting essence and entities. " (OTB 46/58-9) 
There is a sense in which the account of the relation 
between the Saying and the Said is a theoretical 
abstraction in relation to the general account of the 
movement towards the Other. It is after all, in 
Levinas' text, a philosophical account and therefore 
the Saying, in so far as it appears in the account, 
appears qua Said (even though it is there called the 
Saying. ) 'Philosophy is essentially a denomination of 
what-is and a representation of the relations between 
quiddities. The Saying, it is said, implicitly refers 
us not to the quiddity of he who speaks but to his 
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quisnity. 15 The quisnity is in effect the horizon of 
the Saying. An example of this is given by Levinas 
when he says that the "first teaching" of the teacher 
is his "presence" (c. f. above). The notion of 
'presence' being appealed to here is epekeina tes 
ousias and implies the unicity of the one to whom it 
refers. Levinas sometimes calls this i11eity, a term we 
met earlier in the discussion of the trace. Levinas, 
like Heidegger, believes that philosophy contains within 
itself the key to going beyond a meditation on the 
quiddity of beings. Unlike for Heidegger (if we accept 
the claim) in Levinas, the antecedence of the epe. keina 
tes oustas, or let us say opening }, requires the 
-absolute exteriority of the Other. Like Heidegger, 
Levinas-believes that philosophy does not know this 
opening '' but, contrary to Heidegger, Levinas believes 
that a meditation on the opening which gets underway 
through the passage granted by the ontological 
differences represents the most extreme rejection of the 
Other. This thinking is closed to the Other, because it 
thinks both the same and the other on the basis of the 
common denominator - Being. The excess of the Saying 
over the Said which 'remains' outside of its 
philosophical determination is the measure of its 
exteriority. It is the 'I' of diachrony, the "non- 
coinciding" 'I' to whom the Saying is addressed. And in 
this I-, Other conjuncture the Other says his exteriority 
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to an 'I I that can hear it. This is not an experience 
as suche. nor is it an empirical fact"", and it should 
by now be clear that the Other is not an empirical 
Other as such, at all. The experience or event of the 
ethical relation is at no point being presented as 
something appropriable by me qua empirical individual - 
and as such a basis for a good morality. One does not 
arrive in a. face to face relation by means of a 
meditation on the meaning of the reduction of the Said 
to the Saying. One always already is or has been in a 
face-to-face relation, something Levinas does not tire 
of repeating, and which may sometimes appear as the 
most unreflective of empirical observations. Once again 
being in the face to face, reluctantly, perhaps 
misleadingly, appeals to a 'presence', but thought 
beyond being. The reduction proper is not, however, 
theoretical, it is 'real', and as soon as Levinas 
attempts to express this then it becomes clear that 
having .:. understood 
the theoretical representation of 
this relation (and either accepted or rejected it) does 
not'guarantee. our.. being able to follow the account of 
the reduction, as if the thinker could by means of a 
series of logical steps, proceed toward it. The reason 
for this ý' difficulty' is that the true direction of the 
movement of reduction is from the Saying to the Said, 
it only appears the other way around in philosophy. The 
reduction cannot then 'be followed', where this gesture 
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is associated with a logic which moves in steps of 
increasing explicitness. If we want to follow the 
reduction at work in Levinas' text then we find that 
the decisive moments are accessible only through a 
meditation on such statements as, "Obsession... undoes 
thematization" (OTB 101/128), or, "... the thematized 
dissappears in the caress... 11 (ibid 19Lf. n. 10), or, 
"Phenomenology can follow out the reverting of 
thematization into anarchy in the description of the 
approach. " (ibid 121/155). This language is not simply 
tangential to the sobriety of the theoretical, but is 
an instance of the "abuse of language" 7° by which the 
Saying allows itself to signify within the Said. It is 
not that the metaphysician abuses language as if to 
trick it into expressing non-logocentric thoughts, he 
participates in the abuse which language invites in the 
,; "wreckage" of a 
discourse in dissemination. 11 
Talk of the relation to the Other as a movement in 
reverse; as a reduction '= from the Said back to the 
Saying is a kind of supplement to the unsystematic 
meditations on approach, proximity, substitution, the 
caress etc. Its presence as a kind of theoretical 
supplement in OTB is partly a response to a 
demand, 
voiced most notably, by Derrida. It is also a 
living 
illustration of what it seeks to thematically 
represent: it is a Said which bears the 
trace of a 
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Saying. The extraordinary thing about the trace of the 
Saying is that at the same time as the Saying 'appears' 
within the Said it appears as the trace of something 
which is more than the Said can contain and in relation 
to which the Said itself is secondary. This is 
extraordinary because the Said, despite this 
'secondarity', represents our only (theoretical) access 
to the Saying, and yet by definition cannot be adequate 
to this task. Despite this 'restriction', which 
corresponds to what we referred to earlier in various 
places as the limit of language, about which the 
thinkers referred to in this thesis are concerned, 
Levinas insists that his aim is to show that to "hear 
a God not contaminated by Being is a human 
possibility""". At the same time he shows us that 
starting from the Said, the 
'way' for thinking to apps 
step on this way, which does 
Said then the Said (which 
suffered a reduction in the 
, egos of 
being, is the only 
roach the Other. To make a 
not simply produce another 
is a Saying which has 
ordinary sense 1,4 of the 
word) must at the same time be an unsaying of the Said. 
This recanting (dedire) of the Said in its being said 
is a form of "effacing the trace" which we talked about 
in Chapter 3, here of the Said' s being said, and as 
such is a movement 'backwards' in the direction of the 
Saying. This is the possibility Levinas insists on and 
attempts to describe. 
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The account of the relation between the Saying/Said 
given in OTB is again a structure which resonates with 
the entire diatribe of the general claim for the 
antecedence of "ethics" in relation to ontology. It is 
itself a restatement (redire) of the claim which at the 
same time seeks to describe the movement of 
transcendence in terms of a "reduction" of the Saying 
to the Said. It is perhaps better suited to demonstrate 
the interrelation of the two 'realms' than the accounts 
of the egological subject and the face to face were in 
TI. About which it is at least possible, if not in the 
final . analysis legitimate, to object that the 
ontological realm, the same, is being transcended in 
the direction of a 'more fundamental' realm which is 
given the name "ethical" but which nonetheless can only 
be thought on an ontological basis. This would 
therefore signal the return of the same and not the 
Transcendence claimed. In OTB the discussion of the 
Sayir_g/Said is better suited to expressing the notion 
pf the other-within-the-same structure of 
transcendence. At the same time we see in it a further 
echo of the metaphor of "overflowing" referred to in 
Chapter 2 and in the discussion of Descartes Third 
Meditation. 
Once again, in OTB, the movement begins from an account 
of the subjectivity of the subject, but this time it is 
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presented not from the standpoint of the self-interest 
of the subject in enjoyment, and the hypostasis of this 
subject in relation to the element, but aims rather to 
emphasise the sense in which the identity of the 
subject "comes from the impossibility of escaping 
responsibility" (OTB 14/17). In Chapter 2 we examined 
the distinction that was made in EE and TI between the 
concept of identity in ontology and a notion of 
"identification" associated with the upsurge of the 
existent into existence. What we are now looking at in 
OTB is not a third account but rather the same thing 
again from the perspective of its meaning. In Chapter 2 
we made clear that the movement toward the other 
(autre) in hypostasis is, on the basis of an 
antecedence we have tried to understand here, already a 
movement towards the Other (autrui) ; an orientation. In 
view of the diachrony of the subject out of phase with 
itself, Levinas describes this moment from the 
perspective of the Other, or conversely, from 
the 
perspective of the III as pure accusative, as 
the time 
in which subjectivity is seen to have the structure of 
one-for-the-other - at its origin. Here, 
however, the 
term origins refers to something which, relative 
to the 
time of identity, which is the time of 
the same, is 
5narcbi cal . 
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The other-within-the-same structure of the relation 
between being and the beyond being is of course an 
ambiguity that is maintained and held to the fore in 
Levinas, it should never be thought that it is being 
presented as a problem to be resolved. Among the miriad 
expressions of this notion in Levinas, such as 
"overflowing" or the paradoxical anterior posteriori, 
one of the more religious sounding formulations in OTB 
is in terms of precisely this claim that to hear a 
Saying that has not already become a Said is a "human 
possibility". This is put forward at the same time as 
stressing that it at no point indicates a rejection of 
the necessity of ontology. Later we shall look at how 
the return of this paradox is understood as a kind of 
scepticism by Levinas. Before that we shall examine 
the "going backwards" of thought as an Unsaying of the 
Said (dedire de dit). 
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Unsaying the `3a id <1> 
In various places above we have seen how the notion of 
"interruption" plays a significant role in the 
different analyses which constitute Levinas' thesis. 
For example , in the interruption of history, of the ' I' 
chez soi, the breach of the totality as the 
interruption of essence by the otherwise than being, 
and the interruption of the face to face by a third 
party. Interruption as 'hesitation', as a 'suspension', 
indeed as a concrete possibility open to thought is a 
mark of the Husserlian in Levinas. It is its presence 
throughout his thesis which warrants his retention of 
the word ' phenomenology' as a description of what he's 
doing, as it is precisely this aspect of phenomenology 
that he regards as being essential. Once again now, in 
elucidating Levinas' philosophical description of the 
movement of transcendence as the Unsaying of the Said 
(dedire du dit), we must recall that the interruption is 
characteristically not merely within (the) time (of the 
Said), but of (the) time (of the Said). It effectuates 
a leap into a parallel time of the Saying (or in the 
case of the third party interrupting the face to face, 
vice versa, into the time of the Said). The specific 
direction of this transition is in any case 
'theoretical' rather than real: the parallelism of the 
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two times just spoken of is merely a metaphor to aid 
the thinking of a duality which arises out of the non- 
coinciding of two different " perspectives' . The 
metaphor of 'perspective' is the one we have used in 
various places above. The time of the same - the 
synchrony of the Said - is being distinguished from the 
time of the Other - the diachrony of the Saying. The 
question, as ever, is one of thinking the relation 
between.. the two, or more specifically, the manner in 
which the movement between the two is the transcendence 
of/toward the Other. What then is the nature of the 
reduction of the Said to the Saying towards which 
Levinas directs us? 
Let us first look at the figures of this reduction as 
they are to be found in Levinas' work. We have already 
noted that the excess of the Saying over the Said can 
be expressed in terms of the 'presence' of the one to 
whom-- the Said is given, the one who remains outside of 
the Said (theme) ; the speech or the text ' 111. The 
recognition or appreciation of this 'presence', which 
is°- never made present as such (i. e. in a Said), nor is 
a simple absence awaiting presentation, is not a task 
for the thinker, but a fact of proximity. This 'fact' 
of proximity is not merely to be made the object of the 
inquiry, that alone is not the purpose of Levinas' 
drawing our attention to it. Referring the later 
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notion of proximity back to TI can be confusing, as 
without the idea that the subject is the pure 
accusative of . the Other's Saying, c it might appear 
that attending one's own speech neither requires nor 
implies the transcendence of the Other. It is 
nevertheless to be seen in the following: 
"The interpellated one is called upon to speak; his speech 
consists in coming to the assistance of his word - in being 
present. "(TI 69/41) 
Ve've already discussed this use and later avoidance of 
the term 'presence', and how it is not a predicate of 
either the. interpellator or the interpellated here. We 
are not returning to this point in TI to restate this. 
Now we shall examine how this 'presence' inverts "the 
inevitable movement that bears the spoken word to the 
past state of the written word" (ibid). The inversion 
Levinas speaks of here is a kind of suspension which 
'produces' this presence. It is a suspension subtended 
across the diachrony of the Instant. In Chapter 2 we 
spoke of this in terms of the non-coinciding of the 
subject with itself and we referred to the 'dialectic' 
of the Instant. The 'presence' of which Levinas speaks 
is, in a sense, the presence disclosed by metaphysics, 
os-i-&, but it is here being thought with a view to what 
gives rise to its being thought by ontological 
metaphysics. Levinas was less concerned to stress this 
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in TI than he had become in OTB. What his analyses 
collectively show, albeit without this being their 
stated aim, is the metaphysical notion of presence, 
oujaJ. &, in a state of being "undone" . We see this also 
in the following: 
"The face is a living presence it is expression. The life of 
expression consists in undoing the form in which the 
existent exposed as a theme, is thereby dissimulated-He 
who manifests himself comes. -to his own assistance. He in 
each instant undoes the form he presents. " (TI 66/37) 
He undoes the form he presents, which is a theme; is 
Said. In OTB this reduction is formalised in terms of 
the relation of the Saying to the Said. The Saying is 
the anarchic ' origin' of the Said and a philosoph3Zing 
is proposed which would be a reduction of the Said in 
the direction of the Saying. This reduction involves an 
Unsaying of the Said. It proposes a thinking which is a 
breaking up of essence. He says "Esse is Interesse; 
essence is interest" (OTB 4/4) and sets out to describe 
ä thinking which is a becoming dis-interested. '? The 
analyses in OTB are organised around an assemblage of 
metaphors which work together as a vehicle for this 
reversal. , 
We shall briefly look further at some of 
these before questioning the ability of the mode of 
transport to deliver thinking over to the Saying, and 
indeed if this is what is intended. 
269 
Examples which are explicit, at least in what they 
state are such as the following: 
"Responsibility reverses... the order of interest" 
(OTB 12f/14f) 
"The infinity of the infinite lives in going backwards. " 
(ibid) 
"Obsession traverses consciousness counter-currentwise... It 
undoes thematization and escapes any... origin. " 
(OTB 101/128) 
Other examples are explicitly associated with the 
insistence on what we have referred to throughout as 
the "necessity" of the relation between metaphysics and 
its other. 
"(The Saying)... must spread out and assemble itself into 
essence, posit itself, be hypostasized, become an eon in 
consciousness and knowledge, let itself be seen, undergo the 
ascendancy of being. Ethics itself, in its saying which is a 
responsibility, requires this hold... For the saying is both 
an affirmation and a retraction of the said. " 
(OTB 44/56 my emphasis) 
The signifying in which the Saying is heard is in the 
form of a retraction of the Said. Yet Levinas insists 
quite explicitly on a 'meaning' for the "Saying without 
the Said". It is indeed held to be, as we would put it 
in ordinary metaphysical language, the origin of 
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meaning. The reduction of the Said to the Saying is 
nevertheless not being presented as a recuperation of 
the Saying (which would be to regard it as an origin in 
the traditional sense). When Levinas says: "This saying 
has to be reached in its existence antecedent to the 
said, or else the said has to be reduced to it" (op 
cit), it appears that two alternatives are being 
suggested, but in fact these two refer to the 
amphibology of the transcendence which transcends the 
distinction between the verb and the noun. Levinas' 
account of the relation to the Other requires them both 
and thinks them in two different times. 
Time and again this is a point of contention for 
Derrida. For any 'meaning' whatever to be attributed to 
the Saying qua antecedent to the Said, it is the very 
necessity of the Saying's being Said which must be 
interrupted, and this is not possible. Levinas would 
agree that this necessity (itself) cannot be 
interrupted, but he regards the demand for 
consistency on precisely this point as the demand of 
"formal logic", and therefore as what, more than 
anything else, is likely to precipitate a simple 
repetition of metaphysical motifs. For this reason he 
lets it ride. Derrida does not reject the notion of 
interruption as such but he interprets it differently. 
We broached this difference in Chapter 3 where we 
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referred to it in terms of the Derridian notion of 
rupture in comparison to Levinasian interruption. We 
come back to this now in view of several pages of 
Derrida's later essay on Levinas which can help us 
here. *11E' He says there: 
"Interruption is such that it will have torn the continuum 
of a tissue which naturally tends to envelop, close upon 
itself, resew itself and reassume its own tears and as if 
rendering them its own once more... " (ECM p. 38) 
The use of the future perfect here indicates a 
hypothetical time prior to the interruption -a time 
before the continuum is broken. On the other hand it 
implies that in reality the interruption has always 
already occured, and the thought of the interruption 
has passed into the fabric of the continuum, marking 
it, namely with a trace of that past. A recurrent 
metaphor in Derrida is of the text (of) history as a 
torn and resewn fabric. "' Its having been resewn is 
understood by metaphysics to indicate a past in which 
the fabric was untorn. This is not itself a metaphor 
that Derrida would object to, because it is merely a 
fact that metaphysics thinks its origin by means of 
this metaphor (and because this is a version of the 
metaphor of the origin, as he better than others has 
given us to understand). What is at issue is the 
question of the reappropriation of that past. It is the 
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meditation on this question which demonstrates very 
quickly the naivety of the metaphor and puts 
metaphoricity itself into question. In Levinas' notion 
of interruption he finds the thought that the 
"... anterior future of the tear - as absolutely anterior 
past - will have made the seam effect possible, not the 
other way around. On the condition, however, of allowing 
itself to be contaminated, resumed and resewn in what it has 
made possible" (ibid) 
Levinas' retention of the notion of the 
"uncontaminated" (by being) is metaphysical in 
Derrida' s view much as the notion of Being without the 
ontological difference is. Once again Derrida is 
reminding us that Heidegger's thought of the 
ontological difference showed what was wrong with this 
thinking. As though Levinas had doubly misread 
Heidegger - firstly taking Being to be an excellent 
being and secondly by thinking that the purpose of 
drawing our attention to this difference was to make 
Being an object of thought. Is not Levinas' claim that 
to hear a God not contaminated by being is a human 
possibility ultimately subject to this criticism? 
Derrida appears to be opposed to the idea of a 
singular, radical interruption; an interruption such as 
the one that in Levinas' Instant throws the subject 
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into the time of the Other. He argues that the only 
possibility for a thinking which interrupts its own 
becoming said is one which takes into account the 
inevitability of its becoming a Said, and therefore 
no longer has any need to talk about 'Saying' 
and 'origin'. That is not to say, however, that 
according to Derrida thought's taking into account 
the inevitability of becoming said implies its becoming 
the passive observance of its own becoming said. On the 
contrary, it must in a sense actively maintain the 
interruption by means of what, in ECM, Derrida refers 
to as a series, or what he elsewhere (e. g. Positions) 
has called a chain of substitutions, whose function is 
to defer the resumption (reprise) of the continuum as 
such. This series (of what we earlier called 'textual 
devices') is the only possible response to the constant 
"renewing of the seams" of metaphysics; the continuous 
reappropriation of the incisive, interruptive thought. 
In Chapter 3 we said that in Levinas there was no 
"decisive" interruption in the historical sense. What 
we referred to, a few sentences back, as a 'radical' 
interruption would represent the transcendence of 
history/historical time. In ECM, more clearly than in 
some other places, Derrida appears to be opposed to the 
notion of decisive ruptures of any kind, at least of 
any which are 'effectuated' in an active sense. The 
notion of the 'rupture' applied to historical epochs is 
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not decisive (or perhaps better to say 'incisive') in 
the appropriate sense, because it is neutral vis a vis 
the present moment. Derrida is. 1however, seemingly close 
to Levinas when he says, 
"This resumption is even the condition for the beyond 
essence being able to retain its chance against the 
enveloping seam of the thematic or dialectic. "(ECM 37) 
This, is precisely what was meant by the Saying 
"requiring the hold" of the Said as such (see above). 
Derrida represents the couple Said/Saying in terms of 
the logocentric Said and Said-always-being-interrupted. 
He cites Levinas on the Book (OTB 171/217) to 
demonstrate that Levinas' Saying should be understood, 
or can best be understood, as the trace of the Other 
borne by the intertextuality of discourse, namely, in 
the consequent production of signs bearing the trace of 
(a trace of) the Other. The metaphor of retying the 
text is the vehicle of Derrida's attempt to show this. 
The interruptions are marked by the 'knots' in the 
retied text, whose very presence is the mark of the 
Other which is never present in the text but of which 
they are the trace. This `trace of the Other "must, 
therefore, .. b®. _ there,, without being present, otherwise. " 
(ECM 39) Derrida attributes the multiple 
interruption to Levinas at the level of his text, but 
not at the level of his intentions. A peculiar move for 
2'75 
Derrida of all thinkers to make. It suggests, in 
effect, that Levinas' Instantaneous interruption cannot 
achieve the reduction it claims to produce. 
"One sole,. interruption within a discourse does not fulfil 
its task (oeuvre) and lets itself be reappropriated. " 
(ECM 40) 
Treating Levinas' text on these two levels at once, 
interweaving his own critical remarks on the 
interruption, interrupting Levinas' text in doing so, 
is itself a living example of the intertextuality we 
spoke. of above. At times it is impossible to 
distinguish. between what is of the Levinasian text and 
what is of the Derridian text. It could be described 
as a 'live performance'- in which the absolutely other is 
produced. 
c. "There is-, dislocation: the work (oeuvre) does not deport an 
articulation (enonc(? ) or a series of articulations, it re- 
marks in each atom of the said a marking effraction of the 
saying, no longer in the present infinitive, but already a 
having passed (by) of the trace, a performance (of the) 
totally other. " (ECM 37) 22 
For --berrida this performance involves a rethinking of 
the other in a non-metaphysical way but does not 
represent, as in Levinas, an attempt to think this 
other qua "uncontaminated". But neither does the 
'production' of this other imply that the other so 
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thought is merely the effect of a self-rupturing 
discourse and therefore merely another concept. The 
absolute alterity of the Other is not contingent, as we 
said at the beginning of this chapter. Appearing 
otherwise than as a concept in the text of metaphysics 
this other is the trace traced in the withdrawal of the 
concept. This is indeed a point of contact in the 
thinking of Levinas and Derrida. We shall see now how 
it is the thinking of the trace in each which marks 
this point of contact. In ECM Derrida demonstrates 
the intertextuality of the 'contact' and the sense in 
which this relates to the production of the "totally 
other" within the text; within metaphysics. As we see 
from the text cited above, it also deals with the 
thematic of reappropriation; the representation of the 
interruption of the text in a theme, a Said. We shall 
ti return to this after a short digression on metaphor. 
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On Metaphor arnd the Reduction 
:, 
In OTB the formulation of the relation to the Other in 
terms of the reduction of the Said to the Saying 
addresses the matter quite explicitly as one about 
language and of language. This is not something new: in 
TI, as we have noted, the relation between conversation 
and thematization is absolutely central to what is said 
there. The major difference in OTB is that the 
formulation functions quite consciously as a 
formalisation of what is going on in other elements of 
the text. Ultimately the question which remains is 
precisely: What is it that Is going on? The question 
formulated in the Said transcends the Said in the 
direction of the Saying; 
"One can go back to this signification of the saying, this 
responsibility and substitution, only from the said and from 
the question: 'What is it about...? a question already 
within the said in which everything shows itself. " (OTB 
44/57) 
Derrida introduces "The Retrai t of Metaphor" (RoM) 
with a similar question. 
"What is happening, today, with metaphor? And without 
11 
metaphor what is happening? 24 
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We are going to look now at what bearing the question 
of metaphor has on our reading of the Unsaying of the 
Said in Levinas. We shall begin by suggesting that one 
of Derrida's most oft and most variously voiced 
'reservations' about what Levinas is proposing can best 
be understood in view of his writings on metaphor. In 
particular, we suggest that in Levinas' account of the 
relation to the Other, more clearly than elsewhere in 
terms of the reduction from the Said to the Saying, 
Derrida sees a traditional view of the withdrawal of 
metaphor, by means of which thinking would be delivered 
over to this Other. This would roughly correspond to 
the idea that language qua metaphor is the means by 
which thought approaches what is distant through what 
is most accessible. The simplest of interpretations of 
the Saying might see Levinas' proposed reduction of 
(I I the Said to the Saying in these terms, namely, as a 
rendering the Saying accessible; as if the Saying were 
something wholly contained within the Said. This way of 
thinking, however, would make of the Saying an 
originary Said, which is contrary to Levinas' entire 
project.. In drawing our attention to a certain text by 
Heidegger, Derr. ida seeks to make clear how the entire 
question of metaphor is about the essential 
metaphoricity of language and, therefore, the manner of 
locating oneself within metaphor rather than of taking 
a position on metaphor. In places, such as the opening 
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pages of The Retrait of Metaphor, he actually 
demonstrates the uncontrollability of the texts 
metaphoricity by stylistically bringing metaphor to the 
fore. In this privileging of the metaphoricity of the 
text rather than the logical relations, which are 
traditionally held to be what constitute the text's 
intelligibility, we see Derrida, like Levinas, 
attempting to account for the absolutely other in 
metaphysics. This is the attempt to think this alterity 
otherwise than by means of the traditional 
conceptuality. The recurrent metaphor of overflowing, 
in Levinas' various works, which we have referred to 
in several places above, does something similar. The 
Saying is always something more than what can be 
contained in the Said, it is therefore radically 
inaccessible within the Said. The notion of 
accessiblity here has everything to do with making 
intelligible. The reduction Levinas has in mind 
cannot, therefore, be thought of on a simplistic model 
of the withdrawal of the Said' s metaphoricity. In his 
work the 'metaphor' of overflowing itself works to 
resist any such attempt. The inability of the Said to 
contain the Saying corresponds to the 
'uncontrollability' of metaphoricity as such. It is a 
point at which we see the authority of the Said, 
the 
logos, not so much being challenged but being exposed 
in its inability to maintain authority; in its 
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finitude. It is in these terms that we see a 'contact' 
between the two thinkers Levinas and Heidegger, if not 
yet a 'dialogue' . It is in view of Derrida's reading 
of Heidegger' s remarks on metaphor that this is best 
seen. 
In "The Retrait of Metaphor" Derrida is out to show in 
what sense the account of metaphysics as the 
withdrawal of metaphor in terms of wear and tear 
(Abnutzung) is inappropriate and in any case wrongly 
attributed to him. He reminds us in RoM that it is the 
conceptuality or metaphoricity of metaphor that is his 
target. It is the withdrawal of the conceptuality of 
metaphor, metaphor as such and, paradoxically, by means 
of metaphor as such, that he demonstrates at work in 
Heidegger' s thinking on language. -'0 There is an order 
f; or level of reduction involved in this which, and this 
is part of Derrida's claim, either escapes current 
thinking on metaphor, or whose possibility this 
thinking is not willing to acknowledge. : ý'"7 This issue 
becomes one of accounting for this 'second-order' 
withdrawal, which is qualitatively different from the 
first-order withdrawal corresponding to the Abnutzung 
of metaphor. '2eI In a sense the second-order withdrawal 
'founds' the first before the first gets underway. This 
thought of Derrida's proceeds as an interpretation of 
Heidegger's thought of the withdrawal of Being: it is 
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the withdrawal of Being which creates the space for 
c. 
metaphysics as onto-theology. The paradox is that 
" metaphysics bears the trace of the withdrawal of the 
very conceptuality which this metaphysics is and by 
means of which it thinks its own conceptuality as such. 
Derrida attempts to capture this paradox in metaphor 
(at the same time as thematically arguing that there is 
nothing aside from metaphor) often in terms of a 
topology of metaphysics, which he says is not 
circumscribed by: 
"... a circular limit bordering on an homogenous field, but 
more a twisted structure which today, according to another 
figure, I would be tempted to call: 'invaginated'. 
Representation of a linear and circular closure surrounding 
an, homogenous space is, precisely, the them of my greatest 
emphasis... I could multiply the citations from as far as 
Differance where it was said for example, that 'the text of 
metaphysics' is 'not surrounded but traversed by its 
limit... marked on its inside by the multiple track of its 
margin... a simultaneously traced and effaced trace, alive 
and dead simultaneously'" (RoM 16) 
Such a-topology is not representable nor is it meant to 
be as such, it is the conception of withdrawal in terms 
of 'linearity' that it precisely seeks to put in 
question. In another place Derrida attributes a certain 
linearity to the metaphor of overflowing in Levinas. He 
Says 
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"It is strange, is it not, that this excess which overflows 
language at every instant and still requires it, sets it in 
motion incessantly at the very moment of traversing it? This 
traversal is not a transgression; the passage of a cutting 
limit: the very metaphor of overflowing becomes unsuitable 
in so far as it still implies some sort of linearity. 
(ECM 26) 
We shall come back to this shortly. Before that we 
shall take a look with Derrida at the Heideggerian 
text on metaphor which is central to all this. The 
discussion revolves around Heidegger's remarks about 
language and the "house of Being". Derrida quotes from 
the Letter on Humanism, the sentence "Das Denken baut 
am Haus des Seins" -" Thought works at (constructing) 
the house of Being" (RoM 24), and comments on 
Heidegger' s claim that 
"Discourse about the house of Being (Die Rede vom Haus des 
Seins) is not a metaphor (vbertragung) transporting the 
image of 'house' toward Being, but [by implication: 
inversely] it is by way of appropriating thinking the 
essence of Being (sondern aus dem sachgemäss gedachten 
Wesens des Seins) that we will one day be able to think what 
'house' and 'to inhabit' are. " (RoM ibid) 
Derrida sees in this a non-denominational thinking 
which aims to think, for example, 'house' and 'to 
inhabit' beyond their metaphysical determinations, 
beyond essence. It gives 'house' and 'to inhabit' back 
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to thinking by withdrawing their metaphorical 
representation as the empirical objects - house and 
inhabitation. These are no longer to be thought 
according to the "privilege of a name" they are to 
be thought otherwise. It makes of thinking these 
(things) a 'getting to where we already are'. What is 
the connection between the 'exposure of metaphysics to 
itself as empiricism' associated by Derrida with the 
Levinasian text, which we examined in Chapter 4, and 
this promise of a de-empiricisation of thinking in 
Heidegger? The question begs a comparative assessment 
of the reversal as it is to be found in Levinas and 
Heidegger, and goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, in the final sections of this essay we shall 
indicate the direction in which this may take us. 
Certainly both Levinas and Heidegger think the 
reversal as a reversal of the thinking of essence. But 
Levinas' notion of the same is used by him to give a 
reading of the ontological difference of Sein/Dasein 
such that it falls entirely within (it): a difference 
from within which the alterity of the Other is 
hopelessly and already radically excluded; out of which 
the relation of the same to this Other cannot emerge 
(for thought). In other words, for Levinas, Heidegger's 
reversal does not break with the thinking of essence. 
On the other hand we can speculate as to the proximity 
2B4 
of Levinas and Heidegger when Heidegger thinks the 
reversal such that thought thinks from the truth of 
Being to the nature of man as opposed to the 
preliminary meditation which approached the truth of 
Being through its special relation to Dasein. This does 
not suggest that a decision must be made personally on 
the part of the philosopher, the moment is 'historical' 
and coincides with the emergence of the thought of 
historicity itself. It is the point at which the 
thinker recognizes a reversal in the directionality of 
the thought of Being; the point at which the double 
genitivity of the of becomes meaningful for thought. It 
reminds us immediately of Levinas' "The infinity of 
the infinite lives in going backwards". This bears 
great similarity to what we in our analyses have 
described in terms of the "thinking in two directions 
at once"1 characteristic of Levinas' thinking from the 
"perspective" of the Other. In Heidegger we find: 
"Every philosophical, that is, thinking, doctrine of the 
nature of man is in itself already a doctrine of the Being 
of the things that are. Every doctrine of Being is in itself 
already a doctrine of the nature of man. But neither of the 
two can be arrived at by the mere reversal of the other, 
through a dialectical manoeuvre... ""' 
This indicates that the changed perspective in thinking 
after the reversal is not a substitution of one 
perspective for another, but rather a maintenance of 
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the two within the new perspective. This manner of one 
being maintained within the other is, however, to be 
distinguished from the Hegelian Aufhebung. The 'new' 
perspective is more originary, 'older', than the first, 
Here we see another model bearing great similarity to 
the one we appealed to above in our reading of 
Levinas. But once again we must point out that although 
this thinking of the ontological difference, expressed 
in terms of two-way directionality, is to be 
distinguished from Hegelian dialectic, for Levinas it 
remains, nontheless, a form of dialectic of the 
interiority of the same closed to the absolutely other. 
We are not, therefore, on the brink of proposing a last 
minute reduction of Levinas' thought to Heideggerian 
motifs! As will become clear now as we return to the 
theme of the Unsaying of the Said. 
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Unsay irrig tlzte Said <2 > 
In the last section we cited Derrida's remark that the 
metaphor of "overflowing" was unsuitable for 
representing the relation of the "excess" of the Saying 
over the Said because it implied a sort of linearity. 
It is hardly surprising that he says this when in RoM 
we learn the sense in which the very metaphoricity of 
metaphor is linear, metaphor being a concept of onto- 
theological metaphysics. In other words, no metaphor 
can 'represent' this excess without reducing it to a 
concept; subjecting it to metaphor. It is not that 
'overflowing' is a weak metaphor, say compared to 
Derrida' s own of ' invagination'. For the exposition of 
his town thinking, Derrida prefers figures which resist 
,; 
being read linearly. They resist in a way similar to 
that in which certain scenes of copulation in de Sade 
cannot be represented realistically, being physically 
impossible. The metaphor of overflowing, in comparison, 
is (as much as anything can be) straightforward, let us 
say traditional. It is not linked to Levinas' account 
of the ethical relation quite in the way that 
Heidegger's "language works at constructing the house 
of Being" is linked to his thinking of the reversal. 
Heidegger's 'metaphor' is a kind of 'speculative' 
thought more akin to Levinas' "Being is exteriority", 
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mentioned above. If one misses this then it is possible 
to go ahead and read Levinas' representation of the 
reduction of the Said to the Saying as if it proceeded 
according to a supposed linearity. This is not, we 
might add, what Derrida is out to do, but it is a 
point at which we might speculate as to his belief in 
the necessary presence of certain criteria to a 
discourse in order for it to be able to effectuate an 
"interruption" of a 'decisive' character. One criterion 
would appear to be the application of an acute 
authorial control over precisely such disruptive 
devices as the very self-consciously transgressive 
metaphor of invaginatfon. It may be, of course, that 
the authorial aspect of this control is imaginary 
anyway, in which case its presence is merely ironic 
rather than logically problematic. Instead of 
'authorial control' we might speak of a certain level 
of textual consciousness which in its ability to turn 
language back on itself within the text represents an 
"abuse" of language. Derrida talks of the "abuse of 
language" in relation to translation of Heidegger's 
Entziehung: -with the French word retrait (RoM 
22), but 
the real abuse he is perpetrating, in general, is the 
abuse by which language is encouraged to deconstruct 
logocentric self-control. The resulting revelation to 
metaphysics of its own essential metaphoricity, or in 
other words, the impossibility of any meta-language by 
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means of which this control could be maintained, is a 
de-struction after which metaphysics can never be the 
same again. 
In OTB, in several places, Levinas refers to an abuse 
of language which he associates not with the Unsaying 
of the Said, but with the being said of the Saying. In 
other words, in the terminology we have been using 
here: with the reduction in the direction of the Saying 
to the Said, which ontological metaphysics makes. As a 
general rein rk about the project of OTB he says: 
"This way of thinking is against a philosophy which does not 
see beyond being and reduces by an abuse of language, saying 
to the said, and all sense to interest. " (OTB 16/20) 
b 
The Saying appears in metaphysics, through being 
abused, qua Said. It is contrary to this abuse that the 
Unsaying of the Said works. The (self) abuse of 
language which Derrida elucidates in view of, and 
associates with, Heidegger's remarks on metaphor, has 
something in common with this abuse as noted by 
Levinas. The connection is to be understood in relation 
to differing conceptions of the reversal of thinking we 
have had in view throughout this thesis. Derrida's 
reference to the abuse of language, as we said above, 
refers us to the deconstruction (another word for 
undoing) of the authority of the logos. As we have just 
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seen in Levinas, the same term is used to express 
seemingly the opposite, namely, the Said' s asserting 
its mastery of the Saying in the Saying's becoming Said 
- in philosophy. 
"Philosophy, which is consigned in the Said, converts 
disinterestedness and its signification into essence and, by 
an abuse of language, to be sure, says that of which it is 
but a servant, but of which it makes itself master by saying 
it, and reduces its pretentions in a new said. " 
(0TB 126/162) 
For Levinas the abuse is of the Saying - originary 
language - in its reduction to the Said. For Derrida 
the abuse can only be of the Said and in Levinas' 
understanding of the abuse, as being of the Saying, he 
would see the return of the traditional and in fact 
theological notion of the pure transcendental 
r; signification. What these views have in common is that 
the abuse they speak of is for both the self-abuse of 
metaphysics, which begins of necessity in the Said and 
results in what Derrida might call its falling apart 
at the seams. The difference is that beyond this auto- 
destruction of metaphysics in which Derrida generally 
sees an opening up such that it may be thought again 
otherwise, Levinas insists on the absolute 
transcendence of the beyond being, the otherwise than 
being. The abuse of language as the reduction of the 
Saying to the Said should therefore be distinguished 
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from Derrida's thinking of it as the auto-destruction 
of the Said, on the basis of the notion of 
Transcendence. We shall not here investigate the 
proximity of Derrida and Heidegger on their own terms, 
but we can briefly look at the sense in whichi for 
Levinas4 Derrida's reading of Heidegger's remarks on 
metaphor are indeed faithful to a notion of reversal 
proceeding as an 'involution' of the Said, to which 
Unsaying the Said is ultimately to be contrasted. 
Of course it should be remembered that Heidegger has 
his own notion of the Saying (Sage) and in association 
with it the notion of proximity (Nahe) to Being: the 
two are united in the notion of Ere gnis. -*31 But the 
disintegration of Being resulting from thought's being 
unable to provide the name for Being comes as no 
surprise to thought, in a sense we shall explain 
shortly. It may signal a break with the ontological 
conception of essence, but does not break with what 
Levinas calls the cosmos of the same. For Levinas the 
interruption of this totality was never its own 
possibility, so for him the reversal in Heidegger's 
thinking may be described as a change in perspective 
but it remains an alternative perspective still proper 
to the same. Heidegger's later discourse on the 
gathering of the Fourfold of Earth, Heaven, Gods and 
Men, would similarly be said to be a meditation which 
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does not break with the synchronic plenitude of the 
Said, even if one accepts that it gives us to think the 
gathering and the gathered there beyond the traditional 
empiricism. The synchrony implied in the very term 
'gathering' is the time of the Said. Far from being a 
response to the incessant interruption of this time, 
experienced in my proximity to the Other, Heidegger's 
Heimkehr represents an involution of the same, an 
Fi nkehr. It might be objected or remarked that this 
resignation or enclosure of Heidegger's thinking within 
the same makes no attempt to express itself in terms of 
an internal critique, indicating that what it 
criticises is not being taken seriously. To this it can 
only be said that as the notion of internal critique is 
a part of the fabric of the totality of this 
meditation, it is precisely another possibility of the 
f; same. Consistently opposed to this is the notion of 
thinking as a response to an interruption which is not 
a self-rupturing of the same but has its origin 
elsewhere. Expressing the opposition thus it appears as 
if at every turn the failure to engage in a dialogue 
with Heidegger on his terms is defended by means of a 
very simplistic logical formalism, the very nature of 
which Levinas himself rejects a: karelevant basis for 
critique. It is, however, not the case that Levinas' 
account of the absolute alterity of the Other is based 
on some logical objection to its inclusion within the 
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same. We have seen there how his thinking is related to 
other attempts to think the end of philosophy in terms 
of the Inside/Outside of metaphysics. What is in fact 
an attempt to remain faithful to the sense of the 
disturbance of the Other within metaphysics can too 
easily be mistaken for a stubborn adherence to a 
certain logic of interruption. What we have seen in 
Ch. s 2-4 is the manner in which Levinas' work combines 
a philosophical response to our thinking's being within 
metaphysics and a response to the ' phenomenon' of 
being's other. In his work the interrelation of these 
is revealed to be a 'response', in an originary sense, 
to the Other. 
That the signification of the Saying is only to be 
heard qua Said signifies neither the completeness of 
the totality of the Said nor the positing of an 
ideality. The 'reduction' of the Saying to the Said, in 
the ordinary, i. e. traditional sense, can be seen to be 
secondary in relation to the reduction, going in the 
reverse direction, from the Said to the Saying. These 
are not merely two variations or two different 
perspectives on the relation of the Saying to the Said. 
The relation of the Saying/Said exhibits a radical 
asymmetry. As a matter of fact, what we could regard as 
'two different versions' are precisely the account of 
the ethical relation in terms of the 
I-Other 
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conjuncture and this account of the relation of the 
Saying to the Said. This is part of what we have 
attempted to show throughout: the sense in which these 
two are contiguous rather than analogous. The 
impossible thought of the other of metaphysics' is the 
ethical, for 'Levinas, irrespective of the terminology 
one chooses to express it in.. 
We can see this clearly if we consider further the many 
formulations of this gesture of "going back" to the 
Saying from the Said. This "going back" does not 
correspond to a linear withdrawl of the Said, but 
rather to a 'quantum leap' from the synchronic into the 
diachrony of the Saying. This i, S a time in which the 
Saying says prior to its becoming a Said. The Said 
which states this unsaid Saying would regard it as 
f, 'hypothetical', 
but this is precisely a name given to 
the Saying qua Said in synchronic time. Thought has a 
natural, or habitual, tendency to think the diachronic 
as a moment of the synchronic, but the two times are 
emphatically 'parallel' to one another. The Saying is 
not, therefore the past of the Said in any sense which 
would imply its theoretical recuperability. 
"This saying, in the form of responsibility for another, is 
bound to an irrecuperable, unrepresentable, past, 
temporalizing according to a time with separate epochs, in 
diachrony. " (OTB 47/60) 
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That this 'past' is not representable explains why 
Levinas spends so relatively little time trying to 
describe it and why we were right to say that the 
account of the face to face in TI is not a meditation 
on a 'beautiful experience'. It is also why he says 
that the account in general of the relation to the 
Other will resemble negative theology: What this 
relation means 'positively' is only thought through 
what it is 'negatively' Here we see evidence of how 
the terminology of the Said/Saying breaks with this 
metaphysical opposition. The Saying is approached by 
means of the reduction through thought's addressing 
itself to the disruption of the sovereign subject by 
the Other. The reduction is an "undoing" of 
thematization in approach, proximity, obsession, and 
substitution. These are the movements of Unsaying the 
Said and, in a sense, Saying is nothing more than the 
this Unsaying of the Said. The relation between the 
Saying and the Said is not linear - one does not pass 
from the Said to the Saying by means of the reduction. 
The excess of the Saying which 'overflows' the Said, 
which is in excess of the Said, is appropriated fully 
in the Unsaying, not in some ideal synchronic moment of 
a heard command -a pure Saying. The ethical relation, 
the face to face (itself) exhibits diachrony, a 
diachrony subtended by the asymmetrical difference 
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between the terms. The signifying of the Saying occurs 
in the break up of the totality constituted by the 
Said, which is the word of the subject qua same, and 
not in another 'realm' . 
In all this we are surely not wrong to hear powerful 
echoes of Heidegger's thinking on truth as a-lethia, in 
which thinking is related to the unthought (Ungedachte) 
otherwise than in the mode of making it present. There 
is an apparently similar sense of "return" in 
Heidegger' s thinking of a-1 n. We should, however, 
I 
be wary of this apparent similarity, as where 
Heidegger is apt to call thinking Heimkehr, Levinas is 
emphatic that the approach to the Other is Abenteuer - 
a setting sail in the style of Ulysses for an unknown 
destination. Heidegger's thinking remains, despite his 
f, I questioning of onto-theology, a "coinciding" of the 
oneself in its return; its journey is a spiritual 
"detour" which ends where it began, in certainty. 
"... certainty,... remains the guide and guarantee of the 
whole spiritual adventure of being. But this is why this 
adventure is no adventure. ItI is never dangerous; it is 
self-possession, sovereignty, apX3. Anything unknown that 
can occur to it is in advance disclosed, open, manifest, is 
cast in the mould of the known, and cannot be a complete 
surprise. " (OTB 99/126) 
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The "complete surpise" Levinas is thinking of is not 
something that can be said, in fact that is part of 
what is surprising about it. It is the Other who 
surprises us by the very infinity of his transcendence. 
In TI Levinas relates this to the origin of language in 
the following: 
"The Other who can sovereignly say no to me is exposed to 
the point of the sword or the revolver's bullet, and the 
whole unshakeable firmness of his for itself with that 
intransigent no he opposes is obliterated because the sword 
or the bullet has touched the ventricles or auricles of his 
heart. In the contexture of the world he is quasi-nothing. 
But he can oppose to me a struggle, that is, oppose to the 
force that strikes him not a force of resistance, but the 
very unforseeableness of his reaction... (this is) the 
infinity of his transcendence. This infinity, stronger than 
murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is the 
primordial expression, is the first word: 'you shall not 
commit murder'. (TI 199/173) 
This surprise is constantly renewed, it is not epochal. 
It moves the Unsaying of the Said along like the motor 
öf contradiction which propels Hegel's dialectic 
forwards. The difference is that in the former the 
future is not predetermined by the past, the surprise 
being the, interruption of this very movement of time; 
of the future through the present to a past state. 
Perhaps better to say that the future itself is 
postponed in the Instant and along with it death, the 
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preoccupation of the self-centered subject. This is the 
time in which the subject can be for the Other; the 
time in which 'I' am in a relation to the Other before 
I am me. And yet, as we have said several times above, 
this me is, paradoxically, the starting point of this 
transcendence. That this is a paradox and remains one 
in this text and the texts referred to throughout, is 
perhaps of some significance in itself. As a concept 
belonging to the Said it seems to have a use within 
discourse on the relation of metaphysics to its other. 
In belonging to the Said it is itself dependent on what 
we have called "linearity". The paradox of the 
antecedence of the Saying, for instance, results from 
the linearity of chronology. That philosophy can live 
with this paradox (for it is never eliminmated as such) 
must be seen in relation to the way in which it is 
accommodated at the end of metaphysics. The repression 
of paradox in metaphysics is lifted, it is no longer 
regarded as a dubiously respectable name for 
contradiction. In Levinas one of the things that this 
involves is to not respond to the demands of formal 
logic. The Said and the Saying are in two different 
times, we have described them as 'parallel' above. It 
is said that parallel lines meet at infinity, but this 
metaphor does not fit what is being claimed for the 
relation between the Saying and the Said. Infinity is 
traced in the postponement of each interruption of the 
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Said, in each Instant. The interruption. this breaking 
through of the Saying in the Said is not a moment of 
appropriation of the Saying for thinking, for the same. 
It is the renewal (instauration) 11 and Justification 
of the Said. The Saying breaks through as a founding 
(instauration) of the Said. Ethics thus renews ontology 
in the form of a constant calling to responsibility of 
the ontological subject. 
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The Return of Sk¬pticism 
Ethical Neutra 1 ity 
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"In having proffered the epekeina tes ousias, in having 
recognised from its second word (for example in the Sophist) 
that alterity had to circulate at the origin of meaning, in 
welcoming alterity in general into the heart of the logos, 
the Greek thought of Being forever has protected itself 
against every absolutely surprising convocation. (VA 153) 
The logical enclosure of the other in logocentric 
metaphysics is nevertheless breached in each instant, 
and it is this fact rather than its logical 
impenetrability that is the starting point of Levinas' 
thinking. Derrida also puts it well when he says that 
what was taken for the solidity of metaphysics is in 
fact its rigidity and that its surface is severely 
cracked, and that Levinas' thinking moves along these 
cracks. '3 Levinas' thinking in fact works at an 
opening of this metaphysics after which, in principle, 
noth ag will remain the same. Strangely it reveals how 
the edifice never was whole, total, but is and has been 
ceaselessly interrupted, breaking up the time that 
holds being together. It penetrates metaphysics to its 
fundaments and challenges it in its origin by proposing 
a pre-original opening of opening which opens 
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anarchically before being has time to gather itself 
into themes, which in turn form the fabric of the 
metaphysical edifice. 
Levinas likens the notion of interruption to 
skepticism, which he calls " philosophy's legitimate 
child". Skepticism always returns despite its repeated 
refutation and prevents philosophy from having the last 
word. 
"Does not the last word belong to philosophy? Yes, in a 
certain sense, since for Western philosophy the saying is 
exhausted in things said. But skepticism in fact makes a 
difference, and puts an interval between saying and the 
said. " (OTB 168/213) 
The "last word" ; the "word of the end" is always 
already being undone in a going towards the Other. It 
f, is not exhausted in the Said because the reduction is, 
in the way we have described, In reverse. The Saying 
'increases' as the reduction proceeds, beginning from 
the Said. Skepticism and logocentrism are not mutually 
exclusive, nor, and this is what Levinas insists on, 
is the former contained within the latter. At least not 
in any sense of 'within' conceivable by logocentrism 
(itself). Skepticism stands to philosophy as does the 
Saying to the Said. 
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Earlier in this chapter we juxtaposed questions of 
Derrida and Levinas: the questions "What is 
happening... ?" and "What is it about... ? ". It may be 
that these are not pbilosopbical questions, are not 
philosophy's questions - to borrow a sentence from 
Derrida. Whatever the nature of these questions they 
occupy philosophy such that philosophy cannot simply 
eject them from its house. Like skepticism itself they 
return with an "audacity" (to borrow a word Levinas 
uses in this context) such that philosophy cannot 
refuse them an audience. Both formulations of the 
question significantly betray the fact that the 
questions come 'after' and in response to that which is 
already happening. For Levinas this is the very 
significant fact of the antecedence of that to which 
philosophy is the response, namely, the Other. But this 
response is found to be already preceded by a response 
made prior to the expression of the response voiced in 
themes and in ontology. Levinas understands this to be 
contrary to the thinking which thinks the other of 
metaphysics through the ontological difference. The 
thinking of the ontological difference does not think 
Being as being other to thought and teaches that any 
attempt to do so must go via the impossible severance 
of thought and language. We have shown how the account 
of the subjects subjectivity in terms of its 
substantivity is the crucial thought in Levinas on his 
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way to giving an account of the relation to the Other 
qua Other without severing thought and language. 
In these pages here we are guilty of pulling apart two 
parts of an account which, we are ready to admit, 
leaves both parts lifeless. This is the price paid for 
writing a thesis rather than something in the form of a 
futuristic 'engaged writing'. Perhaps we lack the 
audacity and the talent for that, but then there is a 
time and place for everything. This pulling apart of 
the text to which we are now confessing was, however, 
warranted and the perforations were clearly to be seen. 
We have already referred to them: the account of the 
Saying and the Said and the Unsaying of the Said, is 
almost like a theoretical supplement in comparison and 
relation to other elements which together constitute 
Levinas' claim for the primacy of the ethical. This 
supplementarity is not simple and we use the word 
having learnt it from Derrida. We have made themes of 
analyses as the anatomist makes drawings of part of a 
body -a dead body. These are analyses which are in 
fact part of an overall structure intended to produce a 
general dethematization. We have arrested them and 
(perhaps in bad faith) hoped to make them intelligible. 
Intelligible perhaps, but are they meaningful? Levinas 
says, the Face is meaningful without reference to a 
system, it is "pure expression", the face to face being 
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the anarchical origin of meaning. We are not, however, 
despite his insistence in the form of repetition, being 
asked to accept this in good faith, nor simply as a 
phenomenological fact. His aim here is to show that the 
Face signals the call to responsibility, which, however 
it is thought, should also be understood as a call to 
phi 1 ostphy: 
"Our whole purpose was to ask if subjectivity, despite its 
foreigness to the said, is not stated by an abuse of 
language through which in the indiscretion of the said 
everything is shown. Everything is shown by indeed betraying 
its meaning, but philosophy is called upon to reduce that 
betrayal, by an abuse that justifies proximity itself in 
which the infinite cones to pass. " (OTB 156/198) 
Earlier in this chapter we asked about the connection 
between the exposure of metaphysics to itself as 
empiricism, associated by Derrida with the Levinasian 
text and the de-empiricisation of thinking implied in 
Heide gger 's remarks about metaphor. We shall return to 
this now. The ' de-empiricisation' of thinking in the 
context of the discussion in RoM means in fact the 
'non-metaphysical' thinking of beings (and Being). 
Levinas' thinking of the thing as 'gift', which we 
looked at in Chapter 4, also appears in the context of 
an account of a non-metaphysical signifying. This much 
they may have in common, but a most significant 
difference in their thinking is certainly -related to 
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their respective treatment of the subject/object 
distinction. Levinas sees Heidegger's thinking as being 
the nadir (or zenith) in a tradition which "dissolves" 
the subject in its "situation", and it is against this 
that in his analyses he aims to resurrect it. Doing 
this may at first sight appear to be a kind of realism 
of the subject opposed to which, as one might expect, 
the ideal other will be classically opposed. That this 
is not the case is clear from the nature of this 
account of subjectivity, whose meaning, it is revealed, 
is guaranteed not by the system in which it arises but 
in relation to the Other. In Heidegger's account the 
subject/object distinction comes to be thought in the 
space opened up by the withdrawal of Being. In this 
withdrawal or this trace of the originary withdrawal, 
the thought 'of alterity, and of all difference, emerges 
at the same time and in some sort of dialectical 
relation to the thought of sameness. This withdrawal is 
the opening of language for Heidegger. The questioning 
of Being in Heidegger does not therefore interrupt this 
withdrawal because the logos cannot interrupt itself in 
a decisive manner. The sense of 'decisive' we are now 
appealing to is the one appropriate to the interruption 
of the Said by the Saying; the interruption which is 
capable of "renewing" or "founding" the Said. The 
questioning of Being cannot effectuate such an 
interruption because it was always already an intrinsic 
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possibilility of (the withdrawal of) Being. What is the 
skeptical statement to the metaphysics of Being? A 
problem of logic, and nothing beyond that -a call 
falling on deaf ears? 
Is the talk of the Other, which is said not to be the 
empirical other person, as if it were the other person, 
simply pathos? And if it is true as Derrida suggests, 
14 that some of the most decisive moments of Levinas' 
discourse are to be found in his use of pathos, does 
this imply that his use of ethical language, which 
"imposes itself on his discourse", is arbitrarily 
'ethical'. In other words, how are we to relate to 
Levinas' calling this discourse on the otherwise than 
being *etbics? Is the legitimacy of this solely to be 
decided according to the nature of the "imposition" by 
which ethical language presents itself to thought at 
the point of reversal. Could the whole thing have been 
expressed in another grand metaphor? Can such a 
linguistic relativism be taken seriously? Certainly 
there are questions posed with regard to the nature of 
language which despite a more serious guise are in fact 
of this order. Such 'seriousness' would, according to 
Levinas' thesis, indicate a lack of seriousness vis a 
vis the Other, because it is the kind of seriousness 
which in fact belies an 'ethical neutrality' with 
regard to the Other. Levinas sees this neutrality in 
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all attempts to think language in its Being. 11 The 
a 
' difference' between the ' I' and the Other in the I- 
Other conjuncture of the face to face is often referred 
to as the "non-indifference" to the Other. The 
difference between the I and the other, thought on the 
basis of their being, is indifference to the Others 
unicity, which is always reduced in thought according 
to the neutrality of the common denominator of being. 
The destination of this ethics in Levinas' thinking is 
somewhere we are always already on the way back from. 
For him the question is one of the route back to 
philosophy, of philosophizing as Unsaying such that in 
this thinking the Infinite comes to (have) pass(ed): 
"The infinity of the infinite lives in going 
backwards". 
We have just said that the supplementary theory of the 
Saying and the Said must be seen as exactly that: 
supplementary to the discourse on the Face. Levinas' 
discourse nowhere appears as the abstraction of neutral 
theorizing, and although the Other is not the empirical 
other person nor the third party the empirical third 
person, this is what this discourse is 'about' - at 
least on one level. There is definitely a sense in 
which the question as to "what it is all about... " gets 
answered in Levinas. Not that this means the 
literal 
end to philosophy, the question having 
been thus 
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answered. On the contrary it indicates a new way of 
thinking in which nothing would remain as it was. 
Once again we return to this idea that 'after' the 
break with metaphysics, nothing will remain the same. 
We reflected on the all-encompassing 'potential' of 
Derrida's Deconstruction in the same terms earlier (in 
Ch. 1) and related it to the all-encompassing parameters 
of Hegel' s system, in view of Derrida's own sense of 
the transgression (Ch. 3 f. n. 1> . The entire question of 
the end of philosophy, its transformation, overcoming, 
and the beyond is structured around the sense and 
difference of belonging to and transcendence of the 
tradition. We have used Derrida's thinking in this 
thesis as a means of gathering the thinking for which 
the holding together of the tradition, as a feature of 
transcending it, takes on, what could be described as, 
an 'active' role. This conserving of the tradition is 
seen partly as what prevents, or preserves, 
transgressive thinking from becoming neutral in the 
sense of slipping into meaninglessness. It is also 
understood to be a moment of the necessity by which 
metaphysics occurs as a going beyond itself; as a going 
beyond Being. Levinas' thinking which claims to be 
thinking from beyond Being, would be, if the claim is 
authentic, such that these other transgressive 
discourses we have referred to, could be inscribed 
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within its own 'dialectic'. Unlike these other 
transgressive discourses, Levinas' understanding of the 
danger of thinking becoming neutral is not in terms of 
its becoming non-sense, but rather in terms of its 
failing to address the Other other than in precisely 
such terms of sense and nonsense, as if the difference 
between these two, this metaphysics of intelligibility, 
was all of thought. He believes that in such a 
metaphysics the Other is reduced to the other within 
the same. We have seen how this totalisation of the 
Other relates to the ethical in Levinas, and is the 
situation against which he presents the ethical 
relation in his writings. 
This does not imply that his thinking is not a 
contribution to the theoretical considerations which we 
discussed in Chapter 1, in the sections on Derrida's 
thinking of the Inside/Outside and in Chapter 3, on 
Levinas' thinking of the trace. How these are related 
to one another in Levinas' work should in any case be 
quite clear now. 
When Derrida says that perhaps what Levinas' thinking 
does is reveal metaphysics to itself as empiricism, 
there is in fact something of interest in this thought, 
despite our rejection of what is understood to follow 
from it (expressed at the end of Ch. 4). This revelation 
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calls metaphysics to rethink empiricism as such and 
therefore all that has always been thought by means of 
empiricism. Perhaps this is the way to approach the 
somewhat confusing and sometimes seemingly 
contradictory ambivalence to the thinking of the Other 
qua other person in Levinas. Perhaps we have never 
known what/who the other person is? The suggestion is 
reminiscent of the story of Heraclitus warming his 
hands at the fire and telling the others that "there 
3ä 
are Gods here too'; And surely the story can be 
similarly related to Heidegger's sense of astonishment 
at the Being of beings; that is, an astonishment 
always in view of beings and yet also of something 
other. And is it not the case that what we called the 
de-empiricisation of thinking, implied in the remarks 
on the withdrawal of metaphor, is similarly an attempt 
,; 
to think what we know from experience in the ordinary 
metaphysical sense, otherwise? This sweeping 
simplification implies something that Derrida might be 
happy to agree with, namely, that the overcoming of 
metaphysics can only be in the form of it thinking 
itself otherwise. And the difference between this 
otherwise and repetition would be the entire content of 
some sort of strategic quasi-metaphysical thinking, the 
kind of which Derrida is a chief proponent and which we 
looked at in Chapter 1. 
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" Shouldn't we ask. if language is not of itself unbound and 
thus open to the wholly other; to its own beyond.... such 
that it is less a matter of exceeding that language than of 
treating otherwise its own possibilities? " (ECM 27) 
r, 
Levinas' thinking understands this otherwise 
differently. His work argues that the otherwise than 
being is not the thought of Being formulated otherwise, 
but refers to a relation to the Other inconceivable 
within the thought of Being and therefore takes us 
beyond Being. From the outset, we have shown, he 
understands that the presentation of this account, 
which is a "response", involves showing the manner in 
which ontological metaphysics is founded, renewed and 
Justified by the 'ethical'. This is done from within 
and against that tradition, which, in its most general 
form, Levinas describes as a destruction of 
transcendence. 
There are many themes running throughout Levinas work 
which we have not dealt with in this thesis, but which 
nontheless together with the ones we have addressed, 
work together, often unsystematically, to represent the 
transcendence which underwrites the metaphysical text 
and in doing so marks the text with a trace. There are 
certainly many routes by which one can approach 
Levinas' thought. We have presented this reading of 
Levinas on the basis of the work of our first chapter 
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and located it within the discourse on the end of 
philosophy. We have not attempted to identify a 
'method' at work in Levinas' work taken as whole. That 
we have drawn attention to what we have described as a 
kind of supplementary theorizing alongside the 
phenomenological studies and various quasi- 
phenomenological analyses reflects the approach we have 
taken in general and a certain critical apparatus that 
could not be left behind like a dirty pair of shoes at 
the door. We are not claiming that the end of 
philosophy context is the only possible context in 
which to read Levinas claims for the ethical. An 
internal critique would be a least one other that must 
be explored. 
Ontological metaphysics, including the metaphysics of 
the reversal in Heidegger for Levinas, seeks and 
desires the Saying to be the "pure communication of the 
Said. " (OTB 134/171) At times this is the charge with 
which Derrida challenges Levinas' thinking: that 
thinking the Saying as a pure Said is the (non-) 
alternative to passing through the ontological 
difference. In this dialogue, with Derrida as the 
interlocutor, it must be said, this seems to be 
something all would agree on, namely, that the notion 
of a pure Said, or inversely, a pure Saying 
in the 
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Said, is metaphysical idealism: something to which all 
are unequivocally and unambiguously opposed. 
In the course of this thesis we have seen, following 
Heidegger and Derrida, how a reflection on the nature 
of language comes to occupy thought concerned with the 
end of pbilosopby. Of all beings, why does language 
offer the significant resistance to its ontic 
determination? This question is answered in Heidegger, 
differently in different periods of his thought, but 
from the outset always in terms of the special 
reflexivity proper to questioning. We agree with 
Derrida when he says that Levinas' philosophy, too, is 
centrally concerned with 
... questions of language: questions of language and 
the 
question of language... there is no element of Levinas' 
thought which is not, in and of itself, engaged by such 
questions... " (VX 109) 
However, Levinas does not say that the question of 
language imposes itself on thinking at the end of 
philosophy, but that "ethical language" imposes itself 
on the thought of the Other in philosophy. Language is, 
for Levinas, the event of the ethical. It is, 
emphatically, not an ethical phenomenon, and the claims 
demonstrating, linking and drawing on the ethical in 
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life and philosophy are not phenomenological as such. 
This should in any case be clear from the discussion 
above. Levinas' discourse on ethics at no point 
digresses into a polemic about categorizing and 
decategorizing discourse. In our reading of Levinas we 
have seen that language, the logos, requires its being 
(to be) interrupted and that in the same moment that 
this happens, the other is stated: 
"... the hitherside of the ego lends itself to our speaking 
only by referring to being, from which it withdraws and 
which it undoes. The said of language always says being. But 
in the moment of an enigma language also breaks with its own 
conditions, as in a skeptical saying, and says a 
signification before the event, a before-being. " 
(OTB 196f. n. 20) 
But that language breaks with its own conditions, is 
something language will never be made to admit. In the 
absence of this confession what can we do but take the 
word of the Other? 
,? 
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(discussed in Ch. 3). Incidentally, Derrida also refers 
to the Enneads in relation to the "transgression" of 
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metaphysics in Speech and Phenomena trans. Allison, 
Evanston, Northwestern, 1973. p. 127 fn. 8 It is 
important to remember that these moments are themselves 
"historical" and are not decisive in the same sense as 
are the epochs of Being for Heidegger. As we shall see 
below, it is the Instant of the interruption of the 
same which is of a decisive nature for Levinas. 
6. The totality appears to complete itself in the time 
of duration, the time in which beings endure, but this 
is, Levinas seeks to show, 'merely' apparent. 
?. C. f. for example OTB 15/18-19 
B. The theme of the "interruption" of totality and 
metaphysics is central to the reading of Levinas' 
thought of metaphysics/other relation. We deal with 
this directly in Ch. s 3-5 
9. C. f. also the section "Things, Giving and 
Objectivity" in Ch. 4 
10. Levinas expresses this antecedence by means of the 
term anterior posteriori. See above chi f. n. 53a. 
11. This notion of a reduction "in reverse" is that by 
which we characterize the movement of transcendence in 
Levinas and which we shall repeatedly return to. 
12. The use of the term surprise as it appears in OTB 
is discussed in Ch. 5. 
13. On the empirical and the metaphorical, see Ch. s4 
and 5. 
322 
14. Heidegger, Letter on Hu Ani sm, in Basic Writings, 
Ed. D. F. Krell, Harper and Row, New York, 1977. 
4 
15. Op cit p. 195 
16. That Heidegger says " Time passes. And it passes so 
that it passes away" would be further evidence for 
Levinas to relegate his thinking of time to the time of 
"economy". C. f. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, 
trans. Wieck/Gray, New York, Harper Row, 1968, p. 96. 
Was Heisst Denken, Tubingen, 1954, p. 39. 
17. C. f. also further references to the "caress" in 
Ch. 4 
18. This formula used in OTB brings together many 
themes of Levinas. Its citation here is referred to the 
subject's identification vis a vis the Other. In OTB it 
refers also to the sense in which the text for the 
'reader' is punctured and punctuated by the signifying 
of the Other, non-inscribable within the text, but 
always implied in the text's very having been handed 
over; its having been given (c. f. Ch. 4) C. f. also 
Derrida's "En ce moment meine dans cette Ouvrage me 
voici", in Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas, Ed. Fracois 
Laruelle, Paris, Editions Jean-Michel, 1980, p. 21-60. 
He discusses there, amongst other things, the me voici 
and the notion of interruption in Levinas. 
19. C. f. OTB 112/143 and Liewelyn Beyond Metaphysics, 
Humanities, New Jersey, 1983, Ch. 10. 
20. In VM, op cit, p. 312 fn. 7, Derrida says: "In TI the 
use of metaphor, remaining admirable and most often - 
if not always - beyond rhetorical abuse, shelters 
within its pathos the most decisive movements of its 
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discourse. " Later in this thesis we ask if these 
"metaphors" and this "pathos" play the role equivalent 
to the one assigned to them in metaphysics or whether 
Levinas gives us to think what they speak of otherwise 
than can be conceived under their description as 
'metaphors' and 'pathos' as such. 
21. When the ' I' as the pure accusative me voici faces 
the Other and asks the question "who are you? "; asks as 
to what Levinas calls the gu snity of the Other, the 
response is not a symmetrical "me voici aussi", but 
"you shall not commit murder". We can see here why the 
asymmetry of the ethical relation is the point at which 
Levinas distinguishes his thinking from that of the I- 
Thou of Buber. (C. f. Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. 
Kaufmann, T. T Clark, Edinburgh, 1970. 
22. The French words means both 'meaning' and 
'directi on'. We shall see how both of these meanings 
are in play in Levinas' use of the term, when for 
example we think of the meaning of "orientation" or the 
meaning of the reduction of the Saying to the Said and 
vice ver sa (c. f. especially Ch. 5). 
23. Perhaps Sartre caught a glimpse of this when he said 
that the length of a life was irrelevant to its 
mean sngfulness? 
24. C. f. Bernasconi, "Levinas on Time and the Instant", 
in Time and Metaphysics Ed. Wood and Bernasconi, 
Parousia Press, Warwick, 1982. 
25. Below we ask if this very gesture itself could 
be 
described as a feature of Levinasian ethical 
neutrality. 
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26. C. f. Ch. 3 on Levinas critique of maieutics. 
Chapter 3 
1. In Ch. 1 we hinted that the possible neutrality of 
deconstruction might consist in its "leaving everything 
the same", now it may appear that we are suggesting the 
opposite. These 'opposites' are in a sense two sides of 
the same coin. The question is whether they are 
opposites or the same under two different descriptions. 
We must bear in mind that "the transgression of 
discourse must, in some fashion, and like every 
transgression, conserve or confirm what it exceeds". 
("From Restricted to General Economy" in Writing and 
Difference, op cit, p. 274) Obviously this "in some 
fashion" will determine what exceeding metaphysics 
might be understood to mean. 
2. and 3. deleted 4. Op cit. 
5. Bernasconi, "The Trace of Levinas in Derrida", in 
Derrida and Differance, Parousia Press, Univ. of 
Warwick, 1985, p. 28. 
6. Op cit 
7. C. f Derr-ida, Speech and Phenomena, op cit, p. 131. 
8. Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment" in Early Greek 
Thinking, trans. D. F. Krell, Harper Row, New York, 1975. 
9. Derrida, of Grarnrnatology, op cit, p. 12. 
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10. This "productive" begs the question about the 'aim' 
of deconstruction. Used here it refers to the extent to 
which a deconstructive reading is capable of exposing 
metaphysical presuppositions, for example, or defering 
the text's recapture by metaphysics. 
11. Levinas, "La trace de lautre". Published in 
Tijdschrift voor Filosophie 25 (Sept. 1963), pp. 605- 
623. Reprinted in En D6couvrant L'Existence, op cit, 
pp. 187-202. Translated as "On the Trail of the Other" 
by D. J. Hoy (TO) in Philosophy Today Vol. 10, No. 1,1966 
pp. 34-36. Also available translated by A. Lingis as "The 
Trace of the Other" in Deconstruction in Context: 
Literature and Philosophy, ed. M. Taylor, Chicago Univ. 
Press, Chicago, 1987, pp. 345-359. This second 
translation came to my attention to late to be used 
here. Note that in the Hoy translation the English word 
'countenance' translates the French word visage. 
12. Levinas, "La signification et le sens", first 
published in Revue de metaphysique et de morale No. 2, 
1964, reprinted in Humanisme de l' autre homme, 
Monpellier, Fata Morgana, 1972. Trans. A. Lingis 
"Meaning and Sense" in Collected Philosophical Papers, 
op cit. 
13. Levinas, "Le temps et l' autre" , first published in 
Le choix, le monde. l'existence, Paris, Arthaud, 1947, 
pp. 125-196. The article is reprinted as&book of the 
same title by Fata Morgana, Paris, 1983. All page 
references are to this edition. All translations here 
are from R. A. Cohen Time and the Other (TA), Duquesne 
U. P., Pitts., forthcoming (1987). 
14. Levinas, TA, op cit, p. 77 15. C. f. EE 
101/173-4 
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16. Levinas, TO, op cit, p. 34 
17. C. f. for example Levinas' polemicising against 
Heidegger' ecstatic Dasein at TI 94f/67f 
18. TO, op cit, p. 37 19. ibid 
20. ibid p. 39 21. ibid 
22. ibid p. 40 23. ibid 
24. For Derrida's remarks on Levinas' claims for the 
asymmetry of the relation to the other, see VM p. 128. 
C. f. also TI 35 "The metaphysician and the other do not 
constitute a simple correlation, which would be 
reversible. " It seems extraordinary that Derrida should 
suggest that there is no sense in which I am the 
Other's Other in Levinas. The entire thinking of the 
relation between the face to face and the third party 
stays with the paradox of this irreversible asymmetry 
and seeks to articulate it in terms of the plurality of 
Others, but without reducing the relation to one of 
reciprocity. This is Levinas' problem and we look at it 
closely in Ch. 4. 
25. TO, op cit, p. 43 
26. Perhaps this is what Derrida is referring to when 
he suggests the most decisive movements in Levinas' 
discourse are related to pathos, c. f. WD p. 312 fn. 7. 
27. TO, op cit, p. 45 
28. Derrida, positions, op cit, p. 58 
29. 'Positions, p. 60 
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30. TO, op cit p. 44. The notion of illeity is held to 
transcend the distinction between my relation to the 
other person who enters upon the scene qua third party. 
My relation to the third party is through my objective 
knowledge of him. The relation to the third is the 
archetypal, or even empirical, encounter with the other 
person, but it is held to already refer us to the face 
to face. 
31. TO p. 44 32. TO p. 44/5 33. TO p. 45 
34. C. f. final section Ch. 4 
35. C. f. Bernasconi, "The Trace of Levinas in Derrida", 
op cit p. 28 and his f. n. 16 p. 43 . Later, in OTB, 
Levinas adopts the formulation we cited in Ch. 2 p., "a 
past which was never present", c. f. OTB 24/31. 
36. TO, op cit, p. 46 
37. C. f. Positions, p. 104 f. n. 31 
r, 
38. In OTB Levinas affirms this difference with Hegel 
when he says "Arising at the apex of essence, goodness 
is other than being. It no longer keeps accounts; it is 
not like negativity, which conserves what it negates in 
history" OTB 18/22. 
39. C. f. , and with further reference 
to Hegel, OTB 194 
f. n. 3 "Anarchy cannot be sovereign like anarcb6. Also, 
on the "anarchy of God in discourse" OTB 128/165 and 
OTB 151/192-3. In relation to time and presence see OTB 
51/66: "This anarchy, this refusal to be assembled into 
representation" - to mention but a few references. 
40. C. f. Of Gramme a ogy, op cit, p. 70/1 
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41. C. f. Bernasconi, op cit. 
42. C. f. TI 52/23 
43. Levinas, "Antre Deux Mondes" (A spiritual biography 
of F. Rosenzweig) in La conscience Juive - donne et 
debats, ed. E. A. Levy-Valensi and J. Halperin, P. U. F. , 
Paris 1963, p. 121-137. An extract from this is printed 
as "Franz Rosenzweig", trans. R. A. Cohen in Midstream. 
Vol 29, No. 9, Nov., 1983, pp. 33-40. 
44. Derrida's thinking, too, represents a move against 
the irremiscible Hegel, but we shall not raise the 
question of Derrida's relation to dialectics here. 
45. C. f. Bernasconi, " Derrida on Levinas: The Question 
of the Closure of Metaphysics", in R. A. Cohen (ed), Fac 
to Face with Levinas, SUNY Press, New York, 1986. 
Chapter 4 
F, 
1. It is this understanding of the necessity of the 
conceptual moment in terms of being at the same time, 
that Levinas' thinking takes issue with. C. f. below 
and next chapter. 
2. C. f. above C. h. 2 p. 89 
3. For a discussion of the "speculative" nature of 
Levinas' " thinking on the face, see R. Bernascon 
i' s 
"Levinas Face to Face - with Hegel", J. B. S. P. , Vol 13 
No. 3, Oct. 1982, p. 267-276. 
4. For Derrida's remarks on the use of the spatial 
metaphor of 'height' here c. f. VM 93. 
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5. On this model the Hegelian subject would never 
attain the Infinite as absolute transcendence (Autrui) 
but only the infinite other (Autre) unfolded through 
moments of negation as historical absolute 
subjectivity. In other words, Hegelian desire is 
equivalent to need in Levinas' account. c. f Bernasconi 
op cit. 
6. Levinas, "Transcendance et hauteur", op cit, p. 6 
7. In VM (p. 123-126) Derrida defends Husserl against 
Levinas with regard to the respect of the true meaning 
of alterity vis a vis the Other. At the same time he 
argues that Levinas' notion of the asymmetry of the I 
- Other conj unsure must rest on a symmetry between 
subjects, because the thinking of symmetry and 
asymmetry are not inseperable in a way Derrida 
understands Levinas to require them to be. As in other 
places Derrida's point is that Levinas denies, or, 
"deprives himself of the very possibility of his own 
language" (V1M ibid). Whereas Husserl "gives himself the 
right to speak of the infinitely other as such, 
accounting for the origin and legitimacy of his 
language"(ibid). Levinas does not in fact deny the 
symmetry of relations in general between others, and 
this goes too for relations between "existents". It is 
within the gaze of the third party that the two in the 
face to face appear as equals, and this could be called 
an empirical symmetry, but the thought of the beyond 
being in Levinas also calls for a radical rethinking 
of the empirical, as we shall consider in the final 
section of this chapter, one which goes beyond the mere 
exposure of empiricism to itself as (ontological) 
metaphysics. When Derrida says: "Dissymmetry itself 
would be impossible without symmetry (and). this 
dissymetry is an economy in a new sense; a sense which 
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would probably be intolerable to Levinas", we would 
add that this economy is never denied by Levinas. On 
the contrary, he would argue that it occurs with a 
necessity, but at the same time emphasise that the very 
possibility that this economy (of being) can think 
itself as such requires the beyond being; the thought 
of the Infinite within the finite. 
8. We shall return to this idea in Ch. 5, below. 
9. - C. f. TI 65/36 and above Ch. 3f. n. 39 
10. C. f. Ch. 2 p. 99 ff. 
11. All along we are seeking an answer to the question 
as to whether a thinking of the breached-totality would 
be equivalent to the thought of closure as it is 
expressed in Derrida. 
12. c. f. OTB 143/183 "Saying is inseparable from 
giving", and, TI 173/148 "The relationship with the 
Other, transcendence, consists in speaking the world to 
the Other. " 
13. That the two different images of the face to face 
can be shown to bear a relation to each other is not 
the most important thing here. The attempt to 
assimilate them through their reference to things and 
objectivity in the notion of giving is, however, 
useful in relation to the general attempt to 
demonstrate the sense in which the relation to the 
beyond being goes through the conceptual moment in 
Levinas. 
14. A thing, it might be expected would pass through 
the face to face like a brick through a window. One is 
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reminded of how in Sartre's Psychology of the 
Imagination, in presenting an account of the mental 
image, he says that the image could not be immanent to 
consciousness, and if it were then the transparency of 
consciousness to itself would be shattered. 
15. C. f. EE 34/48-50 and TI 133/106. 
16. That it is only part of it is because Levinas' 
account of finitude cannot accurately be assessed in 
relation to his reading of Heidegger because of the 
problems mentioned earlier with regard to this polemic. 
As we do not think that "correcting" Levinas' reading 
of Heidegger on various points, points on which there 
is a' common wisdom' , is a very fruitful way of reading 
Levinas, we shall not proceed with such criticism at 
here. 
17. C. f. my paper "Responding to Levinas" in The. 
Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, 
Bernasconi and Wood (eds. ), R. K. P., 1988 (forthcoming). 
18. This is what Derrida is referring to when he says, 
"One already forsees the unease to which a thought rejecting 
the excellence of theoretical rationality will have to 
resign itself later, especially in that it never ceases to 
appeal to the most uprooted rationalism and universalism 
against the violences of mysticism and history, against the 
ravishing of enthusiasm and ecstasy... The complicity of 
theoretical objectivity and mystical communion will be 
Levinas' true target. The premetaphysical unity of one and 
the same violence. An alternation which always modifies the 
same confinement of the other. " (VM 87) 
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19. C. f. for example, OTB 5/5-6. Also, on 
"... disinterestedness imposed with a good violence", 
OTB 43/56 
!r 
20. c. f. Difficile Libertb: Essaas Sur le 
Judaisme (1963) in Quatre Lectures Talmudi g es Albin 
Michel, Paris, 1968, p. 36. 
21. For further remarks on the feminine in Levinas c. f. 
TA pp. 77-82, and the following essays "Le Judaisme et 
le Feminin" in Difficile libert6, op cit, and "Judaism 
and the feminine element", trans. E. Wyschogrod, in 
Judaism, Vol. XVI II, 1969, pp. 30-38. For a discussion 
see Derrida's essay ECM, op cit. Also TA, pp. 77-82, and 
T. Chanter' s "The Alterity and Immodesty of Time: Death 
as Future and Eros as Feminine in Levinas" in 
A. Benj amin and D. Wood (eds. ) Writing the Future, 
Warwick Studies in Philosophy, R. K. P., London, 
(forthcoming) . 
22. This phrase used by Levinas in the context of the 
command "thou shalt not commit murder" might also be 
appropriate here. The connection between the two is 
that they both refer to a point at which the totality 
is in danger of closing upon itself; completing itself. 
In the context of Eros we shall see this danger takes 
the form of thought stopping short of the ethical 
relation and falsely taking Eros, an ecstatic relation 
in which separation is lacking, to be the ultimate 
relation. This would also come under the rubric of 
'mystical " communion' , one of the 
two violences which 
Derrida correctly describes as Levinas' main targets, 
the other being the excellence of theoretical 
rationality. (c. f. fn. 17) 
I 
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23. "Voluptuosity profanes 
260/238) 
it does not see" (TI 
24. Fecundity, we might add here, can also be said to be 
a form of third party in so far as it turns into 
fraternity. What is more important than the names 
Levinas gives to these relations is the movement they 
articulate: in this case it is the 'turning into', or 
'reverting' that must be understood as this is central 
to the claim of Levinas' entire thesis, as we shall 
see below and in Ch. 5. 
25. In TI it 
filiality and 
related back 
encompasses tb 
which "opens 
signifyingness 
is because Eros ultimately turns into 
fraternity that it can ultimately be 
to the face to face relation which 
.e 
third party, in its becoming dialogue 
the erotic upon a social life, -all 
and decency" (TI 280/257). 
26. N. B. the plurality of subjects here is maintained. 
In Levinas this is the role of the body: it maintains 
position, it is the site of identification, even in 
sleep and unconsciousness. 
27. C. f. EE 91 / 155-7 . Cited above Ch. 2 p. 107 
28. In EE 44-5/68 Levinas talks of the "sincerity of 
life" when polemicizing against Heidegger's for-the- 
sake-of-which. In this sense the sincerity of the 
caress of the consoler is not for the sake of anything, 
but is an- end in itself, is the unity of life and its 
meaning, which, qua theory, is always late in relation 
to life itself. 
29. An idea expressed by Luce Irigaray in "Fecondite 
de 
la Caresse: Lecture de Levinas, Totalite et Infini 
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section IVB ' Phenomenol ogi e de L' Eros' ", in Ethi clue de 
la Difference Sexuelle, Editions Minuit, Paris, 1984, 
pp. 173-199. 
30. In the terminology of OTB we would refer to 
proximity here. We are not, in saying this, simply 
equating the face to face and proximity, as will become 
clear below. 
31. The relationship with the third party is an incessant 
correction of the asymetry of proximity in which the face is 
looked at. There is weighing, thought, objectification, and 
thus a decree in which my anarchic relationship with illeity 
is betrayed but in which it is conveyed before us. There is 
betrayal of my anarchic relation with illeity, but also a 
new relationship with it.. " (OTB 158/201). 
32. He might also say the trace of i 11 ei t, y. In Ch. 3 we 
came across this term as it is used in the essay The 
Trace of the Other. The term is intended to capture the 
sense in which the Other is Another and not an 
impersonal One. c. f. OTB 12/13 
33. This is because the reflection by which the third 
party withdraws from the face to face is a 'telling' 
the total to someone. c. f. TI 295/271-2. 
34. Deleted 
35. "As He and the third person (signifying) is somehow 
outside of the distinction between being and entities. " 
Levinas, "Meaning and Sense" , in Collected 
Philosophical Papers, op cit. p. 106. Perhaps we 
should be wary of our own description of the third 
party in Levinas as "problematic". The compounding of 
references to the flowing relation between me, the 
third, the Other and illeity, indicates a deliberate 
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and utter ambivalence which forestalls any certainty 
with regard to our relation to the Other. 
36. C. f. OTB 119/152-3 37. C. f. Ch. 5 p. 278 
38. We have described the sense in which this "certain 
violence" is not rejected as such by Levinas. If you 
like, it is the violent economy of being that is 
interrupted by the face to face. In saying this it is 
by no means obvious that Levinas' claims for the 
priority of ethics over ontology are 'utopian', which 
is a mistake that can only be made by thinking that the 
ethical relation could be maintained without this, 
economic violence. We are arguing throughout to the 
contrary. 
39. Seen from the ' other side' , what is in fact 
'irreversible' for Levinas is the "absolute past" of 
the Other "having passed by" (le d6ja depass6) and 
which is marked by the trace. C. f. "Meaning and Sense", 
op cit, p. 106. Ontological metaphysics only knows the 
fact of the Other's having passed by, whereas thinking 
from within the trace "... is the passage (la passe) 
itself toward a past which is further removed than any 
past from any future, a passage which is still taking 
place in my time", TO op cit, p. 46. In Ch. 5 we shall 
see the sense in which this passage, in OTB, is 
expressly related to the "unsaying of the said". 
Chapter 5. 
1. C. f. TI 35/5-6 
2. 
54, 
Levinas "Tout Autrement", 
pp. 33-37,1973. Reprinted 
t 'arc; Jacques Derrida, 
in Noms Pronre, Fata 
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Morgana, Montpellier, 1976. Trans. S. Critchley, to be 
published in R. Bernasconi (ed. ) Re-reading_ evinas, 
forthcoming. 
3. ibid 
4. The two terms Saying (dire) and Said (dit) appear 
when used or referred to here with capital letters. 
5. C. f. OTB 25/31 "The other to whom the petition of 
the question is addressed does not belong to the 
intelligible field to be explored. " 
6. Heidegger thinks this in terms of the Lichtung. 
7. C. f. Heidegger' s On Time and Being, trans. 
J. Stambaugh , Harper Row, 1972, p. 66. 
8. C. f. Ch. 2 9. C. f. Ch. 4 
10. C. f. further discussion below. 
11. C. f. OTB 59/75-6 12. E. g. c. f. OTB 44/56-7 
13. OTB p. xlii 
14. The double meaning of the French word lens, which, 
we noted above means both 'meaning' and ' direction' , 
is often in play in Levinas and the significance of 
this could not be clearer then in his thinking of the 
reduction. 
15. C. f. Ch. 4 p. 214 above. 
16. The "written" word is here being presented as a 
paradigm of the Said and the "spoken" word of the 
3 37 
Saying. This is a schematic simplification at this 
point. Of course the spoken is also a Said. It should 
not be supposed that that this implies a 'rejection' of 
the written in this relegation of it to a certain 
secondarity. We do not intend to pursue this here as 
our way of access to what is being said here takes a 
different route. 
17. In "God and Philosophy" (Translated by R. A. Cohen in 
Philosophy Today, Vol. 22,1978, pp. 127-145, p. 132 
[Revised version in Collected Philosophical Papers, op 
cit. ]) Levinas relates this to Descartes, saying, 
"Descartes... has sketched the extraordinary course of a 
thought that proceeds on to the break-up of the I 
tbi nk. 
18. En ce moment meme dans ce ouvrage me voici, op cit. 
Hereafter ECM, all translations of which here are my 
own. 
19. The metaphor of "fabric" and the variations on 
it - of sewing and resewing, tying, retying, cutting 
the knot etc., is in fact shared by Levinas and 
Derrida. In fact its being taken up in OTB is a sign of 
his entering into a dialogue with Derrida. When 
Derrida, in ECM, says that the metaphors of seam and 
tear "obsess" the text this should perhaps be borne in 
mind. 
20. "La trace dolt donc sty' 'presenter' sans presenter 
autrement.. " 
21. C. f. ECM 39f . According to 
the metaphor used here, 
Derrida does not accept the idea that the knots retying 
the threads of interrupted metaphysics can be cut. 
For 
Levinas this cut is the decisive moment 'producing' 
338 
diachrony and accounts for the non-correlation of the 
Saying and the Said. 
22. For an interesting discussion of "performative 
reflexivity" in Derrida, Heidegger, Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard, see D. Wood's "Philosophy as Performance", 
(unpub. ) 
23. Derrida, "The Retral t of Metaphor", in Enclitic. 
vol. 2 Fall 1978. Hereafter RoM. 
24. This question as it appears here in the Derridia& 
text is already an allusion to a text of Heidegger' s: 
"How does it stand today with Being? ", as D. Wood points 
out in "Philosophy as Performance" op cit. 
25. ". .. taking a position on metaphor" here means 
holding any theory which thinks the general concept of 
metaphor is to be thought in relation to the notion of 
proper meaning. Although Derrida at no point gives such 
a reductionistic reading of Levinas' text, this is a 
kind of spear with which he keeps prodding it. On the 
one hand it is one reading amongst many, on the other 
it is a reproach for not posing the question of closure 
"formally and thematically". 
26. C. f. RoM, op cit, p. 16 
27. On the face of it and because RoM is part of an 
exchange with Paul Ricoeur, this charge is primarily 
aimed. at him, but the target is, as ever, the 
metaphysical conception of metaphysics in general. C. f 
also Derrida, "White Mythology" in A. Bass (ed. ) 
Margins of Philosophy, op cit. And Ricoeur, P. The Rule 
of Metaphor, Univ. Toronto Press, 1977, esp. Section 8, 
pp. 259-303. 
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28. This idea of a second-order withdrawal is 
reminiscent of the relation between non-thetic and 
reflective consciousness in Sartre: the first founds 
the second; thought grasps itself, but only 
'afterwards'. The difference is, of course, that in 
Sartre consciousness does this on the basis of a 
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